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The Sino-Soviet Confrontation in Historical Perspective:

From Yalta to the Rift in the Late 1950s

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Introduction

This paper develops a basic framework for research on Sino-Soviet relations which I have just completed in Canberra after the longer study from my previous research which focused on ideology and internal politics in the People's Republic of China. This paper, therefore, is a rough summary of my forthcoming book entitled Gendaishi toshiteno Chūsotairitsu [The Sino-Soviet Confrontation as Contemporary History] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-sha, 1978) (see note at end of this paper).

In my study, I tried to analyse the historical process and dynamics of the evolution and developments of Sino-Soviet confrontation which has become an important chapter in contemporary history. I examined this process during the period from the inception of the so-called Yalta system to the sign of a rift between the two states prior to the open Sino-Soviet dispute in 1960. The reasons are as follows: first, in the search for the historical causes of Sino-Soviet conflict, it seems to me that the Sino-Soviet relations during this period and the U.S. attitude towards them were the most important factors decidedly influencing the post-war environment of Asia. Secondly, there are few studies dealing with the events of 1945-1959, with which my paper is mainly concerned, except for the period after the 20th Congress of the CPSU with its historic denunciation of Stalin. The third and most significant reason for my research is that new historical materials have recently been uncovered or made available, raising the level of factual knowledge and enriching the literature on this topic, as well as adding new dimensions to our perspectives on Sino-Soviet relations and post-war international relations in Asia. As a result, a number of myths about post-war international relations in Asia can be corrected.

As to the sources of my research, Foreign Relations of the United States (Diplomatic Papers) already released up to 1950 and other basic documents of the United States, for instance, NSC (U.S. National Security Council) Papers (in particular, NSC-48/1, NSC-48/2, NSC 68) and JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers) which also include much stimulating information of a Top Secret nature, were made public after the amendment of the Freedom of Information Act in November 1974.

On the other hand, as far as Communist motivations and behaviour are concerned, it is very difficult to evaluate what is going on with so little information and documentary material available. However, due to events such

as the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's Cultural Revolution, it is gradually becoming possible to use hitherto unpublished documents. In this respect, we can utilise several editions of Mao Tse-tung Ssŭ-hsiang Wan-sui in comparison with Volume Five of Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev Remembers and Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, the diaries of P.P. Vladimirov and Otto Braun and Wang Ming's memoirs, etc. and with official publications like Jen-min jih-pao, after performing textual criticisms.

In addition, my understanding of this theme was usefully affirmed by field study: one trip, in 1970, to Central Asia in the USSR; and another, in 1975, to the Sino-Soviet border region from Moscow to Peking via Ulan-bator beyond the border.

The Structure and "Geopolitics" of Confrontation

The Sino-Soviet conflict is a composite of four levels of confrontation: nation-to-nation; state-to-state; party-to-party; and government-to-government. The first is a confrontation of two separate nationalisms; the second, one of national interest; the third is ideological, a conflict over doctrinal orthodoxy; and the fourth involves diplomatic relationship.

Nation-to-nation conflict is probably the most deeply rooted and historically inevitable. The meeting of the Russian and Chinese peoples in the last three hundred years has been accompanied by a great deal of friction. At no time has one side ever held complete sway over the other, but both have been conquered by the Mongol Empire, and this shared historical nightmare is a stimulus to their nationalistic emotions. The image of a powerful Russian nation and that of the Mongol Empire seem to overlap in the minds of the Han people, constituting a "threat from the north", while, on the other hand, the Russians have always abhorred the notion of a strongly unified China, calling it the "threat from the southeast".

The second level of conflict, state-to-state, is over borders and territories, and has continued unabated since the Nerchinsk treaty of 1689. This conflict is so tenacious that it quickly overwhelmed the spirit of Leninist internationalism spelled out in the Karakhan manifestos of 1919 and 1920. With the subsequent rise of Stalinism and Maoism, the national interest of both nations was provided with ideological justification, making the two nations increasingly more incompatible. The Sino-Soviet rift has escalated

from theoretical dispute to confrontation in every phase of relationship between the two socialist states. (As ironic as it may seem, Peking and Taipei are in total agreement as far as border and territorial issues are concerned, not only the border territories but also the Paracel Islands and the Senkaku Islands issues, paradoxical evidence that the confrontation stems from roots far deeper than the realm of ideology.)

