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The Sino-Soviet Confrontation in Historical Perspective

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The Structure of Conflict and the Border Regions

The Sino-Soviet conflict is a composite of four levels of confrontation: nation-to-nation; state-to-state; party-to-party; and government-to-government. The first is a confrontation of two separate nationalisms; the second, one of national interest; the third is ideological, a conflict over doctrinal orthodoxy; and the fourth involves diplomatic relationship.

Nation-to-nation conflict is probably the most deeply rooted and historically inevitable. The meeting of the Russian and Chinese peoples in the last three hundred years has been accompanied by a great deal of friction. At no time has one side ever held complete sway over the other, but both have been conquered by the Mongol Empire, and this shared historical nightmare is a stimulus to their nationalistic emotions. The image of a powerful Russian nation and that of the Mongol Empire seem to overlap in the minds of the Han people, constituting a "threat from the north," while, on the other hand, the Russians have always abhorred the notion of a strongly unified China, calling it the "threat from the southeast."

The second level of conflict, state-to-state, is over borders and territories, and has continued unabated since the Nerchinsk treaty of 1689. This conflict is so tenacious that it quickly overwhelmed the spirit of Leninist internationalism spelled out in the Karakhan manifesto of July 1919. With the subsequent rise of Stalinism

and Maoism, the national interest of both nations was provided with ideological justification, making the two nations increasingly more incompatible. The Sino-Soviet rift has escalated from theoretical dispute to confrontation in every phase of relationship between the two socialist states. (As ironic as it may seem, Taipei and Peking are in total agreement as far as border and territorial issues are concerned, paradoxical evidence that the confrontation stems from roots far deeper than the realm of ideology.)

The third level, party-to-party, is a variable factor in the confrontation structure. In the future, the two countries will probably exhibit the same degree of restorative capacity that they have in the past to accommodate their doctrinal differences, but this, of course, will depend on changes in their respective domestic situations. The reason is that Sino-Soviet relations have a high degree of correlation to factional struggles within the parties, particularly in the Chinese Communist party (CCP). This, in turn, means that ideological conflict will be affected one way or the other by the outcome of the intraparty struggle or by changes in leadership.

The fourth level, government-to-government, is a superficial confrontation, and is the level most subject to internal political changes. Following the death of Mao Tse-tung, the possibility of a restoration on this level can be foreseen.

The ideological confrontation between China and the Soviet Union became increasingly more serious, although covert, after the beginning of de-Stalinization in 1956, and by the sixties it was an overt part of the conflict on both the party-to-party and government-to-government levels. Nation-to-nation and state-to-state conflict, however, date back long before the birth of the People's Republic of China. A number of potentially explosive issues began to surface during modern China's formative years—in the process of the Chinese revolution in its broader meaning. The areas bordering on either or both of these two great powers, such as Mongolia, Manchuria (Tungpei or Northeast), and Sinkiang, have often been scenes of collision between Chinese and Soviet nationalism, stages in their power struggle for spheres of influence. In one way the involvement of those smaller nations has been the source of the historical dynamics in Sino-Soviet relations.[1]

Confrontation over the sovereignty of Outer Mongolia began at

the time of the 1911 revolution and has continued on until today. The declaration adopted by the second convention of the CCP referred to the "liberation" of Mongolia and the prospect of incorporating Mongolia into a Federal Republic of China. Mao Tse-tung talked about the issue in his interview with Edgar Snow in 1936. The issue survived through the Yalta agreement of 1945, the Chinese-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Pact of the same year between Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek (hereinafter referred to as the Chinese-Soviet Pact), the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung (hereinafter referred to as Sino-Soviet Treaty), and the Sino-Soviet talks in 1954 during Khrushchev's visit to Peking. After the most dramatic series of strategic interplays between the two powers, the problem is still not settled, insofar as the Mongolians remain divided into the Mongolian People's Republic and, within Chinese territory, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The memoirs of Otto Braun, who died recently, contain a startling exposé about his experience as an adviser to the CCP during the latter part of the Comintern era.[2] Braun says that Mao Tse-tung's strategy, involving Mongolia and Sinkiang, toward the Soviet Union in the late 1930s was an ambitious attempt to draw the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. About this time Mao Tse-tung's repulsion of Stalin and the Comintern had taken on clear shape. His anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin attitudes probably deepened through the intense struggles with the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks (including Wang Ming [Ch'en Shao-yü], Po Ku [Chin Pang-hsien], and Lo Fu [Chang Wen-tien], and others), an opposition faction within the CCP during the Yenan period in the early 1940s.[3]

On the fluid historical conditions of Sinkiang, which have now become a focal point for Sino-Soviet border clashes, one need only recall that there was a plan for an "East Turkestan Republic" toward the end of World War II. Historically, however, Manchuria has been the most important stage for the Sino-Soviet conflict. From the Yalta agreement and the Chinese-Soviet Pact of 1945, all the way down to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung fought against but had to yield to Stalin's demands for ice-free ports—Port Arthur

and Dairen, and railways—the East China and Manchurian (later Changchun) railways.

