

Choice for Peace in Asia in the 1970's:  
Coexistence ~~or~~ Competition with the "Shadow of China"  
*and*

by Minco Nakajima

## Introduction

The year 1969 is quite symbolic as the prelude to the 1970's, when a new international order based on new structural changes in post-war world politics is going to come about. Without being overly concerned with the numerical distinction between the decades, we might well say that the events of 1969 indicate that this year already belongs to the 1970's.

As is well known, the cold war tensions of the bi-polarized post-war world, maintained by the Soviet-American nuclear power balance, began a rapid turn toward detente with the 1962 Cuban crisis. This change was brought about by the inherent contradictions in the balance system, and there emerged an era of multi-polarization in world politics.

The advent of a Soviet-U.S. detente and the multi-polarization is indicated by the worsening dollar crisis in the United States, the tragic death of President Kennedy and the pathology of that American society which produced such a tragedy, the Sino-Soviet rupture, the downfall of Khrushchev, Chinese nuclear armament, and disagreement between the "have" and the "have not" nations over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The challenging positions of nuclear-armed China and de Gaulle's nationalist France added to this trend toward multi-polarization.

Particularly in Asia, the increasing influence of China aggravated those Sino-U.S. tensions which had originated in the Korean War. The Vietnam War was staged against this background. The U.S. intervention in Vietnam gives one the impression that the United States, despite the trend to multi-polarization, has still kept its old concepts of the cold-war world. The U.S. view of the world, even with the American crusaders' sense of mission, seems to have been totally out of line with the basic trends of world politics.

Many important international events have occurred from the spring of 1968 through the end of July, 1969. These include the U.S. halt in bombings against North Vietnam, progress in the peace negotiations on Vietnam, the start of a U.S.

military withdrawal from Vietnam, Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and its reactions, a series of Sino-Soviet border clashes, the aftermath of the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, the Ninth Chinese Communist Party ~~Convention~~ <sup>Congress</sup>, and the abdication of General de Gaulle. These events of serious global implications, together with the mounting crisis in the international monetary system and social revolutions in the advanced countries, show clearly that the world is today moving into a new age, one different from the age of pluralism that prevailed in the 1960's. While we are not yet able to grasp what this new age will bring, we are at least sure that we are facing a very important turning point in the history of the world. What kind of peace for Asia is there to choose in the already-begun 1970's? In this paper, I would like to discuss the problem of confronting China as one of the keys to the choice of peace in Asia.

#### I. The U.S. "Withdrawal" and The New Asia

The March 31, 1968 statement of President Johnson can be compared, in a sense, to the January 1950 Statement of No-Intervention-in-Chinese-Affairs made by President Truman on the basis of the 1949 *China White Papers: United States Relations with China*. The Johnson statement was apparently an expression of serious policy breakdown. Moreover, it announced the end of an era. While this statement also included the bitter admission that the U.S., bogged in the Vietnamese quagmire, had failed to achieve its goal by sheer force, it is still more significant in confirming that the nuclear potential, which may be useful to the balance of power among big countries, is entirely useless against the bare-handed nationalistic revolutions of Asian people.

Thus the United States is now learning a multitude of lessons through its experience in the Vietnam War. These lessons are concisely summarized by Arthur Schlesinger. (1) Not all world events are equally important to the United States, (2) The United States cannot do everything in the world, (3) The United States

cannot be the permanent and sole guarantor of security in this convulsed world, (4) Military force is not necessarily an effective indicator of a nation's power, and (5) The United States may, in the future, be able to wield a more effective influence by practical, non-military acts.

The U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam is undeniably under way. The Johnson statement was made at the "point of no return" for the United States, as well as for war-fatigued North Vietnam and the Southern National Liberation Front. In light of this, we can perhaps say that the prospects for peace in Vietnam are bright on every count.

Today, the Vietnam policy of the Nixon Administration seems to be a stepped-up United States "retreat" from Vietnam as promised by President Johnson. The June 25 Guam Statement by President Nixon, who went on his Asian tour basking in the glory of the Apollo moon landing, indicated a change being worked out in U.S. Asian policy. In his statement, President Nixon declared that, after Vietnam, the United States would avoid direct military intervention in Asia and that conflicts in Asia should be solved by the Asians themselves. This Nixon statement, as was observed by Senator Mansfield, is of such importance that it should be called "the Guam Doctrine".