The third level, party-to-party, is a variable factor in the confrontation structure. In the future, the two countries will probably exhibit the same degree of restorative capacity that they have in the past to accommodate their doctrinal differences, but this, of course, will depend on changes in their respective domestic situations. The reason is that Sino-Soviet relations have a high degree of correlation to factional struggles within the parties, particularly in the Chinese Communist party (CCP). This, in turn, means that ideological conflict will be affected one way or the other by the outcome of the intraparty struggle or by changes in leadership.

The fourth level, government-to-government, is a superficial confrontation, and is the level most subject to internal political changes. Following the death of Mao Tse-tung, the possibility of a restoration on this level can be foreseen.

The ideological confrontation between China and the Soviet Union became increasingly more serious, although covert, after the beginning of de-Stalinization in 1956, and by the sixties it was an overt part of the conflict on both the party-to-party and government-to-government levels. Nation-to-nation and state-to-state conflict, however, date back long before the birth of the People's Republic of China. A number of potentially explosive issues began to surface during modern China's formative years - in the process of the Chinese revolution in its broader meaning. The areas bordering on either or both of these two great powers, such as Mongolia, Manchuria (Tungpei or Northeast), and Sinkiang, have often been scenes of collision between Chinese and Soviet nationalism, stages in their power struggle for spheres of influence. In one way the involvement of those smaller nations has been the source of the historical dynamics in Sino-Soviet relations.[1]

Confrontation over the sovereignty of Outer Mongolia began at the time of the 1911 revolution and has continued on until today. The declaration adopted by the second convention of the CCP referred to the "liberation" of

Mongolia and the prospect of incorporating Mongolia into a Federal Republic of China. Mao Tse-tung talked about the issue in his interview with Edgar Snow in 1936. The issue survived through the Yalta agreement of 1945, the Chinese-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Pact of the same year between Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek (hereinafter referred to as the Chinese-Soviet Pact), the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950 between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung (hereinafter referred to as Sino-Soviet Treaty), and the Sino-Soviet talks in 1954 during Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to Peking. After the most dramatic series of strategic interplays between the two powers, the problem is still not settled, insofar as the Mongolians remain divided into the Mongolian People's Republic and, within Chinese territory, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.

The memoirs of Otto Braun, who died recently, contain a startling expose about his experience as an adviser to the CCP during the latter part of the Comintern era.[2] Braun says that Mao Tse-tung's strategy, involving Mongolia and Sinkiang, toward the Soviet Union in the late 1930s was an ambitious attempt to draw the Soviet Union into the war against Japan. About this time Mao Tse-tung's repulsion of Stalin and the Comintern had taken on clear shape. His anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin attitudes probably deepened through the intense struggles with the Twenty-eight Bolsheviks (including Wang Ming [Ch'en Shao-yü], Po Ku [Chin Pang-hsien], and Lo Fu [Chang Wen-tien], and others), an opposition faction within the CCP during the Yenan period in the early 1940s.[3]

On the fluid historical conditions of Sinkiang, which have now become a focal point for Sino-Soviet border clashes, one need only recall that there was a plan for an "East Turkestan Republic" toward the end of World War II. Historically, however, Manchuria has been the most important stage for the Sino-Soviet conflict. From the Yalta agreement and the Chinese-Soviet Pact of 1945, all the way down to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung fought against but had to yield to Stalin's demands for ice-free ports - Port Arthur and Dairen, and railways - the East China and Manchurian (later Changchun) railways.

To sum up, we can regard Mongolia, Sinkiang and Manchuria (Tungpei) as the "Intermediate Zone" (tentatively borrowed from the CCP's terminology) between China and the Soviet Union. The Korean peninsula, on the other hand, has been the "Buffer Zone" for China and the Soviet Union. This was obvious

when T.V. Soong (Sung Tzu-wen) was carrying out talks centered on the Chinese-Soviet pact on behalf of the Kuomintang (KMT) government, which had been dumbfounded by the secret deals at Yalta; at that time the Soviet Union and China were quick to agree on the "independence" of Korea without paying much attention, quite unlike England and the United States. By its very nature, however, a "Buffer Zone" can easily be sacrificed by the conflicting parties once there is a change in the situation. I am inclined to believe that there was such an aspect to the Korean War.