The Korean peninsula, on the other hand, has been the buffer zone for China and the Soviet Union. This was obvious when T. V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen) was carrying out talks centered on the Chinese-Soviet pact on behalf of the Kuomintang (KMT) government, which had been dumbfounded by the secret deals at Yalta; at that time the Soviet Union and China were quick to agree on the "independence" of Korea, quite unlike England and the United States. By its very nature, however, a buffer zone can easily be sacrificed by the conflicting parties once there is a change in the situation. I am inclined to believe that there was such an aspect to the Korean War.

Sino-Soviet relations, nurtured in this particular historical milieu, have had a highly dynamic background of strategic considerations[4] and been the most important factor in the postwar environment of Asia as well. Following the end of World War II American leaders had some historical insight into the possibilities of conflict between China and the Soviet Union, but they were unable to penetrate the heart of this conflict. The China White Paper was a document containing many logical inconsistencies, but in its introduction Secretary of State Dean Acheson did express a view of China, not as subservient to the Soviet Union, but rather as a potential Yugoslavia. If the United States had followed that view of China and begun serious talks with the new regime after the autumn of 1949, then perhaps the postwar Asian situation might have been radically different. From diplomatic papers recently made public, it seems clear that Mao had favorable feelings toward the United States in the late forties. When we compare them with his ill feelings toward the Soviet Union, we can see that the United States could have realistically chosen such a policy toward China.[5]

The Dilemma in the Yalta System

The Yalta Conference was held in February 1945 by the leaders of Great Britian, the United States, and the Soviet Union to lay out plans for the postwar international order. However, the Yalta system had built into it elements that would bring about its own

destruction soon after the conference started. Within the framework of this unstable structure, the secret provisions concerning East Asia were bound to create problems. Even before Japan was defeated, the Soviet Union and the United States began to harbor mutual doubts about the other's intentions, and the postwar conditions of East Asia were decidedly influenced by those provisions. The beginning of the Cold War in Asia is generally considered to coincide with the outbreak of the Korean War, but in actuality the conflict in Korea was more aptly the beginning of hot war in Asia. The Cold War had begun much earlier; even the failure of the United States, Great Britain, and China to inform the Soviet Union of their final ultimatum to Japan and the American insistence on keeping secret the existence of the atomic bomb were part of the Cold War. A great deal of research has provided material showing that although the United States knew Japan was sending out peace feelers through Moscow, the Americans decided to use the atomic bomb as a means to prevent Soviet participation in the war against Japan as agreed upon at Yalta.

The Soviet Union pointed out at the Potsdam Conference that, as indicated at Yalta, it would declare war against Japan after the conclusion of the Chinese-Soviet Pact. Only two days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima they sent adequately prepared troops quickly into Manchuria and swept over the Kwantung Army, disregarding the fact that the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was still in effect.[6] Although the Soviet Union had broken its promises on East Germany and Poland that had been made at the Yalta Conference, it kept its word in Asia. That meant that the U.S. decision to use the atomic bomb involved a double miscalculation, and by keeping the promises made at Yalta, the Soviet Union won a dual victory: the country became one of the victors in East Asia after only a week of fighting, and its Asian policy was executed exactly as planned.

The biggest flaw in the Yalta agreement was that it made a sacrificial object of China, which, although one of the victorious powers, suffered most from the war. The agreement also miscalculated the future of China and made no provisions for responding to the rise of Chinese nationalism. The first American who recognized the dangers inherent in this secret agreement was the ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley. However, Hurley failed in his attempts to revise the Yalta agreement, and when the Kuomin-

tang government discovered what the secret agreement was about, they hurriedly dispatched T. V. Soong to Moscow for discussions with the Soviets. Because of the power relations that existed at that time and the East Asian situation brought about by the Yalta agreement, China had no choice but to succumb to Stalin's arrogant attitude and make one compromise after another. This is clearly revealed in Chiang Kai-shek's memoirs, which were released recently.[7]

The Chinese-Soviet Pact was signed on August 14, 1945, one day before the Japanese surrender, just when the Soviet armies had almost completely occupied all of the northeastern provinces. Even though the treaty had been concluded on the basis of the secret Yalta agreement, it was signed in such a hurry because the Soviet Union wanted to carry out its intended Far Eastern strategy without U.S. interference. In the exchange of notes and appended agreement of the treaty, China had to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and agree to the 30-year joint operation of the Changchun railway, the joint use of Port Arthur, and the declaration of Dairen as a free port. In short, the Chinese allowed czarist Russian interests in China to be restored more or less intact, sanctioned by the Yalta agreement.

This treaty was the basis for Soviet relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government right up until the establishment of the People's Republic of China. (The Soviet embassy moved each time Chiang moved his capital—from Nanking to Chungking, Chengtu, and finally to his last capital on the continent, Canton.) The Kuomintang government was continually threatened by the possibility that Stalin would extend aid or recognition to the CCP, and in order to prevent that eventuality, they had to concede many rights to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was able to skillfully take advantage of the KMT's weak position, and when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was pressing on to the Yangtze, the Soviet ambassador was applying pressure to the KMT government to concede rights in Sinkiang.[8]

It was perhaps only natural that the Soviet Union placed much importance on the KMT as the organization that would hand over to the Soviet Union everything that had been established or built in the territories occupied by Soviet armies. Within only a few months after the occupation of the Northeast, the Soviet

Union had transported to its own country the industrial facilities left behind by the Japanese as well as a great number of Japanese prisoners. The U.S. economic investigation team led by Edwin W. Paulay estimated that the assets removed totaled U.S. $858,100,000 and if the depreciation and replacement costs were added, the figure would surpass $2 billion. Another estimate brings the figure closer to $3.5 billion.