One of the important merits of such a policy change for the United States today is that such a change points to a real recognition of the need to improve Sino-U.S. relations and the dialogue between the two countries. In this connection, it is significant that the United States Government, on July 21, immediately before Mr. Nixon's departure for his Asian tour, relaxed its restrictions on U.S. citizens' entry into China and purchases of Chinese-made products.

Now, in Asia, with the "retreat" of the United States, a new situation is coming into being. For the U.S. to withdraw completely from Asia is impossible and would be even meaningless at this time; yet, recollecting the days of Sino-U.S. confrontation since the Korean War, Americans may some day realize that the U.S. was possessed

with the evil myth of Chinese containment.

The United States is thus going to make major revisions in its policy of over-commitment in Asia. In the same way, Britain is ready to retreat "west of the Suez" after 1971. Such retreats by the major powers will create a vast power vacuum in Asia. Several years ago such a vacuum might have been filled on the one hand, by the solidarity of the newly-emerged Asian countries and an alignment among the Non-alliance nations based on that solidarity and, on the other hand, by such regional military alliances as CENTO and SEATO. Today, however, all of these conceivable replacements for the presence of the major powers are no longer substantial or workable.

In view of such a situation, the Soviet Union is most aggressive to come into the Asian power vacuum, and Soviet diplomacy has been quite active and greedy. Soviet Defense Minister Grechko visited India and Pakistan last March; Premier Kosygin called on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in May; and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev suggested an Asian collective security system at the International Congress of Communist Parties in June. This proposed collective security system, though still highly ambiguous and too expressly directed against China, fully describes the direction of Soviet intentions regarding Asia in the post-Vietnam era.

China meanwhile, passing through the Cultural Revolution, reconfirmed the Maoist system at the Ninth Communist Party Convention and is now going to launch new diplomatic moves aimed at post-Vietnam Asia. China is again today paying much attention to the changes in international relations.

It now seems that there will appear in post-Vietnam Asia a tri-polarization with the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Needless to say, it is this which is the foundation of the circumstances surrounding Asia. Within such a system of tri-polarization, however, is it possible to secure peace and stability for Asia?

The first point to be considered here is that the power vacuum in Asia can never be filled except by means that have sound ties to the nationalism of the Asian

people. In other words, the question here is whether or not the world will realize that the potential for social change in Asia based on the Asian nationalistic desires should not be altered by outside pressures.

The second point to be grasped here is that, with the historic event of U.S. withdrawal, Asia is trying to achieve normalcy and each Asian nation is trying to cope with its own inherent problems.

Peace and stability in Asia will reveal the complicated inherent problems of the Asian nations. These problems include racial and ethnic conflicts, poli-economic difficulties, opposition between revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces, and different degrees of development among the countries. Also, new antagonisms and troubles will occur with religious and political problems, conflicts among local communities within a country, language barriers, industrialization and dictatorial political systems, and Chinese immigrants.

America's failure may be traced to its Asian policy's being based upon a simple view of Asia as a victim of Communist aggression, whereas Asian nations actually have various inherent complicated problems. Now Asia is going to face its own problems. This Asian agony is inevitable in the process of its modernization and industrialization which is its historical corollary. For Asia to try to avoid such agony would be to remain forever a "developing" area of the world.

## II. The Post-Vietnam Era and China's Cultural Revolution:

### A New Outlook for Sino-American Relations and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation

In the previous section, I touched upon the U.S. desire to change its Asian policy and at the same time took note of the possibilities of a change in its policies toward China. Nevertheless, I do not think the United States will drastically change its China policy immediately. Consequently, we must always distinguish between this latent desire for change and the political realities so as to be aware of the interrelations

between them.

Needless to say, the basic thinking behind American China policies may be seen in its policy of "containing China," and this basic strategy has been accomplished through multiple use of legal, military, and economic factors.