Sino-Soviet relations, nurtured in this particular historical milieu, have had a highly dynamic background of strategic considerations[4] and been the most important factor in the post-war environment of Asia as well. Following the end of World War II American leaders had some historical insight into the possibilities of conflict between China and the Soviet Union, but they were unable to penetrate the heart of this conflict. The China White Paper was a document containing many logical inconsistencies, but in its introduction Secretary of State Dean Acheson did express a view of China, not as subservient to the Soviet Union, but rather as a potential Yugoslavia. If the United States had followed that view of China and begun serious talks with the new regime after the autumn of 1949, then perhaps the post-war Asian situation might have been radically different. From diplomatic papers recently made public, it seems clear that Mao had favourable feelings toward the United States in the late forties. When we compare them with his ill feelings toward the Soviet Union, we can see that the United States could have realistically chosen such a policy toward China.[5]

The Dilemma in the Yalta System

The Yalta Conference was held in February 1945 by the leaders of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union to lay out plans for the post-war international order. However, the Yalta system had built into it elements that would bring about its own destruction soon after the conference started. Within the framework of this unstable structure, the secret provisions concerning East Asia were bound to create problems. Even before Japan was defeated, the Soviet Union and the United States began to harbour mutual doubts about the other's intentions, and the post-war conditions of East Asia were decidedly influenced by those provisions. The beginning of the Cold War in Asia is generally considered to coincide with the outbreak of the

Korean War, but in actuality the conflict in Korea was more aptly the beginning of hot war in Asia. The Cold War had begun much earlier just after the inception of the so-called Yalta system. As far as this situation is concerned, a great deal of research has provided material showing that although the United States knew Japan was sending out peace feelers through Moscow, the Americans decided to use the atomic bomb as a means to prevent Soviet participation in the war against Japan as agreed upon at Yalta.

The Soviet Union pointed out at the Potsdam Conference that, as indicated at Yalta, it would declare war against Japan after the conclusion of the Chinese-Soviet Pact. Only two days after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima they sent adequately prepared troops quickly into Manchuria and swept over the Kwangtung Army, disregarding the fact that the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact was still in effect.[6] Although the Soviet Union had broken its promises on East Europe, in particular the so-called Poland issue that had been made at the Yalta Conference, it kept its word in Asia. That meant that the U.S. decision to use the atomic bomb involved a double miscalculation, and by keeping the promises made at Yalta, the Soviet Union won a dual victory the country became one of the victors in East Asia after only three days of fighting, and its Asian policy was executed exactly as planned.

The biggest flaw in the Yalta agreement was that it made a sacrificial object of China, which, although one of the victorious powers, suffered most from the war. The agreement also miscalculated the future of China and made no provisions for responding to the rise of Chinese nationalism. One American who recognised the dangers inherent in this secret agreement was the ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley. However, Hurley failed in his attempts to revise the Yalta agreement, and when the Kuomintang government discovered what the secret agreement was about, they dispatched T.V. Soong to Moscow for hurried discussions with the Soviets. Because of the power relations that existed at that time and the East Asian situation brought about by the Yalta agreement, China had no choice but to succumb to Stalin's arrogant attitude and make one compromise after another. This is clearly revealed in Chiang Kai-shek's memoirs, which were released recently.[7]

The Chinese-Soviet Pact was signed on 14 August 1945, only several hours before the Japanese surrender, just when the Soviet armies had almost completely occupied all of the northeastern provinces. Even though the treaty had been concluded on the basis of the secret Yalta agreement, it was signed

in such a hurry because the Soviet Union wanted to carry out its intended Far Eastern strategy without U.S. interference. In the exchange of notes and appended agreement of the treaty, China had to recognise the independence of Outer Mongolia and agree to the 30-year joint operation of the Changchun railway, the joint use of Port Arthur, and the declaration of Dairen as a free port. In short, the Chinese allowed czarist Russian interests in China to be restored more or less intact, sanctioned by the Yalta agreement.

This treaty was the basis for Soviet relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government right up until the establishment of the People's Republic of China. (The Soviet embassy moved each time Chiang moved his capital - from Nanking to Chungking, and finally to his last capital on the continent, Canton.) The Kuomintang government was continually threatened by the possibility that Stalin would extend aid or recognition to the CCP, and in order to prevent that eventuality, they had to concede many rights to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was able to skilfully take advantage of the KMT's weak position, and when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was pressing on to the Yangtze, the Soviet ambassador was applying pressure to the KMT government to concede rights in Sinkiang.