That Stalin concluded the Chinese-Soviet Pact with Chiang Kai-shek and maintained diplomatic relations was in line with his consistent refusal to recognize the CCP and with his professed view that "all efforts would go into unifying China under Chiang's leadership." There is a great deal of evidence of what Stalin thought of the CCP at that time. It is very interesting, however, that the present Soviet view holds that the many contacts the Soviet Union had with the Chiang regime, including the 1939 commercial treaty, indicate that the USSR has always had a friendly attitude toward China.[9] Not only did Stalin continue to recognize the KMT government, but he also underestimated the capability of the CCP. Even during the civil war, on the ground that the advance of the PLA would cause the United States to openly intervene, he put all sorts of pressure on the CCP until he somewhat modified his attitude in 1948.[10]

Moscow Meeting

It is worthy of note that, given this situation, Mao Tse-tung gave instructions to establish bases in the Northeast and strengthen the party apparatus there as early as December 1945.[11] It even seems probable that Mao was then considering preparations for Soviet intrusion and was being pressed to decide whether or not he would bargain with the United States. It is significant that the report made by Mao at the second plenary session of the seventh central committee of the CCP in March 1949 implicitly pointed to a moderate line of accommodation with the United States.[12] But later, on July 1, Mao declared that China would adopt a "lean-to-one-side" policy in favor of the Soviet Union in his thesis on the people's democratic dictatorship.[13] He abandoned the Titoist alternative once and for all. That decision was very im-

portant, and involved more complex issues than simply the idea that "blood is thicker than water." Then why did Mao Tse-tung make that decision, having had bitter experience with Stalin's China policy on both the state-to-state and party-to-party levels?

Just prior to the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Mao foresaw that Soviet aid and advice would be necessary for nation-building. In addition to this obvious reason, several points which form the background of the decision must also be mentioned. First, there was a risk in selecting a policy of appeasement toward the United States because of the power relation that existed between the Soviet Union and China. To have taken that course would have created apprehension about what Stalin would do, judging from the way he acted in the past. Second, Mao had to consider the situation within the CCP at that time. According to Ch'i Pen-yü in his article "Patriotism or National Betrayal," written during the cultural revolution,[14] in 1949 Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers were contemplating turning against Mao and were therefore even more inclined to be conciliatory toward the United States than Mao. Third, and probably most important, is that the decision resulted from a tactical consideration by Mao, to build up a strong sense of nationalism vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Mao, now in place of Chiang, had the responsibility for the future of China and was worried about what would happen to Manchuria and Sinkiang, seized under the Yalta agreement and the Chinese-Soviet Pact. Leaning to the Soviet Union side can be seen then as a tactical move. Earlier, in July 1949, Stalin invited Kao Kang, chairman of the people's government in Manchuria, to Moscow without consulting the CCP's leadership, and a trade agreement was concluded between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.[15] This was probably an additional factor governing Mao's decision. Incidentally, there is no official mention of this trade agreement in *Jen-min jih-pao,* but an editorial in *Tung-pei jih-pao* concerning this pact was reprinted in the August 9, 1949, issue of the official national daily. By contrast, the details of the agreement were reported in the July 31 issue of *Izvestija.*[16]

Against a background of these events, Mao set out for Moscow at the head of a group visiting the Soviet Union on December 16, 1949, immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic. He probably expected to receive his first warm welcome

from Stalin as the leader of the Chinese revolution, but he was also wary, knowing what had happened before, and burning with the desire to totally reform Sino-Soviet relations. He felt that the visit would be the starting point. Officially, the reason to go to Moscow was to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday, but it was Mao's first trip abroad. Stalin, at least on the surface, welcomed Mao, but the reception was far colder than that accorded T. V. Soong some four and a half years before.

Mao told a Tass reporter on January 2, 1950, "I expect to be in the Soviet Union for several more weeks. The length of my stay depends on how long it takes to solve the problems confronting Chinese interests."[17] This was an indication that the talks were in trouble almost from the beginning. Mao Tse-tung finally signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty on February 14, and he signed two other agreements and exchange of notes before he returned to Peking on March 4. It is rather unusual for the top leader of a country to stay in another nation for more than two months and a half so soon after establishing his regime. Moreover, Mao was accompanied in Moscow by Ch'en Po-ta, his political secretary, who was extremely proficient in Russian. But by January 20, Mao called to Moscow Chou En-lai, premier of the Government Administration Council and concurrently minister of foreign affairs; Li Fu-ch'un, vice-chairman, Northeast (Tungpei) People's government; Yeh Hsiu-chuang, minister of trade; and Wu Hsiu-lo, director of the USSR and East European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On January 30, they were joined by Saifudin, vice-chairman, Sinkiang Provincial People's government.