I would like, now, to discuss each of these three factors. First, let us look at U.S. relations with China from a legal stand-point. This is a question that will never be solved so long as the United States continues to refuse to recognize China, effect the restoration of American-Chinese diplomatic relations, and solve the problem of United Nations representation for China. In this respect, groping for a solution to this problem from a liberal standpoint is seen to have been made, for example by Professor Reischauer and others. But it appears highly unlikely at this moment that the U.S. Government will alter its present policies. For instance, President Nixon declared at his post-inaugural press conference that he would "continue to oppose Chinese participation in the United Nations." Solution of this issue is impossible unless the U.S. takes into consideration the difficult question of Taiwan-U.S. relations, and change in its policy on even this area alone seems unlikely at present.

Secondly, let us consider the U.S. military response to China. In this regard, certainly the "anti-Chinese encirclement net" of U.S. conventional military forces may possibly weaken in the future, depending on changes in post-Vietnam Asia. However, even so, it is inconceivable that there be any withdrawal in the American nuclear strategy. By the same token, the U.S. positions as the "nuclear policeman" or "holder of the nuclear umbrella" will not change. While the Johnson Administration's "Sentinel" program, which called for a thin ABM system to cope with anticipated Chinese ICBM development, has been altered by the Nixon administration to the "Safeguard" project directed at the Soviet Union, and while the administration's bill finally passed by the Senate on August 6 after long debates over the ABM, it is still nevertheless true that American nuclear deployment continues to be directed toward Chinese nuclear weapons. As Chinese nuclear development approaches combat

applicability, this issue will come to assume more serious proportions in the future.

Finally, let us look at Chinese-American economic relations. The dollar crisis has produced in Americans a desire to cut back on foreign aid, such that America is now asking those countries which have heretofore received aid to take over their own defense burdens.

Under such conditions, the political effectiveness of an embargo trade to China is being increasingly questioned in the United States. Compared with the legal and military aspects, the possibility of changes in U.S. China policies on this point seems most likely. Such a change, however, will only take place if the U.S. feels that lifting the embargo against the Chinese economy, which is primarily agricultural and light-industrial, will not threaten the world market.

Viewed in this way, it seems improbable that any drastic changes in U.S. policies toward China will occur in the near future. Such an assumption, of course, does not deny the latent, partly real, American intention to change its policies. In the post-Vietnam era, the United States may move toward a policy of "containment without isolation" so as to maintain its communications with China by bringing China into international society. Yet, in consideration of the presumably growing Chinese nuclear capacity, the U.S. will continue to contain the Chinese "threat" militarily. There is even the possibility that the United States may intentionally choose a neo-isolationistic course. Today, even many American liberals are criticizing large-scale American "pull back" from Asia as a move toward neo-isolationism. Such criticism, however, may be interpreted as the expression of a sense of crisis on the part of those seriously concerned about the future of America. Therefore, it appears that their criticism may rather help the United States open the way for an entirely new type of neo-isolationism different from the isolationism of the past.

What, though, will be the situation for China? The logical expectation is that, when as progress toward peace in Vietnam is likely to bring about an international environment favorable to China, the Chinese posture toward foreign countries under

post-Vietnam conditions may well become flexible. At the Ninth National People's Congress China officially declared Soviet "socialist imperialism" its enemy in its overseas strategy. Due especially to a series of armed clashes along the Sino-Soviet border since March of this year, China is trying to initiate a full-scale diplomatic strategy against the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, Chinese diplomacy, which has been kept inactive by the recent Cultural Revolution, is about to resume its activities. The international isolation of China today, as China approaches the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China this coming fall, is a far cry from China's avowed hope for international amity in the early days of its existence. Therefore, it is an only matter of course undemanding of our attention that Chinese diplomatic activities move to normalize diplomatic relations with such countries as France, Albania, Cambodia, Pakistan, North Vietnam, Tanzania, Guinea, Zambia, etc., with which China suspended diplomatic activities, symbolic of its "diplomacy of rebellion", amid the Cultural Revolution. Its subtle maneuvers to approach Pakistan, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, however, are deserving of attention as part of that global anti-Soviet strategy which has already become China's highest national goal. This is proof of China's intention to deploy its global strategy to take the place of the old "neutral zone" strategy (of which the chief advocates were Liu Shao-Chi and Chen, and especially Lo Jui-Ching).

In this way, China is demonstrating the possibility that it will gradually take a flexible attitude toward those nations which do not maintain close relations with Soviet revisionism, yet this is not the result of progress toward peace in Vietnam. To be sure, some critics attribute the Cultural Revolution primarily to intensification of the Vietnam War. They see it as hastened political unification and military reorganization at home by the Mao-Lin mainstream faction so as to be able to cope with the Chinese-American showdown, that is, with a direct attack by the United States. Those critics then surmise that China may now start a full-scale diplomatic offensive.