It was perhaps only natural that the Soviet Union placed much importance on the KMT as the organization that would hand over to the Soviet Union everything that had been established or built in the territories occupied by Soviet armies. Within only a few months after the occupation of the Northeast, the Soviet Union had transported to its own country the individual facilities left behind by the Japanese as well as a great number of Japanese prisoners. The U.S. economic investigation team led by Edwin W. Paulay estimated that the assets removed totalled U.S. $858,100,000 and if the depreciation and replacement costs were added, the figure would surpass $2 billion. Another estimate brings the figure closer to $3.5 billion.

That Stalin concluded the Chinese-Soviet Pact with Chiang Kai-shek and maintained diplomatic relations was in line with his consistent refusal to recognise the CCP and with his professed view that "all efforts would go into unifying China under Chiang's leadership". There is a great deal of evidence of what Stalin thought of the CCP at that time. It is very interesting, however, that the present Soviet view holds that the many contacts the Soviet Union had with the Chiang regime, including the 1939 commercial treaty, indicate that the USSR has always had a friendly attitude toward China.[8] Not

only did Stalin continue to recognise the KMT government, but he also underestimated the capability of the CCP. Even during the civil war, on the ground that the advance of the PLA would cause the United States to openly intervene, he put all sorts of pressure on the CCP until he somewhat modified his attitude in 1948.

Moscow Meeting

It is worthy of note that, given this situation, Mao Tse-tung gave instructions to establish bases in the Northeast and strengthen the party apparatus there as early as December 1945.[9] It even seems probable that Mao was then considering preparations for Soviet intrusion and was being pressed to decide whether or not he would bargain with the United States. It is significant that the report made by Mao at the second plenary session of the seventh central committee of the CCP in March 1949 and at the preparatory meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference in June 1949 implicitly pointed to a moderate line of accommodation with the United States.[10] On the other hand, during this period, Ambassador Stuart's secret contacts with the CCP through his former student Huang Hua (the present Minister of Foreign Affairs) were proceeding.[11] But later, on 1 July, Mao declared that China would adopt a "lean-to-one-side" policy in favour of the Soviet Union in his thesis on the people's democratic dictatorship.[12] He abandoned the Titoist alternative once and for all. That decision was very important, and involved more complex issues than simply the idea that "blood is thicker than water". Then why did Mao Tse-tung make that decision, having had bitter experience with Stalin's China policy on both the state-to-state and party-to-party levels?

Just prior to the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Mao foresaw that Soviet aid and advice would be necessary for nation-building. In addition to this obvious reason, several points which form the background of the decision must also be mentioned. First, there was a risk in selecting a policy of appeasement toward the United States because of the power relation that existed between the Soviet Union and China. To have taken that course would have created apprehension about what Stalin would do, judging from the way he acted in the past. Second, Mao had to consider the situation within the CCP at that time. According to Ch'i Pen-yü in his article "Patriotism or National Betrayal", written during the Cultural Revolution,[13]

for example, in 1949 Liu Shao-ch'i and his followers were contemplating turning against Mao and were therefore even more inclined to be conciliatory toward the United States than Mao. Third, and probably most important, is that the decision resulted from a tactical consideration by Mao, to build up a strong sense of nationalism vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Mao, now in place of Chiang, had the responsibility for the future of China and was worried about what would happen to Manchuria and Sinkiang, seized under the Yalta agreement and the Chinese-Soviet Pact. Leaning to the Soviet Union side can be seen then as a tactical move. In addition, earlier, in July 1949, Stalin invited Kao Kang, chairman of the people's government in Manchuria, to Moscow without consulting the CCP's leadership, and a trade agreement was concluded between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.[14] This was probably an additional factor governing Mao's decision. Incidentally, there is no official mention of this trade agreement in Jen-min jih-pao, but an editorial in Tung-pei jih-pao concerning this pact was reprinted in the 9 August 1949 issue of the official national daily. By contrast, the details of the agreement were reported in the July 31 issue of Izvestija.[15]

Against a background of these events, Mao set out for Moscow at the head of a group visiting the Soviet Union on 16 December 1949, immediately after the establishment of the People's Republic. He probably expected to receive his first warm welcome from Stalin as the leader of the Chinese revolution, but he was also wary, knowing what had happened before, and burning with the desire to totally reform Sino-Soviet relations. He felt that the visit would be the starting point. Officially, the reason to go to Moscow was to celebrate Stalin's seventieth birthday, but it was Mao's first trip abroad. Stalin, at least on the surface, welcomed Mao, but the reception was far colder than that accorded T.V. Soong some four and a half years before.