It is clear from the two additional agreements and the protocol that were signed later that in these talks with China, Stalin again demanded concession of rights from the Chinese, including ice-free ports and railways. We can easily surmise from the list of Chinese negotiators who later joined in the talks that the Northeast and Sinkiang had again become important issues. Further, problems seem to have arisen over what to do about the trade agreement concluded by Kao Kang for the Northeast.

China and the Soviet Union flaunted their monolithic unity in the Sino-Soviet Treaty as well as making it an alliance that would defend against any revival of Japanese militarism. It was a military alliance in which the United States and Japan were regarded

as potential enemies, but in all of the pending questions between China and the Soviet Union, the Chinese won concessions, at least more than what was gained by the Chinese-Soviet Pact of 1945. The treaty provided for the free return of the Changchun railway to China by the end of 1952, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the return of facilities at Port Arthur after the conclusion of peace with Japan or before the end of 1952 (in the case of war, then the port would be used jointly). The problems surrounding the port of Dairen would be left for discussion after the peace treaty with Japan. The talks indicate Mao's strong sense of equality vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the strong impact of the victorious Chinese revolution on Stalin. However, China had to go along with the Soviets for a joint operation of enterprises to exploit petroleum and nonferrous metals in Sinkiang and to submit to Soviet demands that the independence of Outer Mongolia be recognized.

The 1950 Sino-Soviet talks must have left Mao half-satisfied and half-frustrated, but at the tenth plenum of the eighth central committee in September 1962 he made a confession in which he said that "Stalin did not want to sign, but after two months of further negotiation he finally signed."[18] It is clear today that at private meetings in China as early as 1957 and 1958 Mao Tse-tung revealed what went on in the Sino-Soviet talks. In January 1957, Mao is quoted as saying, "Our opinions differed from Stalin's. We were ready to sign but he was not, and we demanded the Chinese Changchun Railway, but he wouldn't give it back. But one can after all take the meat out of the tiger's mouth."[19] In the speech of March 1958 he said, "Stalin and I argued for two months in Moscow in 1950. Our attitude toward the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Changchun Railway, the joint-stock companies and border issues was to hear the proposals that Stalin made first and then argue with him over the ones that we did not like. The ones that he would push vigorously, we would accept. We did this in consideration of socialism's overall interest. There remained the problems of the colonial areas, Sinkiang and the Northeast. It was not to be tolerated that foreign nationals live there. This has now been solved."[20]

At any rate dissatisfaction remained with Mao after the Moscow meeting; the establishment of the joint-stock companies in Sinkiang served as a new provocation and deepened Mao's an-

tipathy toward the Soviet Union. It was considered equivalent to a policy of Soviet colonialism and later provided a basis for the criticism of Stalin. Moreover, the total amount of aid loans that the Soviet Union promised China was only U.S. $300 million with interest. At the signing ceremony, the Soviet foreign minister's attitude was like that of an arrogant alms-giver.[21] Khrushchev said in his secret report that "Stalin treated Mao Tse-tung like a beggar."[22] In all probability Mao found the typical chauvinism in Stalin and Vishinsky and felt extremely indignant at heart. Such was the true picture of the Moscow meeting—the meeting projected to the world as the manifestation of brotherly friendship and monolithic unity.

Major Miscalculations in U.S. Asian Policy

While Mao was not totally satisfied with the Moscow meeting, it gave the newly born people's republic heightened prestige abroad and ensured a more stable position for the CCP within the country. To do this, China brandished the unity of socialist nations with the Soviet Union like an elder brother. It also had a decisive effect on Mao's view of the Soviet Union and Stalin and eventually brought about a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations in which China sought to equalize its position vis-à-vis the USSR.

The United States had abundant information on China, which finally resulted in the voluminous China White Paper of August 1949 by the State Department. But the State Department was not allowed to make full use of its wisdom. The White Paper was a kind of self-criticism of the previous one hundred years of U.S.-China relations,[23] but as the lofty introduction (Letter of Transmittal) by Secretary of State Acheson shows, there was a logical conflict between the idea of China as a potential Yugoslavia and the attitude that China was subordinate to the Soviet Union. Acheson expressly charged that "the Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia. . . ."[24] On this point as well we would have to say that the United States was unable to understand what was behind Mao's declaration of the "lean to one side" policy.

As American leaders witnessed the unfolding of events in China with the establishment of the people's republic and the flight of the Chiang government to Taiwan, they again placed their hopes in the possibility of a new Titoism. By the end of 1949, they already foresaw the fall of Taiwan, but were prepared not to intervene. Then in January 1950 President Truman made a statement calling for nonintervention in the Taiwan problem,[25] followed by the famous Acheson speech at the National Press Club on January 12, in which the secretary stated that the U.S. defense line went through the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but excluded Taiwan and Korea.[26]

If the United States had maintained that China policy, then the result might have been very good, for a great abyss in thinking between Mao and Stalin was emerging just at that time in Moscow. But the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty was a great shock to the United States. Two days after the treaty was signed, on February 16, Acheson again said, "They [the Chinese] were completely subservient to the Moscow regime," a clear statement of the "loss of China" theory.[27] There is also another way of looking at the shift in policy: the Acheson statement is part of the response made at the beginning of the communist witch hunt by Senator Joseph McCarthy.[28] But basically, what was occurring was the adaptation of part of the logical conflict that existed within the China paper: that part which saw China as subservient to the Soviet Union. The concept of Titoization was maintained as a passive idea, an American hope, and it never developed into any active policy, at least not during the time that Mao and Stalin were locked in serious conflict. Then the Korean War broke out.

