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JAPANESE POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA-1982

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Japanese sentiment toward the Soviet Union is now very unfavorable. Of course, it has never been particularly favorable within my memory. But today, even the reformist parties in Japan are strongly inclined to disown any friendly relationship with the Soviet Union – a situation rather exceptional throughout Japan's postwar history. Even in the apparently pro-Soviet left wing of the Japan Socialist Party, represented by the Socialist Society, the leadership is unenthusiastic about speaking for friendship with Moscow – with the exception of the top leader of the society, Itsuro Sakisaka.

In many Japanese bookstores, a special USSR section has been set up to display anti-Soviet publications and books emphasizing the Soviet threat, and all are selling very well. Many of them are sensationally topical, talking as if the Soviets were ready to invade Hokkaido tomorrow. A more serious discussion of the Soviet Union is "The Fall of the Soviet Empire" by Maoki Komuro (Kappa Books), which, according to the publisher, has already had sales of more than 300,000 copies. Apparently, the Japanese in their present anti-Soviet frame of mind would wish to see the Soviet Union fall.

From a dispassionate point of view, the anti-Sovietism now prevalent in Japan, though admittedly feeding on such recent actions of the Soviet Union as the invasion of Afghanistan and the construction of new military bases on Japan's Northern Islands, may be an

inevitable result of the foreign policy choice made by Tokyo when it decided to promote friendly relations with Beijing. If so, the Japanese sentiment against the Soviet Union may be viewed as a "strategic" development dictated by the current international environment. As such, it should be distinguished from the traditional anti-Soviet sentiment that has always lurked in the minds of the Japanese.

Many Japanese public opinion leaders and policy-makers have been aware of this fact, and are strongly concerned about the possibility of the trend swaying and restraining Japanese foreign policy in the future. They include the late Premier Ohira and former Premier Fukuda. The Foreign Ministry also appears to be developing the consensus that Japan in the near future will have to give serious attention to its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Perhaps a typical statesman with much insight, both theoretical and pragmatic, into the advisability of this policy stand is Kiichi Miyazawa, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and the real "helmsman" of the incumbent Suzuki administration.

WHAT THE PEACE TREATY WITH CHINA IS COSTING JAPAN

In the early 1970s there was the prevailing prediction that the Sino-U.S. *rapprochement* would greatly reduce tensions in Asia. It was in this climate that the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan was realized. Personally, I could not persuade myself to be so optimistic. Looking back at the beginning of the 1980s, after the major event of the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, one realizes that the fluid Asian situation in recent years obviously cannot be grasped accurately in terms of a detente alone. One may even feel that, just because a detente was achieved between big powers, the old tensions have been, as it were, carried over to smaller nations in the area and their neighbors, as may be seen from the recent developments in Indochina and the dramatic changes taking place in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The detente symbolized by the Sino-U.S. *rapprochement* has been brought about on the strength of a serious "cold war" between China and the Soviet Union, and there is no denying that the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations and the improvement of Sino-Japanese

relations in the opposite camp have provoked the Soviet Union into extensive strategic expansion in Asia.

In this general environment, Japan under the Peace and Friendship Treaty with China finds itself in a position, whether it likes it or not, to play a role in the international power game in Asia. For Japan today is no longer what it was in the 1960s, not to mention what it was under the allied occupation. As the world's second biggest nation in terms of GNP, Japan is now capable of exercising a very substantial influence. China, on its part, is predominant in Asia as a potential big power, and beginning to be active in a way as one of the leading players in the power game. By signing with this country a peace and friendship pact containing a highly provocative "hegemony clause", Japan, it must be said, has plunged into a situation carrying implications too serious from the viewpoint of international relations to be accepted as part of a conventional war settlement between the two countries.

In the 1980s, Japan may have to pay the cost of this foreign policy choice.