Such theorizing, however, shows that they have persistently shut their eyes to

the fact that the Cultural Revolution basically originated from such internal factors as China's own political and social crisis during the process of making the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" absolute, various problems during the period of economic readjustment after the failure of the 1958 "Great Leap Forward," and the serious struggles within the Party caused by various issues in connection with Chinese foreign policy (especially its relations with the Soviet Union) during the first half of the 1960's.

In so far as domestic factors are the fundamental cause of the Cultural Revolution, the moves of China in overthrowing the so-called "Authoritative Faction Power" are essentially unrelated to the Vietnam War. Consequently, the opening of Vietnam peace talks itself means a diplomatic failure for revolutionary China, and its continuous calls for protracted all-out struggle in Vietnam. China's silence concerning peace in Vietnam as well as its reaction of not reporting even the facts about the continuation of the talks only serve to verify this. In assessing the Great Cultural Revolution and considering the Hanoi-Peking discord in connection with Vietnam peace, China's diplomatic setback is obvious. From this point of view, we may possibly say that the basis from which to develop a positive China diplomacy in post-Vietnam Asia has been considerably weakened. If that is the case, China may be unable for the time being to put into practice those of its diplomatic strategies which embody the ideals of the Great Cultural Revolution. Consequently, China is left with no other choice but to push forward the "Liu Shao-Chi line without Liu Shao-Chi."

However, an important exception here is Chinese strategy against the Soviet Union. China has begun to consider the Soviet Union a strategic enemy not only ideologically and politically but also militarily. Under these circumstances, the series of Sino-Soviet border clashes since March of this year gave China an excellent chance for strategic and ideological indoctrination to convince its 700 million people to change their image of the Soviet Union and see it as "Chinese Public Enemy Number 1." Since the outbreak of a border incident on Chen Pao Island (Damanski Island) in the Ussuri River, more than 400 million Chinese have taken part in organized

demonstrations throughout the country. This fact indicates that such an image-change has already been carried out on a nation-wide scale among the people. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is the only country against which China can make the charge of revisionism, and thereby transform one of the fundamental ideas of the Great Cultural Revolution into true political policy. As a matter of fact, since the Soviet armed intervention of Czechoslovakia last summer, China has been loudly voicing the possibility of a direct invasion of China by Soviet "Socialist Imperialism," and the Chinese leaders themselves appear beset with such a sense of crisis. The fact that the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia was made by a sudden attack by Soviet tanks too must have been a serious blow to those Chinese leaders whose theories are based on long people's wars of attrition. A joint editorial entitled "No Enemy anywhere can Withstand the Liberation Army: In Commemoration of the 42nd Anniversary of the Foundation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" in the *China People's Daily*, *Red Flag*, and *Liberation Army Bulletin* on August 1 of this year appealed to the Chinese people to make themselves ready for action in the event of direct aggression against China by the United States and the Soviet Union. From this editorial we can fully guess the distrust which the Chinese leaders feel toward the Soviet Union.

Now, let us direct our attention to the situation within China. In this respect, the Ninth National People's Congress held in April of this year revealed that the Mao-Lin structure has been established throughout China. On the other hand, the task of reconstructing the Chinese Communist Party, completely demolished by the Great Cultural Revolution, has yet to be done, and the reconstruction of the party from below had to be postponed for a later date. There are, of course, many problems to be discussed in the relationship between the Ninth National People's Congress and the Great Cultural Revolution. What kind of political position within the system is to be given in the future to a provisional power structure (the revolutionary committees) which is a direct product of the power struggle? How will the provisional leadership, called the Cultural Revolution Group, be treated within the system? How