The Korean War and China[29]

Hypotheses about the War

It seems that all the possible hypotheses about the origins of the Korean War that could be presented have been, ranging from one extreme that places total blame on Stalin to another that labels the war an act of U.S. aggression. A great deal of study has been

conducted to unravel the riddle of how the war started and to analyze U.S. Asian policy and its decision-making process. When it comes to relations between North Korea, the Soviet Union, and China, however, there is almost no empirical research except some simplistic guesswork supporting a Sino-Soviet conspiracy theory and theses on Sino–Soviet–North Korean collaboration.[30] D. Horowitz has taken a view similar to I. F. Stone's[31] in analyzing the causes of the war in terms of American and South Korean motives, and he admits that one can see, to some extent, what was actually going on in Washington and East Asia just before the outbreak of the Korean War because a relatively large volume of information on the situation is available. But as far as Communist motivation is concerned, it is impossible to evaluate what was going on with so little information available.[32]

The most simplistic argument in favor of the Sino-Soviet joint conspiracy thesis is based on the premise that some arrangements must have been made between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung in Moscow several months before the war.[33] But most of this conjecture has been brushed aside by the availability of a clear picture of what went on at the Moscow meeting.

In a book into which much time and effort has gone, *Chōsen sensō no boppatsu* [The Outbreak of the Korean War], Shinobu Seizaburō effectively counters those who claim that the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea conspired to start the war.[34] One possible bit of evidence that might refute Shinobu's view is that during Mao's stay in Moscow, a North Korean mission also visited, led by Mao's friend Kim Du-bong, permanent presidium chairman of the Supreme People's Congress.[35] But when we consider what actually went on at the Moscow meeting, it is difficult to believe that Stalin and Mao had the degree of trust in each other necessary for a "conspiracy" that would start the Korean War.

Some subscribers to the joint conspiracy view also point to the fact that after February 1950, the Korean troops that had participated in the PLA were gradually incorporated into the North Korean armed forces. However, a more persuasive interpretation of this troop movement might just simply be that it was the return of Korean soldiers after the scheduled completion of duties with the PLA.[36] Another common contention among those supporting the Sino-Soviet conspiracy thesis is that a secret deci-

sion was made by which the Soviet Union had the responsibility for providing weapons and China was in charge of sending troops.[37] However, this too proves to be groundless given the background of the meeting and what was actually happening at the time. As will be discussed in greater detail later, China today criticizes the Soviet Union for having done nothing in the Korean War except sell weapons. If there had been some sort of agreement between the two on the role that each would play in the war, then China would undoubtedly be in no position to criticize the Soviet Union now.

Another view is that some mention must have been made in Moscow of the connection that the coming war would have with the internationalization of the policy of armed liberation. Such conjectures are taken from the fact that both the Cominform and the CCP criticized the Japan Communist party in January 1950.[38] However, even if Stalin and Mao discussed the problems of strategy for world revolution, they probably did not go beyond getting the Cominform to finally recognize the "Liu Shao-ch'i Thesis" for armed revolution in Asia[39] as part of the "Way of Mao Tse-tung." But we have to keep in mind that the "Way of Mao Tse-tung" entails not only aspects of armed revolution, but also those of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, as Liu Shao-ch'i points out in his "Internationalism and Nationalism." B. T. Ranadive, secretary-general of the Indian Communist party, and others who criticized the "Way of Mao Tse-tung" and advocated a more radical line were censured by the Cominform in March 1950.[40]

China's Frustration

As shown so far, it would be inaccurate to look at China's involvement in the Korean War in terms of Sino-Soviet conspiracy or an assigned division of roles between the two powers. What then was China's position in the background of the war? This question should be examined as thoroughly as possible, using the evidence that is available.

First, attention must be directed to the fact that China is now criticizing the Soviet Union in public for what happened in their relations during the Korean War. China is clearly indignant. One of the earliest examples of this attitude dates from July 13, 1957, right after the sudden shift was made from the Hundred Flowers