Recent changes in international relations vividly illustrate the fact that Japan stood at a very important crossroad in its recent history when it chose two years ago to sign a treaty with China containing a hegemony clause. At that time I pointed out that it was risky for Japan, elated in the prevailing atmosphere of friendship between the two countries, to view their new relationship simply as "bilateral" since both nations were now major figures in the arena of international politics. I also expressed the fear that, in the increasingly precarious international environment, too close a relationship between Beijing and Tokyo might seriously provoke Moscow and prompt it into further military and strategic expansionism while an "anti-hegemonist" alliance of the United States, China, and Japan might be organized to counter it, and that this might leave Japan in a tight spot in which it would have very few choices. I said that this foreign policy choice might then lead us dangerously from a pro-Chinese to an anti-Soviet stand. One of my articles on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty was subtitled, "A Choice for Peace or a Dangerous Alliance?"¹ On the other hand, the Japanese press as well as the Foreign Ministry and other government sources then prophesied that the pact would help strengthen Japan's diplomatic position in the world, and proponents of Sino-Japanese cooperation were confident that the Soviets would not do anything

serious against Japan if it accepted the hegemonism clause. Business leaders, dazzled by the prospect of an immense Chinese market, were all too anxious for contacts with China.

Beijing and Tokyo at that time had already had diplomatic relations with each other. While Beijing had reason to want to strengthen them in preparation for its "Four Modernizations" program, there was actually no need on Japan's part to sign the treaty at the cost of accepting the hegemonism clause. At the end of a negotiation process in which Japan, as it were, got into a blind alley, it made a decision that has since helped create the stringent international climate we find ourselves in today. It must be said that Japan is paying rather dearly for that treaty with China.

Now in retrospect, the first repercussion of the Sino-Japanese pact came in the form of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty signed in November 1978. As a result, a Soviet military, strategic bridgehead was established in Southeast Asia, the backyard of China. The Vietnamese, seeing their relationship with China thus deteriorating, ventured with Soviet backing on an expedition in Cambodia, which in its turn touched off a conflagration between China and Vietnam. A violent chain reaction of this sort tends to occur in international relations today, making the environment harder for Japan and everyone else in Asia.

The second repercussion of the treaty with China, which affects Japan most directly, has been the construction or consolidation of Soviet military bases or installations on three of Japan's Northern Islands. It looks as if Japan has plunged into a situation in which it appears to be voluntarily closing the possibility of getting the Northern Islands back.

How much of this was anticipated by the Japanese when they signed the treaty with China? Isn't the foreign policy choice they made in a sentimental mood now proving to be one lacking in diplomatic foresight and consistency? During the peace treaty negotiations with China, the prevailing attitude of the Japanese was optimistic and of the opinion that the treaty would result in a peaceful international environment in Asia. Little thought was given to its possible unfavorable repercussions. Now the Japanese are suddenly aware of the "Soviet threat". It was obvious to me that that particular foreign policy choice would give the Soviets an excuse to step up their strategic position against Japan, and I feel it is rather

naive to be anxious about the Soviet threat now after failing to anticipate what was obviously coming.

I am not denying the Soviet threat. But let me point out, as I did when I attended a strategic affairs subcommittee of the Soviet-Japanese Roundtable held in Tokyo in the fall of 1979 – which experience further confirmed me in my belief – that the Soviet Union is suffering from a psychological complex about Japan, and is much irritated and harassed by the anti-Soviet sentiment mounting in Japan. This often unnoticed aspect of the Soviet attitude, I believe, should be taken into consideration. In any case, since Japan has been much slower in developing a favorable diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union, it seems to me only logical that Japan should take an active attitude now for improving relations with the Soviet Union while ingeniously taking into account their external as well as internal vulnerabilities.

LOOKING INTO THE "SOVIET THREAT" THEORY

Among all criticisms of the Soviet Union mounting in Japan and elsewhere in the world since the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, the most violent and thorough is A. Solzhenitsyn's recent discussion of the Soviet Union,² in which he bitterly speaks of the Soviet action in Afghanistan as resulting from a lack of Western wariness of the Soviet Union, and goes on to argue that the present situation has its origin in the fact that "the most dangerous miscalculation of the West about communism began in 1918, when the West provided little support for the national resistance of the Russians" to Bolshevism. From his point of view, the Japanese Expedition in Siberia (1918-1922) would be justified, and an international military intervention in the Russian Revolution would appear to have been necessary. I was struck by the fact that Solzhenitsyn went so far in wishing for his "lost Russia" and condemning the Russian Revolution. The Japanese press, which previously was so eager to report everything about him, now seems indifferent to his argument.

Perhaps the press means to ignore Solzhenitsyn's recent remarks as reflecting his degeneration into mere anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. Even a sympathizer with him would have to admit that it is heedless and pointless to discuss current international relations and contemplate policies toward the Soviet Union from his point of view.