should the sharp yet potential contradiction between, on the one hand, the desire to attain order and structure for the reconstruction and unification of the party, and on the other hand, the desire to destroy and disrupt that which has been planned by the already-extinct spirit of "righteous rebellion" be met? How may an objective solution be found to the historic problems of Chinese society: Reform of the vast agrarian society and modernization and industrialization of the Chinese society under the tremendous population pressure? What kind of reform should be established in the Chinese society after the Great Cultural Revolution? Although these, and many other problems are exceedingly important, none of them was taken up in either the new party rules or Lin Piao's political report. Despite its intense belligerence Lin Piao's political report completely ignored any concrete measures for national construction. Even the third five-year program was left unmentioned. This leads one to suspect even that the Chinese leaders themselves are perhaps unable to exercise full control over these essential issues. In the Ninth National People's Congress of the CCP. The victory of "Mao Tse-Tung's thought" was glorified and the offenses of both the authoritative faction headed by Liu Shao-Chi and the capitalist faction were severely indicted, so much so that one cannot but see here a revelation of the extremely torturous problems afflicting a post-revolution China. It therefore seems that China, in the short-run, cannot but, as a fundamental principle, give priority to the domestic policies of national reconstruction and unity.

Consequently, China probably cannot afford for some time to develop dynamic foreign policies in conformity with the ideals of the Great Cultural Revolution, and it is for this reason that they cannot but advance the "Liu Shao-Chi Line without Liu Shao-Chi." The only country toward which foreign policy can conform with such domestic policies as "self-struggle to criticize revisionism" and criticisms of "capitalist factions" without requiring great diplomatic efforts is the Soviet Union. In this respect, too, it may be said that the Sino-Soviet confrontation is moving forward into a more serious stage of its history.

Seen in this way, the Sino-American relationship may be seen to be entering a new phase in which the U.S. tends to a neo-isolationism and China to a policy of giving first priority to domestic politics, that is, to a self-imposed and unavoidable isolationism. We are thus forced to foresee the probability of gradual though major shifts in that Sino-American confrontation which is the major factor in the post-Vietnam cold war in Asia. It is only by calmly recognizing the undercurrents of such directions that we may hope to control peace and stability in Asia.

### III. The Chinese threat and "the Shadow of China"

Now, having explored the above possibilities, let us think of the so-called Chinese threat. Evaluation of this problem is prerequisite to any search for new directions in policies toward Asian peace. Until now, of course, the view that the Chinese threat is real has occupied the mainstream in both Japanese and U.S. politics. For example, when the Japanese government's Prime Minister Sato issued a joint declaration with President Johnson when he visited the U.S. in November of 1967, the appeal to the Chinese threat shown by this Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration did not make clear the meaning of the threat, instead tending to emphasize only defense force efforts to resist this severe threat. Yet it will only aggravate tensions more than necessary if resistance is attempted wantonly without first grasping the true meaning of the threat's actual condition. We must first, now, scrutinize seriously what the Chinese threat is.

Generally, three elements are thought of as the Chinese threat. The first is the threat brought about by the Chinese strategy for global revolution, the second is China's diplomatic threat, and the third is China's nuclear threat. While these three have, of course, a complementary and organic relation, and their amplifying relationship must be considered. I would like here to grasp the content and meaning of the Chinese threat by examining these elements separately for the moment.

First, about the Chinese strategy for global revolution, as clearly shown since the

Sino-Soviet conflict, the central link in that Chinese strategy for global revolution based upon the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung," is the unmistakable pursuit of armed national liberation struggles in the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Also, this strategy for revolution consists of denying completely the peaceful shift to revolution in advanced nations. The so-called "Neutral zone" strategy is for victory in the armed national liberation struggles of the Afro-Asian zone as the "world's countryside" to encircle the "world's cities," especially the United States. This strategy was to universalize to the present that view of encompassing revolution built upon the unique Chinese Yen-an experience and Mao Tse-Tung's views of revolutionary uprisings. Yet such a strategy for global revolution suffered severe setbacks in the present situation, as shown by the great shocks in the Afro-Asian nations since the latter half of 1965 (the failure of the September 30 coup d'etat in Indonesia, the miscarriage of the Second Afro-Asian Conference, and the failures in various African nations, and China was isolated even within those Afro-Asian nations which are its own strategic zone. Lin Piao's thesis "Long Live Victory of the People's Wars" in September of 1965 showed the strategy of aggressive encirclement "from the world's countryside to the world's cities" and attempted to show clearly the Chinese position as the base of world revolution in connection with the Great Cultural Revolution. But, despite the belligerence of language, this was, in the logical context, no more than a self-admission of the defeat of the "Neutral zone" strategy, and there is no possibility of this strategy's concrete development. Then, the intensification of the Great Cultural Revolution and the isolation of the Chinese Communist Party within the international Communist movement brought about the more conspicuous retreat of China's strategy for global revolution, and it was necessary to demonstrate this revolutionariness by uprisings by "pro-Chinese elements" or "the diplomacy of rebellion." Within this context, even the Vietnam Labor Party was tacitly conducting sharp criticism of the Lin Piao strategy and the Great Cultural Revolution. Then, as shown most directly by the 1967 Anti-British Riots in Hong Kong, when the