campaign to the anti-rightist campaign. At the National People's Congress, leaders of the democratic parties each had to make a self-criticism of their part in free speech during the Hundred Flowers campaign. In criticizing himself for statements made against the "lean to one side" policy, Lung Yün, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, admitted that he had spoken out fervently against the role of the Soviet Union during the Korean War.[41] Following the self-criticism, Lung was temporarily relieved of his position, but after Sino-Soviet relations had definitely turned for the worse, he was returned to the Defense Council in December 1958, showing that by this time the government had officially endorsed his criticism of the Soviet Union. During the Sino-Soviet dispute of 1963, the Chinese position toward the Soviets was made public in an article in *Jen-min jih-pao*. "We have always made the necessary sacrifices and stood at the front-line in the defense of socialism so that the Soviet Union can be kept at the second line."[42] Then, in the "Letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU from the Central Committee of the CCP" of February 29, 1964, the CCP said that during the Korean War, "We made a tremendous sacrifice and spent enormous sums of money for military purposes. . . . We have paid all principal and interest on loans from the Soviet Union at that time. . . . In aiding the Korean War and fighting against the United States, no free aid was ever offered by the Soviet Union."[43] This is exactly the same kind of idea that Lung Yün voiced against the Soviet Union, but here it is presented in an official context. More recently, in January 1972, officials of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association told members of a Japanese labor delegation from Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan) and Chūritsurōren (Federation of Independent Unions) that "the Soviet Union is a merchant of death. China sent a volunteer army to Korea which gave both blood and life in battle. All the Soviet Union did was sell weapons. Not only did they take the money for those weapons, they also collected interest."[44]

These Chinese statements are indicative of how strong their displeasure is toward the Soviet Union's conduct during the Korean War. Some idea of what the feelings of Chinese leadership were toward the Soviet Union at that time is shown by the fact that there were high tones of praise for the Kremlin at the August 1, 1950, anniversary of the PLA, but no mention whatsoever of the

Soviet Union at the same event in 1951, after China had entered the war.

According to a 1960 RAND Corporation study on Chinese motives for becoming involved in the Korean War, the Chinese entered the war neither in collusion with North Korea nor from pressure exerted by the Soviet Union.[45] The MacArthur strategy was the trigger for China's participation.[46] Perhaps a more basic reason was that if China did not enter the war during this period of unstable relations with the Soviet Union, the danger existed that Soviet armies would again enter the Northeast, which was under the control of the pro-Stalin Kao Kang.[47] As Edgar Snow says, one result of the participation of Chinese volunteer armies in Korea was China's being branded the aggressor by the UN.[48] It also made the People's Republic much more dependent on the Soviet Union, but more than that, it allowed the USSR to avoid direct intervention and continue its role as a "merchant of death." Both these things were ample reason for the strong Chinese antipathy toward the Soviet Union. One other important point is that during this course of events, the liberation of Taiwan was indefinitely postponed.

The Korean War was a great sacrifice for China. While it was developing a stronger system of preparedness to fight a war of resistance against the United States and to help Korea, the Chinese were also upgrading their level of domestic and national unification. Unification was a by-product of preparations for war.

China and the Korean War

It can be inferred, then, that China, rather than actually playing a part in fomenting the Korean War, was caught totally unaware when the war started. That this was the case is shown by three separate facts.

On June, 30, 1950, just five days after the war had begun, China proclaimed its land reform law. Considering the importance of national reconstruction, particularly the years of effort that the CCP had expended on land reform, leads G. Paloczi-Horvath to conclude that there was almost no reason for China to start a war.[49]

Another fact is that at the ~~second~~ third central committee meeting

of the seventh CCP congress on June 6, 1950, Mao ordered the mobilization (Mobilization for Production and Construction in Peacetime) of part of the PLA solely for domestic construction.[50] Then two days before the war, on June 23, he gave the opening address to the national committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference. His statement was devoted to the two trials of land reform and war, saying that "the trial called war is something that belongs totally to the past."[51]

The third point is that China at that time considered its most important domestic problem yet to be resolved: the liberation of Tibet and Taiwan. Only with the liberation of these two areas could the Chinese revolution be considered complete. In April 1950, the PLA liberated Hainan Island, and in May the Chusan islands were secured. The next objectives were Tibet and Taiwan. The liberation of Tibet was begun in October after the Korean War was well under way. There is a great deal of evidence, however, to show that the plans for attacking Taiwan had been made so that the invasion would take place during that summer.[52] The November 6 editorial in *Jen-min jih-pao* comments on the entrance of China into the Korean War in late October, saying that there was a great deal of argument within the nation as to whether or not China should participate.[53] Apparently, a number of people opposed the intervention.

Stuart Schram says that it is inconceivable that Mao could have had his nation involved in the war before June 25.[54] Allen S. Whiting says that there is no clear proof that China interfered in planning and preparations for the Korean War.[55] My own research leads me to agree with these views. The outbreak of the Korean War was a great surprise to China. Another important bit of evidence lies in the fact that neither Chinese newspapers nor radio carried any prepared reports on the war on the first day. It was not until two days later that the war was announced in the media.

My hypothesis is that the Korean War was part of Stalin's overall international strategy, especially as it related to Asia and China policy. China had just completed its revolution and was still filled with fresh passion. It participated in the Korean War not only because it confronted an emergency situation of defending the fatherland, but also because it was led by a sense of mission

to defend the socialist camp. But it led to China's becoming fully drawn into Stalin's strategy, with which the Chinese grew exceedingly discontented.