For the Soviet Union today is an immense reality and the major opponent of the West in the present world crisis.

Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I had always felt that the Soviet effort to organize a network of peace and friendship treaties or good neighborhood and friendship treaties containing what the Soviets insist on as "the consultation clause" constituted a basic element in Brezhnev's concept of an "Asian collective security system". Especially after the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborhood in December 1978, I often pointed out that Afghanistan now belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, I was less shocked than most people by the Soviet action there when it came, although it does not surprise me that the Soviet Union is now exposed to severe world criticism against its invasion of Afghanistan, which is glaringly indicative of the unsavory aspects of the Soviet state.

Indeed, the Afghan crisis has once again brought to light one established pattern of Soviet expansion abroad. Now under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union does not necessarily follow its classic expansionist patterns. But there is no denying that it has intervened in fluid situations abroad — in Angola, Ethiopia, and elsewhere — by supplying arms or dispatching military advisors there on the strength of its military capabilities. Coming on top of all this, the invasion of Afghanistan has seriously shaken the old view of the Soviet Union held by the State Department in Washington, which was beginning to see signs of maturity in Moscow's recent foreign policy. Meanwhile, observers are coming out with views in which they find consistent Soviet aggressiveness in the whole series of Soviet actions abroad, ranging from the traditional Russian expansionism and southward thrust carried on since the Tsarist days, through Stalin's expansionist actions including the division of Poland and the annexation of the three Baltic states during World War II, to the oppression of the revolts in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 during the process of de-Stalinization. However, it must be said that there is a considerable lack of reason in viewing all these developments in the same light and seeing a consistent Soviet attitude of aggression in Stalin's expansionist policies on the one hand, not to speak of those of Tsarist Russia, and, on the other, the Soviet actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia after the beginning of the de-Stalinization process, which were ill-conceived defensive actions for preserving the Soviet interests in these countries.

There have been a whole range of views advanced on the intention and background of the Soviet action in Afghanistan, and I think I should refrain from adding my own here. However let me point out that, in the Soviet viewpoints, Afghanistan after the downfall of the King probably appeared to be something like Mongolia (outer Mongolia). That is, Afghanistan's relationship with the Soviet Union after 1978 began to resemble that of Mongolia after the 1911 Xinhai revolution in China, after which Mongolia became the object of a suzerainty contest between the Russians and the Chinese, and finally fell under the predominant influence of the Soviet Union, where it now stays. In Afghanistan, as the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement illustrates, there was a similar competition for suzerainty between Britain and Russia. This background may have caused the Soviet Union to contemplate "Mongolization" of Afghanistan. Both Mongolia and Afghanistan are inland Asian neighbors of the Soviet Union, and should appear in Moscow's eyes to be twin subsystems closely resembling each other. In Mongolia, however, an inclination toward alienation from the Soviet Union has surfaced from time to time, and led to oppressive Soviet intervention in each case. Similarly, the Amin regime in Afghanistan had been getting out of Moscow's control when the Soviet Union intervened, and their awareness of a crisis in this situation, in addition to the various factors already pointed out exhaustively by various observers, must have confirmed the Soviet Union in its resolve.

Thus, we can see that Soviet military intervention is likely to occur only when the Soviet Union thinks it has some kind of justification or moral obligation for it, such as a need to defend a revolutionary regime in power from "counterrevolutionary forces", whether "external" or "internal", and that many "Soviet threat" theorists are unjustified in their argument that the Soviet Union in its present condition may invade a peace-loving country any minute through unlimited use of their military might. Stanley Hoffman³ is in favor of the view that "military power has never been so central and conspicuous a means of Soviet foreign policy as many people suggest." A "Soviet threat" theory not giving sufficient thought to this fact is bound to be demagogic. So long as one looks at things from such a viewpoint, it will be impossible, both theoretically and in practice, to effectively meet the existing crisis. At least, one cannot provide from such a stand any long-range principle that may safely be followed by Japan in dealing with the Soviet Union.

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CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

With reference to China, on the other hand, how should one assess recent political and social developments in that country? One could begin by looking at major political events recently witnessed in China.

The National People's Congress called in late August and early September 1980 (5th Congress, 3rd Session) elected Zhao Ziyang new Premier, and offered a number of other fascinating topics to the world before closing.