Mao told a Tass reporter on 2 January 1950, "I expect to be in the Soviet Union for several more weeks. The length of my stay depends on how long it takes to solve the problems confronting Chinese interests."[16] This was an indication that the talks were in trouble almost from the beginning. Mao Tse-tung finally signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of February 14, and he signed two other agreements and exchange of notes before he returned to Peking on March 4. It is rather unusual for the top leader of a country to stay in another nation for more than two months and a half so soon after establishing his regime. Moreover, Mao was accompanied in Moscow by Ch'en Po-ta, his political secretary, who was extremely proficient in Russian. But

by January 20, Mao called to Moscow Chou En-lai, premier of the Government Administration Council and concurrently minister of foreign affairs; Li Fu-ch'un, vice-chairman, Northeast (Tungpei) People's government; Yeh Chi-chuang, minister of trade; and Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, director of the USSR and East European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On January 30, they were joined by Saifudin, vice-chairman, Sinkiang Provincial People's government.

It is clear from the two additional agreements and the protocol that were signed later that in these talks with China, Stalin again demanded concession of rights from the Chinese, including ice-free ports and railways. We can easily surmise from the list of Chinese negotiators who later joined in the talks that the Northeast and Sinkiang had again become important issues. Further, problems seem to have arisen over what to do about the trade agreement concluded by Kao Kang for the Northeast.

China and the Soviet Union flaunted their monolithic unity in the Sino-Soviet Treaty as well as making it an alliance that would defend against any revival of Japanese militarism. It was a military alliance in which the United States and Japan were regarded as potential enemies, but in all of the pending questions between China and the Soviet Union, the Chinese won concessions, at least more than what was gained by the Chinese-Soviet Pact of 1945. The treaty provided for the free return of the Changchun railway to China by the end of 1952, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and the return of facilities at Port Arthur after the conclusion of peace with Japan or before the end of 1952 (in the case of war, then the port would be used jointly). The problems surrounding the port of Dairen would be left for discussion after the peace treaty with Japan. The talks indicate Mao's strong sense of equality vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the strong impact of the victorious Chinese revolution on Stalin. However, China had to go along with the Soviets for a joint operation of enterprises to exploit petroleum and nonferrous metals in Sinkiang and to submit to Soviet demands that the independence of Outer Mongolia be recognised.

The 1950 Sino-Soviet talks must have left Mao half-satisfied and half-frustrated, but at the tenth plenum of the eighth central committee in September 1962 he made a confession in which he said that "Stalin did not want to sign, but after two months of further negotiation he finally signed."[17] It is clear today that at private meetings in China as early as 1957 and 1958 Mao Tse-tung revealed what went on in the Sino-Soviet talks. In January 1957,

Mao is quoted as saying, "Our opinions differed from Stalin's. We were ready to sign but he was not, and we demanded the Chinese Changchun Railway, but he wouldn't give it back. But one can after all take the meat out of the tiger's mouth."[18] In the speech of March 1958 he said, "Stalin and I argued for two months in Moscow in 1950. Our attitude toward the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Changchun Railway, the joint-stock companies and border issues was to hear the proposals that Stalin made first and then argue with him over the ones that we did not like. The ones that he would push vigorously, we would accept. We did this in consideration of socialism's overall interest. There remained the problems of the 'colonial areas', Sinkiang and the Northeast. It was not to be tolerated that foreign nationals live there. This has now been solved."[19]

At any rate dissatisfaction remained with Mao after the Moscow meeting; the establishment of the joint-stock companies in Sinkiang served as a new provocation and deepened Mao's antipathy toward the Soviet Union. It was considered equivalent to a policy of 'Soviet colonialism' and later provided a basis for the criticism of Stalin. Moreover, the total amount of aid loans that the Soviet Union promised China was only U.S. $300 million with interest. At the signing ceremony, the Soviet foreign minister's attitude was like that of an arrogant alms-giver.[20] Khrushchev said in his secret report that "Stalin treated Mao Tse-tung like a beggar."[21] In all probability Mao found the typical chauvinism in Stalin and Vishinsky and felt extremely indignant at heart. Such was the true picture of the Moscow meeting - the meeting projected to the world as the manifestation of brotherly friendship and monolithic unity.