In relation to this, it is necessary to look again at the Sino-Soviet meeting in the early part of 1950. Stalin had to confront Mao's fervent nationalism and was not able to get the Chinese to accept all of his demands. Since the United States had not completely abandoned the policy of regarding China as a potential Yugoslavia, Stalin's worries and suspicions increased. In this regard, Mao said of Stalin that "he suspected that after we won the revolution, China would become like Yugoslavia, and I would be another Tito."[56]

If the memoirs of Otto Braun are correct in saying that Mao wanted to draw the Soviet Union into the war against Japan by keeping the situation in northeast Asia in a volatile state of confusion,[57] then it seems that the situation was reversed during the Korean War. Stalin's strategy then was to weaken China through protracted military conflict which would be confined to the Korean peninsula and the Chinese mainland. From the beginning, Stalin predicted that China would enter the Korean War, and he at least knew that the war would make the Mao regime even more dependent on the Soviet Union. With the ability of hindsight, we can see what was going on in Sino-Soviet relations at the time, and it can be quite reasonably surmised that the Soviet Union's boycott of the UN Security Council from January 1950 until after the Korean War began was a strategic move. They calculated to first boycott the council on the pretext of pressing for recognition of China, while knowing that the United States would intervene in the war and the Chinese would send in troops.

The situation in Korea was such that conflict could break out in the form of a war for national liberation,[58] but although the internal situation was an indispensable catalyst, it is very difficult to imagine that North Korea had nothing to do with the Stalinist strategy. After Stalin's death, a ceasefire was obtained through Chinese diplomatic efforts. Right after the ceasefire, Hŏ Ka-i and others of the Moscow group in North Korea were purged.[59] In China as well, those with close connections to the Soviet strategy in Korea, including Kao Kang, were purged.[60] Taking all these facts into consideration, we can see that, as G. Paloczi-Horvath

says, the Korean War was started by Stalin's Soviet Union and ended by Mao's China.[61]

This study of the various events at that time thus crosses the border of conjecture and gives us a fairly adequate glimpse of reality. I believe that the events leading up to the Korean War, where China was unavoidably drawn into Soviet strategy and paid a great price in both lives and money, are important factors in understanding the abrasive criticism that China makes of the Soviet Union today.

1. For Sino-Soviet relationship on frontier areas, *see* Sakamoto Koretada, *Henkyō o meguru Chū-So kankeishi* (Tokyo: Ajia keizai kenkyūjo), chaps. 2–4.

2. Otto Braun, *Kitajskie zapiski: 1932–1939* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974) pp. 214–16. *See also* Otto Braun, "Mōtakutō wa ikani seiken o nigitta ka," *Kyokutō no shomondai* 3, no. 2 (June 1974).

3. A critical analysis of P. P. Vladimirov's memoirs has revealed important information. *See* Petr Parfenvič Vladimirov, *Osobyj rajon kitaja 1942–1945* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Agentstva Pečati Novosti, 1973).

4. For the dynamic background of Sino-Soviet relations, *see* Nakajima Mineo, "Mosukuwa-Uranbatōru-Pekin," *Chūō kōron* (March 1975).

5. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart's secret plan to visit Peking was one step toward the possibility of such a policy. *See* Usami Shigeru, "Stuart taishi no Pekin hōmon keikaku," *Kokusai mondai* 198 (September 1976).

6. *See* Yubashi Shigeto, *Senji Nisso kōsho shoshi: 1941–45* (Tokyo: Kasumigaseki shuppan, 1974), chaps. 8–10.

7. Sankei Shimbun, ed., *Shōkaiseki hiroku, I: Higeki no Chūgoku tairiku* (Tokyo: Sankei shuppan, 1975), pp. 22–108.

8. J. M. MacKintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 41.

9. *See,* for example, A. M. Dubinsky, *The Far East in the Second World War: An Outline History of the International Relations and National Liberation Struggle in East and South-East Asia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1972), p. 59.

10. For discussion on this point, interesting material is found in Khrushchev's memoirs. *See* Strobe Talbot, tr. and ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), chap. 18; and Strobe Talbot, tr. and ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 235–44.

11. *See* Yen Chung-chuan's article in *Wen hui pao* (Hong Kong), 10 May 1969.

12. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China" (5 March 1949), *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (henceforth cited *SW*), vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), pp. 370–72.

13. Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China" (30 June 1949), *SW*, vol. 4, p. 415.

14. Ch'i Pen-yü, "Ai-kuo chu-i hai shih mai-kuo chu-i? P'ing fan-tung ying p'ien 'Ch'ing-kung mi-shih', " *Hung-chi* 5 (1967).

15. For details on the Kao Kang problem and the Soviet Union, *see* Nakajima Mineo, "Kōkō jiken to Chū-So kankei," *Kyōsan shugi to kokusai seiji* 1, no. 1 (July–September 1976).

16. *Tung-pei jih-pao* editorial, "Tui Chung-kuo jen-min ti chen-cheng yu-i: Ch'ing-

chu Tung-pei yü Su-lien i-nien mao-i hsieh-ting," *Jen-min jih-pao*, 9 August 1949. "K voprosu o torgovle Man'čžurii s SSR," *Izvestija*, 31 July 1949.

17. "Mao chu-hsi tsai Mo-ssŭ-k'o." *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* 1, no. 3.

18. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai pa-chieh shih-chung chuan-hui shang ti chiang-hua" (24 September 1962), *Mao Tse-tung Ssŭ-hsiang Wan-sui* (henceforth cited *Wan-sui*) (August 1969), p. 432.