Though outwardly amicable and uneventful, the Congress was certainly noteworthy in that it brought to light China's troubles and conflicts rather than hopeful prospects at this time of a major turnabout in favor of the Four Modernizations program. While indicating that the political situation in post-Mao China was undergoing a quick, dramatic change, the Congress was also suggestive of a number of explosive problems lurking under the surface that would probably come to a head should Deng Xiaoping die or become incapacitated now. Just because Chinese society is moving at a dizzy pace in the direction dictated by this rare genius in political strategy, there is not a little resistance to that trend within the country, and for some time to come the people at large will have to suffer from the same kind of uneasiness about what is coming after Deng as they did immediately before the decease of Mao Zedong.

In spite of all this, the Japanese press, which tended to overplay the last People's Congress, generally impressed the public with the idea that China was taking a new giant step forward at the meeting, and noted the following four features of the event: (1) There is an effort at separating the Administration from the Party, as reflected in Chairman Hua Guofeng's resignation as Premier; (2) the top leadership has become younger as a result of the emergence of second-generation leaders; (3) a series of top personnel shifts have been carried out on the strength of political stability achieved under a collective leadership system; and (4) Chinese politics is becoming more open, as may be seen from the fact that foreign diplomats and newsmen were allowed to witness the proceedings of the Congress.

Are these observations really valid? I regret to say no on all four accounts.

First, Party and Administration are far from being separated from each other, as is evident from the fact that Chairman Hua's resignation as Premier, which was the main event of the meeting, was realized "at the request to the Party leadership." It is evident that top personnel shifts in the Administration are still under the control of the Party leadership. Moreover, the newly-appointed Premier, Vice-Premiers, and leading members of the Executive Board of the National People's Congress are all top leaders of the Party, most of them Politburo Members or Central Party Secretaries. The "Party-for-All" principle has not been shaken at all.

The Congress has not been successful in rejuvenating the leadership, either, as is illustrated by the fact that the new leadership is only a year younger than the old in average age. Chairman Ye Jianying of the Executive Board of the Congress was reelected at 82, and Vice Chairman Sun Qingling at 90. The noteworthy post of defense minister, vacated by Xu Xiangqian at 78, could not be filled.

The term "collective leadership" is essentially inimical to Chinese politics because of its cultural background. It should be noted that Deng Xiaoping, having retired as Vice-Premier, is using such followers as Hu Yaobang, Wan Li, and other influential technocrats who have fallen twice and risen twice with him since the Cultural Revolution and now hold key positions in the Central Politburo and the Central Secretariat of the Party, to break up the camps of the right-wing and middle-of-the-road factions of Cultural Revolutionists led by Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying. The new Premier, Zhao Ziyang, though theoretically an exemplary implementer of the Four Modernizations program, used to be a follower of the late Tao Zhu. It is recalled that, during the campaign against the pro-capitalists in 1976, Zhao attended an anti-Deng Xiaoping rally in Sichuan Province and made a speech in which he bitterly attacked Deng. As a candidate for Premier, he probably met with less opposition than anyone else in the current transitional period in Chinese politics just because he was not a dyed-in-the-wool follower of Deng.

It may be true that Chinese politics is gradually becoming more open. But one should remember that a Constitutional amendment against "Four Freedoms" including the one for putting up "wall bulletins" was carried by a vote of 3,220 to 0 (with one abstention). Does this suggest "open politics"? The People's Congress still appears to be a controlled affair.

Thus, it may be said that the problems have all submerged under the surface without being solved, and are likely to come up again to rock the Chinese political world as the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party draws near.

Immediately after the close of the National People's Congress, the *People's Daily* on September 18-19 carried an important article signed by Li Hunglin and titled, "Leaders and the People", in which the writer bitterly denounced "the feudalistic, autocratic way of appointing successors", thus apparently questioning the legitimacy of Chairman Hua Guofeng's assumption of power. This is just another reflection of the complex situation in Chinese politics described above.

Underlying all this is the question of how far de-Maoization should be carried out, or how Mao Zedong should be reassessed. Although Liu Shaoqi and most other people branded as "enemies" by Mao himself have been rehabilitated and a campaign for repudiating the Cultural Revolution and praising Liu is getting under way, Beijing is still unable to say outright that Mao himself is responsible for the past tragedies, and has to put the blame solely on "Lin Biao and the Gang of Four". This internal dilemma will continue to trouble China for some time to come.