Major Miscalculations in U.S. Asian Policy

While Mao was not totally satisfied with the Moscow meeting, it gave the newly born People's Republic heightened prestige abroad and ensured a more stable position for the CCP within the country. To do this, China brandished the unity of socialist nations with the Soviet Union like an elder brother. It also had a decisive effect on Mao's view of the Soviet Union and Stalin and eventually brought about a new phase in Sino-Soviet relations in which China sought to equalise its position vis-a-vis the USSR.

The United States had abundant information on China, which finally resulted in the voluminous China White Paper of August 1949 by the State

Department. But the State Department was not allowed to make full use of its wisdom. The White Paper was a kind of self-criticism of the previous one hundred years of U.S.-China relations,[22] but as the lofty introduction (Letter of Transmittal) by Secretary of State Acheson shows, there was a logical conflict between the idea of China as a potential Yugoslavia and the attitude that China was subordinate to the Soviet Union. Acheson expressly charged that "the Communist leaders have foresworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia...."[23] On this point as well we would have to say that the United States was unable to understand what was behind Mao's declaration of the "lean-to-one-side" policy.

As American leaders witnessed the unfolding of events in China with the establishment of the People's Republic and the flight of the Chiang government to Taiwan, they again placed their hopes in the possibility of a new Titoism. By the end of 1949, they already foresaw the fall of Taiwan, but were prepared not to intervene. Then in January 1950 President Truman made a statement calling for non-intervention in the Taiwan problem,[24] followed by the famous Acheson speech at the National Press Club on January 12, in which the secretary stated that the U.S. defense line went through the Aleutians, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but excluded Taiwan and Korea.[25]

If the United States had maintained that China policy, then the result might have been very good, for a great abyss in thinking between Mao and Stalin was emerging just at that time in Moscow. But the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty was a great shock to the United States. After the treaty was signed, American leaders stressed that they [the Chinese] were completely subservient to the Moscow regime, a clear statement of the "loss of China" theory. There is also another way of looking at the shift in policy: these statements are part of the response made at the beginning of the communist witch hunt by Senator Joseph McCarthy. But basically, what was occurring was the adaptation of part of the logical conflict that existed within the China White Paper: that part which saw China as subservient to the Soviet Union. The concept of Titoisation was maintained as a passive idea, an American hope,[26] and it never developed into any active policy, at least not during the time that Mao and Stalin were locked in serious conflict.

On the other hand, during late 1949-early 1950, the United States was confronted with the three losses; i.e., the "loss of atomic monopoly", "loss

of China" and the "loss of Chinese Titoism", and launched a full-scale reappraisal of its Asian policy. Since hitherto confidential American documents of the post-war period are now accessible, we can understand the process of basic change in the U.S. Asian policy. This shift was clearly reflected in the Presidential recommendations embodied in the documents from NSC 48/1 and NSC 48/2 in December 1949 to NSC 68 in April 1950 inclusive.[27] The NSC 68 document apparently shows that the momentum toward a global military expansion policy of anti-communism or the concept of the "globalization of containment" had by then become thoroughly internalised within American public opinion, the Congress, and the administration.[28]

However, it is very significant for our consideration that although these documents show the basic orientation in U.S. Asian policy, as Dean Acheson recalled in retrospect,[29] NSC 68 was designed as a blueprint and material for brain-storming among the staff in top government circles and that the President had made any decision on it.

On the contrary, according to FRUS: Diplomatic Papers,[30] as far as East Asia was concerned, Korea was of very little strategic value to the United States, and Taiwan was foreseen as likely to become a write-off during the next few months. As a result, in the first half of 1950, not only the basic policy of the U.S. was to avoid using American military forces in the Korean peninsula, but the possibility of a North Korean attack on the South appeared to have received little attention.[31] Then the Korean war broke out.

The Korean War, China and the Soviet Union*

The Korean War was an 'International Civil War'. The situation in Korea was such that conflict could break out in the form of a war for national liberation. In this respect, the internal situation in Korea at that time was an indispensable catalyst.[32] But it is also very difficult to imagine that North Korea had nothing to do with the Stalinist strategy.