contradictions between so-called revolutionary principles and the Chinese national interest becomes acute the reality of giving priority to national interest is exposed even in Mao's China.

Seen in this way, the Chinese strategy of global revolution of course tends to such methodological defects as may be seen in "exporting revolution." But even more, as seen from its logical weakness based upon the awareness of the world's spatial and geopolitical structure, it is incapable of resolving the contradictions of the present world. From this, it is not necessarily able to become a threat to states possessing the ability for normal government and a sense of balance.

What is the situation concerning the second, the diplomatic threat? Needless to say, the path of Chinese diplomacy is intimately related to and consistent with the strategy of global revolution. One outstanding characteristic of China's diplomatic line is that, while in principle not creating any logical contradictions with the strategy of global revolution, it reserves the freedom of decision on foreign policy. In this, it shows a remarkable difference from the Soviet Union, even if both are said to Practice Communist-bloc diplomacy. As the Soviet Union today is in the position of having principally to avoid the danger that every international dispute will develop into thermonuclear war, not only does this greatly restrict Soviet diplomatic lines but, because of this restriction, the Soviet Union must endlessly face the contradiction of having as a socialist nation to stand on the side of revolutionary justice in local wars and national wars of liberation. The 1967 Soviet response to the Middle East war during the Vietnam war is one pattern demonstrating this contradiction. As opposed to this, the Chinese side, such restrictions and accompanying contradictions in principle being completely non-existent, may be said to preserve the conditions which make it possible to decide foreign policy freely in accordance with the strategy of global revolution, just as it reserves the freedom of action concerning nuclear development.

Seen in this way, it may be precisely this Chinese diplomatic strategy which is

thought to be the major threat. As the dynamic development of the former Five Principles of Peace diplomacy possessed a universality capable of dealing effectively with the international situation at the time of the Afro-Asian historic emergence, the "shadow of China" was a decidedly great threat for those who deny this historic aspect. However, it must be noted here that the situation whereby China is able to establish diplomatic lines according to its own choice leads, in a sense, to the problem that the influence of internal politics becomes decisive in Chinese diplomacy. That is to say, the competitive balance between domestic politics and diplomacy exerts a regulatory effect even larger than the general action principles of Chinese diplomacy. Therefore, with the Chinese necessity for internal political unification through the Great Cultural Revolution and with China's necessarily and inevitably placing the main emphasis on domestic politics, it is inconceivable that China should show any dynamic diplomatic developments other than the "Liu Shao-Chi line without Liu Shao-Chi" so that the threat of Chinese diplomacy is on this point considerably diminished.

While it may be seen from the above examination that the Chinese strategy of world revolution and diplomatic line do not necessarily mean only the substance of threat, there is also the question of Chinese nuclear weapons as a new source of threat.

Now, when the ideal of establishing a non-nuclear world order is undergoing a fundamental ordeal, China, boasting of its accepting no restraints on nuclear development, is glorifying its self-conviction that it can destroy the Soviet-American nuclear monopoly. More than this, the fact that China can be seen to have not the least awareness of the dangers of nuclear proliferation is no doubt an important problem. From the Chinese thinking on nuclear proliferation and its position on Japan-U.S. estrangement, the opinion has even been voiced lately that China is rather in agreement with nuclear arms for Japan. Yonosuke Nagai, for example, has even speculated that, "from the Chinese viewpoint, the arming of Japan should perhaps be welcomed

in certain political contexts" ("The 'Balance of Power' in Asia": *Economist*; Tokyo; 1968 Special New Year's Edition). At any rate, the Chinese nuclear threat can not but come to have an increasingly serious meaning today.