One characteristic feature of the political environment just described is the fact that China is beginning to show signs of change in its assessment of Soviet society. In contrast to the old charges of "revisionism" and "capitalism" hurled at Moscow, the prevailing view in Beijing today is that the Soviet Union is a socialist state after all. This is a very important change that must be noted.

The new Chinese view of the Soviet Union must have something to do with the new internal situation in China in which Liu Shaoqi has been rehabilitated and is now highly praised for his achievements. Thus, old factors of conflict are disappearing at least at the Party level between the two countries. It seems to me, moreover, that the evolution of Chinese society, including the effect of the current Four Modernizations program itself, is turning toward the direction which the Soviet Union trod before.

Of course, the Moscow-Beijing feud at the level of international relations has been intensifying all the more since the recent Afghan crisis, and the above-mentioned change in Chinese opinion does not immediately justify one in thinking that Beijing is taking a step toward reconciliation with Moscow. Nevertheless, the possibility

of an improved relationship developing between the two socialist powers in the future is increasing, from the pragmatic as well as theoretical point of view.

While stressing more strongly than most other observers that the Sino-Soviet antagonism is highly deep-rooted,⁴ I have also been suggesting the possibility of Moscow and Beijing making up in the future. My viewpoint, however, has not always been favored by other experts in international relations. Both U.S. and Chinese scholars tend to argue that there is no such possibility. But something like a hunch as a student of Chinese affairs tells me otherwise. I am practically convinced that China's foreign policy always changes voluntarily reflecting changes in domestic policies, and is influenced more by internal political factors than external ones involved in international power politics.

After the death of the old myth of "monolithic unity" between the Soviet Union and China, has a new myth of everlasting antagonism between them emerged to replace it? If so, I must say that there is danger in that sort of thinking.

It is well known that China today is at a very low level of development at home (per capita GNP 200 odd U.S. dollars, foreign exchange reserves only \$1.3-1.4 billion). On the external scene, however, China is speaking in a highly spirited way with its favorite slogan of "anti-hegemonism". Since the Afghan crisis, indeed, Beijing has been emphatic that its theory of anti-Sovietism and anti-hegemonism has been corroborated. Generally, China has a unique talent for impressing others with an overly grand image of itself. Although its national power is still inadequate both in military and economic terms China somehow manages to make others believe that it has very substantial capabilities.

Moreover, Washington is strongly inclined to make China more powerful in military terms and make much of it in dealing with the Soviet Union at a time when the United States itself is experiencing a leadership crisis both at home and abroad — a strategy clearly reflected in the recent visit of Defense Secretary Brown to China. Sandwiched between the United States and China, Japan is getting involved in the new relationship between the two powers whether Japan likes it or not.

In Washington's eyes, it is in the immediate interest of the United States to bring up China as a military counterbalance to the Soviet Union. China, on its part, continues to call for anti-hegemonism",

but we should try to see whether to not Beijing indeed is wholly committed to it.

In the international environment of new growing "cold-war" tension following the Afghan crisis, Washington has come out with a clearcut policy of cooperation with Beijing, while China apparently wonders if it should go all the way with the United States, whose position is now so critical that it cannot help feeling the military threat of the Soviet Union. In the event of a conventional type of war, China will have to face a really serious military threat from the Soviet Union. Beijing must be mindful of this possibility.

After the outbreak of the Afghan crisis, China purchased as many as six large helicopters from the Soviet Union in late January this year; agreed to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on navigation along the border rivers in late February (which negotiations led to an amicable settlement on March 19); also conducted clerical-level talks on Sino-Soviet trade, resulting in the successful conclusion of a 1980 trade agreement under which 1,500 Soviet "Volga" cars would be imported this year (as against some 900 last year); and signed another agreement for importing 100 Soviet combines this summer. All this seems to reflect Beijing's new attitude toward Moscow. In short, China finds itself in a "seller's market" in international relations today, and therefore does not feel like playing "the Soviet card" in haste. Apparently, Beijing is merely showing it off deliberately from time to time while proceeding toward its own strategic goals.