My hypothesis is that the Korean War was part of Stalin's overall international strategy, especially as it related to Asia and China policy. China had just completed its revolution and was still filled with fresh passion. It participated in the Korean War not only because it confronted

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*On this topic, I am now preparing a paper entitled, "The International Roots of the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet Confrontation", which is to be presented at the Korea Symposium at ANU in August. In addition, this constitutes a quite rough summary of a chapter from my forthcoming book.

an emergency situation of defending the fatherland, but also because it was led by a sense of mission to defend the Socialist camp. But it led to China's becoming fully drawn into Stalin's strategy, with which the Chinese grew exceedingly discontented.

In relation to this, it is necessary to look again at the Sino-Soviet meeting in the early part of 1950. Stalin had to confront Mao's fervent nationalism and was not able to get the Chinese to accept all of his demands. Since the United States had not completely abandoned the policy of regarding China as a potential Yugoslavia, Stalin's worries and suspicions increased. In this regard, Mao said of Stalin that "he suspected that after we won the revolution, China would become like Yugoslavia, and I would be another Tito."[33]

Stalin's strategy then was to weaken China through protracted military conflict which would be confined to the Korean peninsula and the Chinese mainland. From the beginning, Stalin predicted that China would enter the Korean War, and he at least knew that the war would make the Mao regime even more dependent on the Soviet Union. With the ability of hindsight, we can see what was going on in Sino-Soviet relations at the time, and it can be quite reasonably surmised that the Soviet Union's boycott of the UN Security Council from January 1950 until after the Korean War began was a strategic move. They calculated to first boycott the council on the pretext of pressing for recognition of China, while knowing that the United States would intervene in the war and the Chinese would send in troops.

After Stalin's death, a ceasefire was obtained through Chinese diplomatic efforts. Around the time of the ceasefire, Hŏ Ka-i and others of the Moscow group in North Korea were purged. In China as well, those with close connections to the Soviet strategy in Korea, including Kao Kang, were purged. Taking all these facts into consideration, we can see that the Korean War was started by Stalin's Soviet Union and ended by Mao's China.

This study of the various events at that time thus crosses the border of conjecture and gives us a fairly adequate glimpse of reality. I believe that the events leading up to the Korean War, where China was unavoidably drawn into Soviet strategy and paid a great price in both lives and money, are important factors in understanding the strong discontentment[34] and abrasive criticism that China makes of the Soviet Union today.

The Kao Kang Affair and Sino-Soviet Relations*

In short, my conclusion is that the Kao Kang affair was a very important development with international implications - not only representing a power struggle between Kao's local power group, attempting to turn Tungpei into an "independent kingdom" and the Party leadership in Peking, but also constituting a part of the struggle between Stalin and Mao or his Party leadership that had occurred in this traditional arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry of Tungpei.

Relaxation and Collapse in Sino-Soviet Relations

After the Sino-Soviet talks between Stalin and Mao, which produced some useful results for China but left in Mao's heart a deep-rooted sense of mistrust of Stalin, China took the first steps to achieve a relationship of equality with the Soviet Union. But it was a path encumbered with thorny bushes. Under these circumstances, Chou En-lai visited Moscow from August to September 1952. Chou was accompanied by a high-powered delegation of economic, military and diplomatic experts: Ch'en Yun, Li Fu-ch'un, Su Yu, Liu Ya-lou, Sung Shao-wen, Wang Ho-shou, Chang Wen-t'ien, and others. This was the second round of negotiations between China and the Soviet Union following the historic Moscow meeting of early 1950. These negotiations focused on three major issues: first, the revision or abolition of a series of unequal agreements which included the problems of the free return of the Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and the port of Dairen; second, the need for economic assistance from Moscow; and third, the question of a ceasefire in the Korean War which China already appeared anxious to reach. Chou was unable to gain any concession from Stalin except for the return of the Changchun Railway which had already been promised in the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1950. During this period, although the Sino-Soviet alliance was strongly stressed by both parties, there were deep-rooted tensions apparent between them.