Aside from a certain limited degree of disorder, Chinese nuclear development continued to be promoted even during the Great Cultural Revolution as though a politically neutral area. While there is then the opinion in Japan that urges promoting an independent Japanese nuclear force to meet the Chinese nuclear challenge, is it really effective or even appropriate to try to deal with the Chinese nuclear weapons on a "fight fire with fire" basis? When considering this problem, since it is so extremely serious, we must try to think calmly of the political meaning of Chinese nuclear weapons.

On this point, first, it is recollected that, after the first Chinese nuclear experimental success in October of 1964, at the same time as Soviet Premier Khrushchev's dismissal, Prime Minister Chou En-Lai spoke of the tests saying "Did not we explode an atomic bomb? Have not we thrown off that nickname of the invalids of the Orient previously given us by the people of Western Europe? How is it to be expected that the proletariat of the East can not do whatever the bourgeoisie of the West can do?" (Political Activities Report at the First National People's Delegates Conference of the Third Period).

This Chou En-Lai statement shows clearly how intense was that Chinese national ambition, burning with hatred of the Soviet Union, which produced the Chinese struggle for nuclear development under the banner of "attaining success by overcoming difficulties."

How though does China, having pursued nuclear development against this background, evaluate its practical nuclear capacity? While the formula "people's wars over atomic bombs" is a well-known program, the Chinese Communist Party in today's context too persists in emphasizing that "at present building missiles with our own strength and striking a serious blow against the nuclear monopoly of the Soviet-

American collusion, we are giving great inspiration and encouragement to the people carrying out that heroic revolutionary struggle which continues to advance throughout the world. Yet in the future too we must defeat our enemies in people's wars." ("Let Us Study 'Strategic Problems of the Chinese Revolution' by Mao Tse-Tung"; *Liberation Army Report*; December 29, 1966)

As can be seen here, the fundamental thought of the Chinese nuclear strategy consists of the dual conception of recognizing on the one hand the supremacy of the "the people over weapons" logic of people's wars, while unreservedly emphasizing on the other hand the militant "fight nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons" aspect of Mao Tse-Tung's military thought. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that this kind of thinking was not born of such external factors as the existence of the "anti-Chinese encirclement net" but formed internally as a logical necessity from the Chinese Communist Party's view of the world today. This being the practical meaning of the Chinese nuclear weapons, a great political quality is attached to this Chinese nuclear development in addition to its purely military (that is, practical use) character. This is also recognized by China itself and the essay mentioned earlier entitled "Long Live Victory for the People's Wars" by Lin Piao, for example, standing on the unspoken premise that nuclear war is in fact already impossible (the theory repudiating nuclear war), develops a strategy which tries to draw enemies onto the Chinese mainland and develop people's wars. It is imperative that we calmly and carefully understand the paradoxical meaning of such a Chinese nuclear challenge, and it is rather clear, even if considered separate from the Chinese emphasis on "no nuclear first-strike," that the Chinese nuclear challenge does not immediately mean a military threat.

From the above examination of these three aspects, it is almost obvious that there is the danger that the substance of the so-called Chinese threat may be overestimated and greatly misread depending upon the ideological illusions of the viewer. It may be that to shout wantonly about the Chinese threat without grasping this

point is in fact to be made jumpy by the "shadow of China."

#### IV. Asian Peace and Japanese Diplomacy

While I have tried in the above to examine the Chinese threat, I am definitely not one to deny this Chinese threat entirely. It is just that I feel the Chinese threat in fact to exist much more deeply in a different dimension.

As is well known, and as clearly shown by the Great Cultural Revolution, China today is in the ideologically over-saturated condition of making absolute "the thoughts of Mao Tse-Tung" and building a charismatic, patriarchial system of support for Mao Tse-Tung, and the fanatic emotions of the masses are sweeping the entire land. Within this, China, intentionally trying to establish a self-contained autarchal society, is rejecting the rational approach to a modern society through industrialization and is molding a world ruled by political myth.

For such a state, existing as a kind of "state of the masses" (E. Leaders's phrase) completely cut off from the outside world, embracing within it 700 million people, and moreover even now being incapable of breaking out of its social and economic backwardness, to be limpingly developing nuclear weapons is in itself, in fact, the really big threat to today's peace and security. That such a China should fill the wide spaces of continental Asia is itself an acute threat to the peace of Asia. This is because, should this "state of the masses" once lose its internal equilibrium, it is liable to explode and become reckless in all directions. Moreover, this is a nuclear-armed state. That is why now is the time for the entire world to consider seriously fruitful policies in order that China not be forced further in this direction. To this purpose, it is imperative that concrete concepts be devised to fill the present fearful rupture between China and the outside world and open China into international society. Again, when considering the variability of Chinese society itself, it is precisely the process of such efforts which will open the path to discussions with China.