Moreover, with the progress of the de-Maoization process, Liu Shaoqi, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentien, Li Lisan and other "pro-Soviet" leaders have been rehabilitated one after another. This means that, on the domestic scene at least, China is getting rid of the biggest factors responsible for the Sino-Soviet dispute. How soon this change will be reflected on the foreign policy scene needs close watching. It seems to me increasingly important to recognize that such recent changes inside China are sharply increasing the chances of a Moscow-Beijing reconciliation.

After acting in concert with China in following its anti-Soviet, anti-hegemonist policy, and venturing into a tripartite alliance with the United States and China, Japan may find Beijing itself suddenly changing its mind and bowing out. Recent domestic changes in China seem to me to suggest that possibility.

REALITIES OF SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

In an increasingly difficult international environment, Japan can no longer rely solely on the friendly mood of the Beijing-Tokyo relationship. This is partly because the honeymoon phase of economic relations between the two countries is now over. In reality, they are proving not so sweet as many Japanese business leaders expected initially in the prevailing atmosphere of Sino-Japanese friendship. When a long-term trade agreement was signed between China and Japan in February 1978, it was widely reported that 15 million tons of crude oil would shortly be shipped to Japan, and that the flow would soon increase to 50 million tons. In 1979, only 7,510,000 tons of high-cost, low-quality heavy-grade oil came from China. This year, imports of Chinese oil are expected to amount to more than 8 million tons, but even this is not a firm prospect. All this is no wonder since China does not have much oil for export in the first place, and needs more and more oil for domestic consumption.

Looking at Sino-Japanese trade as a whole, including oil transactions, one notes that the 1979 export-import total of \$6,658 million is already as much as about a quarter of China's total external trade. Further growth will not be easy to achieve. One should dispassionately consider the fact that, despite the loud talk about Sino-Japanese economic relations, trade with China accounts for a paltry 3.1 percent of Japan's trade volume.

Moreover, the Baoshan Steel Mill in Shanghai, the main "show-piece" in Sino-Japanese economic relations, which was initially scheduled to come on stream in 1980, is still in such a state that no one knows exactly when it will be ready for operation. On top of all this, the *People's Daily* on March 21 carried an article titled, "Some Realizations and Proposals on the Modernization of the Metallurgical Industry", and signed by Zhou Chuandian, Deputy Director of the Technological Office, Metallurgical Industry Department. In this article, the writer pointed out that the Japanese-designed Baoshan mill, though ranking among the most sophisticated in the world, was too costly because it was too large in scale, automated too much, and integrated too much. He clearly stated that China under its present circumstances and at its current level of metallurgical technology would do better with a mill of the U.S. type, or even of the Soviet type. This threw cold water on the wishful thinking

of many Japanese business leaders. It might be added that the Baoshan mill was openly objected to at the last National People's Congress.

China and Japan are, so to speak, half-brothers, who would do better by dealing with each other at arm's length. Their relationship for the immediate future should have emphasis on cultural, academic, and educational contacts rather than on ostentatious events in the political and economic areas. Japanese cooperation in the former areas would be able to make much greater contributions to the modernization of China.

Japan should consider its future relations with China from a dispassionate point of view. In December 1979, Deng Xiaoping met with the late Japanese Premier Ohira. Although the relationship between the two countries then was very close already, with Japan offering \$1.5 billion of credit to China, the Chinese leader ventured to say that his country viewed relations with Japan as part of China's global strategy. This strategic way of thinking of China should be borne in mind by the Japanese.

EPILOGUE

On May 7, 1980, Soviet Ambassador Polyanski spoke at the foreign press club in Tokyo, and stressed that the Soviet Union had deployed new forces in the Far East including the Northern Islands with a view to countering the Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. *rapprochements*. Also in May, the late Premier Ohira visited Washington for a summit conference with President Carter, and late that month received in Tokyo Chairman Hua Guofeng from Beijing for a Sino-Japanese summit. For the first time in Japanese diplomatic history, U.S.-Japanese and Japanese-Chinese summit meetings were held in the course of a single month on Japan's initiative. This has given Moscow some ground for arguing that a U.S.-Japanese Chinese anti-hegemonist coalition/anti-Soviet alliance came into being in May 1980 — a new problem for Japan's foreign policy.

Personally, I believe it is an urgent necessity for Japan to establish itself in a new diplomatic stand in favor of maintaining a sort of "dynamic balance" in dealing with Moscow and Beijing rather than "dealing with them equally at arm's length", a popular but inconsiderate notion. For this purpose, Japan should work out a practical course of action vis-a-vis Moscow to bring back to a

proper position the foreign policy pendulum that has swung too far in the direction of Beijing.