However, the death of Stalin brought a perceptible change in Sino-Soviet relations. The agreements and joint communiques regarding ten items that the two countries achieved when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Peking in 1954 were intended to help rectify the unequal relationship, which had

*To this paper I have attached copies of my article on this topic which has been published in English in Japan.

hitherto marked intercourse between them. For the first time, the Chinese seem to have been satisfied with the new terms and substance of the agreements. After that time, the agreements and protocols between China and the Soviet Union were signed in Peking.[35] This was one of the reflections of the new relationship. Formerly, Mao could be summoned to Moscow and await Stalin's pleasure; now, the top leaders of the USSR came to Peking.[36] Needless to say, ideological differences began to emerge as ramifications of new issues produced at the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956, but for all intents and purposes, the re-invigorated friendship between the two communist neighbours was sustained until the first half of 1958. We have seen that, even then, the dispute and split had already been festering for some time below the surface, but before the vital interests of the two states brought the new confrontation to a stalemate in the nuclear era, the friendship between them had achieved much that was positively constructive. The final breaking point was the clash over military preparations and defense when they came up in the so-called Agreement Covering Military Technology and National Defense, which had been concluded in October 1957 and was abrogated in June 1959. In the Taiwan Straits Crisis in the summer of 1958, China attempted to test not only the U.S.-Taiwan military credibility but also the ultimate effectiveness of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance at the beginning of the nuclear age. On the one hand, the United States was also anxious to test the Sino-Soviet military alliance by means of the so-called Secretary Dulles's War Crisis Policy. On the other hand, Moscow learned through this crisis that nuclear sharing with Peking was a very dangerous choice for herself. In my assessment, the 1958 Quemoy Crisis may be said to be an international simulation of war in the nuclear era. Thus, the final collapse in Sino-Soviet relations occurred in June 1959 when Moscow unilaterally abrogated the so-called Agreement Covering Military Technology and National Defense.

Epilogue: The Myth of Sino-Soviet Confrontation

According to the newly disclosed FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, in April 1950, when the American public was shocked and confused by the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida expressed his belief that China would never become a slave of the Kremlin, referring to centuries of Chinese history, the character of the Chinese people and so on;

and he concluded that the Chinese would be "too much for the Russians".[57] This was a very impressive historical view of Sino-Soviet relations.

By the way, after the dramatic bankruptcy of the myth of Sino-Soviet monolithic unity, another myth has replaced it. It is a new myth of Sino-Soviet eternity confrontation. In the analysis above, I described the deep and historically rooted Sino-Soviet confrontation. As well, we must recall that a restoration momentum has sometimes been significant in Sino-Soviet relations. As I pointed out at the beginning of this paper, the Sino-Soviet conflict is a composite of four levels of confrontation. In this respect, we should consider the possibility of some change at the party-to-party level of relationship as well as at the government-to-government level in the foreseeable future. Anyway, the future of Sino-Soviet relations will be the most important factor in world affairs in the next decade.

Note from Introduction, page 1:

In order to put the present paper in proper perspective, the contents of my forthcoming book are as follows:

Preface

Introduction: The Structure and "Geopolitics" of the Sino-Soviet Confrontation

Chapter 1: The Cold War in Asia and Sino-Soviet Relations

1. Dilemmas in the Yalta System
2. The End of the War and the Asian Cold War

Chapter II: Perception and Fate in Sino-U.S. Relations

1. Sources of Sympathetic Images: Good Feelings Between the Two Nations and the Problems of the CCP
2. Contradiction and Split in U.S. Policy toward China
3. Loss of "Chinese Titoism"

Chapter III: Mao Tse-tung and Stalin: Myth and Reality about the Sino-Soviet Friendship Alliance

1. Stalin, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung: the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945
2. The Way to Moscow: Change to "Lean-to-One-Side"
3. Moscow Meeting: Historical Talks
4. Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and the Results of Moscow Meeting

Chapter IV: The Korean War and the Sino-Soviet Conflict

1. The Korean War as seen as America's Miscalculations
2. Hypotheses about the War
3. China's Frustration and Her Motives for Participation in the War
4. China and the Korean War

Chapter V: The Kao Kang Affair and Sino-Soviet Relations in Tungpei

1. The Current Significance of the Kao Kang Affair
2. The "Anti-Party Alliance" and the Deep-rootedness of the Affair
3. Decentralization of Power and Kao Kang
4. Tungpei for the Soviet Union: Sino-Soviet Relations in Post-war Manchuria
5. Stalin and Kao Kang

Chapter VI: Relaxation and Collapse in Sino-Soviet Relations

1. Before and After Stalin's Death and Improvement of Relations

   a) The Negotiations of 1952
   b) The Passing of Stalin and Achievement of Friendship in 1954

2. Khrushchev and Mao: Interaction between Alliance and Defiance

3. The Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Atomic Bomb

Conclusion: Myths about the Sino-Soviet Confrontation: "If", Hindsight and Lessons of the Past

Postscript

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