19. Mao Tse-tung, "Sheng shih-wei shu-chi hui-i shang ti ch'a-hua" (January 1957), *Wan-sui*, p. 85.

20. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai Cheng-tu hui-i shang ti chiang-hua" (March 1958), *Wan-sui*, pp. 163–64.

21. San Yuan, *Mao Tse-tung Ssŭ-hsian yü Chung-su kuan-hsi* (Hong Kong: Sincere Publishers, 1972), p. 22.

22. Khrushchev's "secret" speech on Stalin, 25 February 1956 (New York: The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism, 1956).

23. On this point, *see also* Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), especially chaps. 6 and 12.

24. Dean Acheson, "Letter of Transmittal," in *The China White Paper, August 1949: United States Relations with China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. xvi.

25. "United States Policy Respecting the Status of Formosa (Taiwan): Statement by the President, January 5, 1950," in *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, ed. Department of State (New York: Arno Press, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 2448–49.

26. "Review of the Position as of 1950: Address by the Secretary of State: January 12, 1950," in *American Foreign Policy*, vol. 2, pp. 2310–22.

27. "'Total Diplomacy' to Strengthen United States Leadership for Human Freedom: Summary of Remarks by the Secretary of State, February 16, 1950," in *American Foreign Policy*, vol. 1, p. 7.

28. David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 103–9.

29. For a more extended analysis of this issue, *see* Nakajima Mineo, "Chōsen sensō to Chūgoku," *Kokusai mondai* 182 (May 1975).

30. One of the recent exceptions is Robert R. Simmons's book: *The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yŏng yang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: Free Press, 1975), especially pp. 48–136. My hypothesis on the origins of the war, however, is not in full agreement with Simmons's view, in particular on the Soviet Union's strategy and China's ignorance of the situation.

31. I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952).

32. Horowitz, *Yalta to Vietnam*, p. 119.

33. *See*, for example, Edgar O'Ballance, *Korea: 1950–1953* (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 59–60; Kim Chum-kom, *The Korean War* (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing, 1973), pp. 59–61.

34. Shinobu Seizaburō, *Chōsen sensō no boppatsu* (Tokyo: Fukumura shoten, 1969).

35. Kim, *Korean War*, p. 83.

36. Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 44.

37. O'Ballance, *Korea*, p. 60; Kim, *Korean War*, pp. 47–53; Tamaki Motoi, "Nihon ni okeru Chōsen sensō kan," in *Chōsen sensō shi: Gendai shi no saihakkutsu*, ed. Minzoku mondai kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Koria hyōronsha, 1967), pp. 308–9.

38. Ibid., p. 307.

39. For the "Liu Shao-ch'i Thesis," *see* Nakajima Mineo, *Gendai Chūgoku ron: Ideorogī to seiji no naiteki kōsatsu*, rev. ed. (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1971), p. 64.

40. *For a Lasting Peace and for a People's Democracy!* 2 March 1950.

41. Lung Yün, "Lung Yün tai-piao ti fa-yen," in *Chun-hua jen-min kung-ho-kuo ti i chieh ch'uan-kuo jen-min tai-piao ta-hui ti ssu tz'u hui-i hui-k'an* (Peking: Jen-min chu-pan-she, 1957), pp. 1402–3.

42. "Tsai chan-cheng yü ho-p'ing wen-t'i ti liang-t'iao lu-hsien: Wu p'ing ssu-kung chung-yang ti kung-k'ai-hsin, *Jen-min jih-pao*, 18 November 1963.
43. *Jen-min jih-pao*, 1 March 1964.
44. *Mainichi shimbun*, 26 January 1972.
45. *See* Horowitz, *Yalta to Vietnam*, p. 131.
46. For discussion on the MacArthur strategy, *see* Kamiya Fuji, *Gendai kokusai seiji no shikaku* (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1966), chs. 2–3.
47. *See* note 15.
48. Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 654–55.
49. George Paloczi-Horvath, *Mao Tse-tung: Emperor of the Blue Ants* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1962), p. 279.
50. Mao Tse-tung, "Wei cheng-ch'ü kuo chia ts'ai-cheng ching-chi chuang-k'uang erh tou cheng," *Hsin-hua yüeh-pao* 2, no. 3, p. 488
51. *See* Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 263.
52. Whiting, *Yalu*, pp. 21–22.
53. "Wei shen-me wo-men tui mei-kuo ch'in-lüeh ch'ao-hsien pu neng chih chih pu-li," *Jen-min jih-pao*, 6 November 1950. *See also* Tang Tsou, *America's Failure*, p. 575.
54. Schram, *Mao*, p. 263.
55. Whiting, *Yalu*, p. 45.
56. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai pa-chieh shih-chung ch'üan-hui shang ti chiang-hua," *Wan-sui*, p. 432.
57. Otto Braun, *Kitajskie*, pp. 214–16.
58. Okonogi Masao, "Minzoku kaihō sensō to shite no Chōsen sensō," *Kokusai mondai* 182 (May 1975).
59. For the purge of Hŏ-ka-i, *see* Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 440, 509.
60. *See* note 15.
61. Paloczi-Horvath, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 283.