In doing so, Japan should first of all take into consideration the Soviet Union's anxieties about the institutional vulnerabilities of its society and about its economic future, and attempt to find a way in which the Soviet Union can be induced to become more dependent on Japan in the economic area. In this connection, Japan can learn from the example of West Germany, which is successfully containing the Soviet threat economically by purchasing large quantities of natural gas from the Soviet Union.

Secondly, with reference to the essentially provocative issue of the Northern Islands, Japanese public opinion has been tending to overheat lately. But one should realize with a cool head that just heated public opinion can never solve the problem. If one rejects the unwise choice of "all or nothing", it will be essential to reconsider what has been a taboo on this issue: the idea of having two units (Habomai and Shikotan) of the Northern Islands returned and having the other two (Etorofu and Kunashiri) frozen. It is also logically appropriate since there is little Japan can do diplomatically in dealing with Moscow on this territorial issue even though there are old maps and documents in support of Japan's claim.

It is recalled that the idea of splitting the Northern Islands for reversion was advanced in the days of the Miki Administration by the late Kazushige Hirasawa, one of Premier Miki's brain trusters. But he was "beaten up" for this suggestion: a settlement should be made on Habomai and Shikotan on the basis of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration which said that the two territorial units should be returned to Japan upon conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries while the other two islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, should be left "frozen" until the end of this century; and on these conditions a peace and friendship treaty should be signed with the Soviet Union.⁵ Unfortunately for Mr. Hirasawa, the proposal flopped partly because he was the advocate, and partly because it was brought up under the unpopular Miki Administration. The concept may become more realistic in diplomatic terms under an Administration headed by Kiichi Miyazawa, if it ever comes about in the future.

In any case, Japan will have to take a more independent foreign policy stand before long. The U.S. administration is rather naive about China, and does not seem to have a very sophisticated view

of Asia, either. In some cases, therefore, Japan may be able to help the United States learn more on these subjects, and advise Washington to exercise more self-restraint in its policy toward Asia and China. Instead of simply having to pay for the aftermaths of U.S. policy failures in Asia, Japan should come out with an independently-conceived foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which, I am convinced, will help create a new sound partnership between the United States and Japan.

NOTES

1. Mineo Nakajima, "The International Environment of the Sino-Japanese Treaty: A Choice Between Peace and a Dangerous Alliance." *Sekai*, October 1978.
2. "Solzhenitsyn on Communism: Advice to the West, in an 'Hour of Extremity'." *Time*, February 18, 1980.
3. Stanley Hoffmann, "Muscle and Brains." *Foreign Policy* 37 (Winter 1979-80).
4. Mineo Nakajima, *Chūso Tairitsu to Gendai: Sengo Azia no Saikōsatsu (The Sino-Soviet Confrontation and the Present Age: Reappraisal of Postwar Asia)* (Tokyo: Chū Kōron Sha, 1978).
5. Kazushige Hirasawa, "Japan's Emerging Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975.

6

JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN THE 1980s

Tatsumi Okabe

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Since 1972 and especially since 1978, Japanese-Chinese relations have been very good. This is the first case of friendship on equal terms in the modern history of relations between the two countries. On looking back, however, one notices that there had been very tense relations between Japan and China just before the normalization in 1972. The tension was mainly caused by China's severe attacks on the alleged "complete revival of Japanese militarism." China had attacked the "revival of Japanese militarism" all the time before the normalization, but she accelerated the attacks in April 1970, saying that the militarism had "completely revived." The attacks came to a complete stop in mid-1972 just before the normalization. In other words there was a *volte-face* of China's position in the 1971-72 period. Before discussing the present relations, it is necessary to analyze the background of this policy change.¹

China's attacks on the "revival of Japanese militarism" seem to have had two aspects. One was the reflection of "real intentions" of Chinese leaders. Ideologically speaking, Japan was regarded as a subordinate country to the "American imperialism." So far as the United States was seen as the "main enemy" of the Chinese people, Japan was also seen as a "lackey" serving this "master." It was for this reason that China never labeled Japan as imperialist, but labeled it as militarist. The term imperialism was reserved for only independent "monopoly capitalism."