Then, should China reject all of these efforts seriously attempted by the outside

world, China itself would have to bear the moral responsibility and all decisive losses from such action. Whatever happens, we must for some time patiently and tenaciously seek coexistence with this Chinese colossus. As these efforts must, as a start begin with restoring China to international society, it is on this point that the question of United Nations representation for China is a problem of decisive meaning. Now is the time for Japanese diplomacy to embark upon new steps to prepare positive alternative proposals different from its policy of designating the problem of Chinese representation an "important question." America, now grouping for a fundamental conversion in its Asian policies, is expecting much of Japan, and the Soviet Union too is working to approach Japan as never before. Diplomatically, Japan may be said to be in a "seller's market" and, rather than making do with makeshift measures, ought in our independence to mark out boldly the path of a diplomacy of peace to cope with the new situation in Asia. The time is passing when Japan can pursue only its own national interests under a cheap-for-Japan security system. The tactical dimensions of establishing such an independent Japanese diplomacy would shortly, even if the China problem is converted into merchandise with which to bargain with America, push Japanese diplomacy directly in the direction of coexistence with China and, in turn, world peace. It is in such directions that efforts ought to be made to thaw the Sino-American cold war.

Even if post-Vietnam Asia is, as noted earlier, covered by the Sino-Soviet-American tripolar structure, the balance of power among these three political great powers can not alone bring true peace and security to Asia. The nations of Asia, continually feeling bewildered in the arena of these three great powers, have their various difficult problems. Pakistan, which might be seen as recently intending delicate approaches to China against the background of its fateful conflict with India, is no exception. Although the Pakistan government delegation headed by Air Force Lieutenant General N. Khan received an enthusiastic welcome when it visited Peking last July 12, and despite Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's opening a severe criticism of the Soviet

Union at the welcome reception, Lieut. General Khan said not a single word about the Soviet Union. We must understand those complex turns in the minds of the Asian countries themselves as shown by this reality.

On the other hand, China is strongly criticising Japan at present for taking over the American policy of containing China, and is further attacking Japan for trying to establish a new "anti-Chinese encirclement net" in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Also, it is keeping a cautious eye on Japan's economic expansion into Asian nations. While it is not necessary for us to accept Chinese criticisms as they are, it is for us to reflect deeply upon the fact that Japan is incapable of efforts for peaceful diplomacy correspondent to its economic strength. Of course, there might be some tensions and friction in our relations with America should Japanese diplomacy grope in such directions, yet it is not the least realistic to think that Japan and the U.S. can maintain eternally their alliance in its present form. Today, concurrent with the growth of the Japanese economy, there are sharp criticisms from the American side of Japan's role and position in the Japan-U.S. relationship. While the Seventh Meeting of the Joint Japan-U.S. Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs was held in such a harsh atmosphere, it may even be said that the Japan-U.S. relationship, despite the beautiful rhetoric of "equal partnership," is already changing economically to relationship of non-alliance. In such reality, it is impossible for Japan and the U.S. to obtain fruitful results by simply repeating empty diplomatic phrases. Japan, as a responsible member of Asia, should propose Asian-oriented diplomatic policies to America. It is in this form that the true friendship and ideal of the U.S.-Japan relationship ought to be sought.

The effort to overcome gradually the various bad effects of the hardening of the Japan-U.S. security system too must be made in this context, and it goes without saying that Okinawa will be for some time the most important problem on this point. Then, if America is trying to change fundamentally its Asian policy, there will obviously be revisions made in its policies toward Japan as well. The biggest

problem for us, however, is the idleness of the Japanese government. This is because the Japanese government has not yet the accumulated experience and preparation appropriate to the American government's intention of groping toward changes in its Asian policy and efforts to improve its relations with China. The various opposition parties too naturally must bear their responsibility for what has led to this result, and it may be said that the progressive parties especially have a very large moral responsibility.

\* \* \* \* \*