

Chapter 14-5

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THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA

VOLUME 14: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-65

Part 1. Emulating the Soviet model, 1949-57

Chapter 5. Foreign Relations: from the Korean War  
to the Bandung Line

by

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## Overview

On October 1, 1949, the broad national unity front that had supported the Chinese Revolution led to the foundation of a central people's regime headed by Mao Zedong. The newborn people's democratic dictatorship had to tackle the immediate national, social task of reconstructing the Chinese economy that had been wrecked and exhausted by the long revolution and civil war. China was setting out on the road to socialist transformation into a so-called new democratic state (or a people's democratic dictatorship).

On the external scene, the newly-established People's Republic was quickly recognized by the Soviet Union, its East European satellites, and some Asian nations including India. Britain followed suit a year later in 1950, and new China was making a successful debut in the world.

Needless to say, China's top foreign policy goal then was to develop friendly relations with its big brother in socialism, the Soviet Union. As early as December 1949, Chairman Mao personally led a delegation to Moscow for that purpose. The following year, in February 1950, new China signed with Moscow a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance as well as a number of agreements with the hope of launching an industrialization program with Soviet aid. However, what the Chinese got from Stalin's Soviet Union fell far short of their expectations, and it is now known that they had long, difficult negotiations with the Kremlin leadership as Stalin treated them rather coldly. The myth of the monolithic unity of Moscow and Beijing certainly needs to be unraveled.

Following its foundation, moreover, the People's Republic of China was faced with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and had to send "volunteers" to Korea in October. China thus lapsed back into a state of war, and launched a nationwide "Resist America, Aid Korea" campaign. As is well known, the Korean War provided the basis for the subsequent cold-war pattern in Asia based on U.S.-Chinese antagonism. Meanwhile, Tibet was "liberated" in October 1950, and the People's Republic established effective control over all traditional Chinese territory with the exception of Taiwan.

Under these stringent circumstances, the Communist regime in Beijing proclaimed a land reform law in June 1950. Completed by the end of 1952, the land reform revolutionized the agrarian scene that had traditionally characterized Chinese society.

Farm life in China changed completely. With the landlords overthrown and the poor peasants and small farmers acquiring land, agricultural production soared sharply. Although it was still difficult to keep up the growth curve on a lasting basis, the sense of crisis created by the Korean War and the national unity campaign under the "Resist America, Aid Korea" slogan went a long way toward the solution of the problem.

On the external scene, revolutionary China came out with the policy, manifest in the Liu Shaoqi thesis of 1949, of supporting and encouraging armed national liberation struggles by revolutionary forces in other Asian countries in conjunction with the world strategy then followed by the Cominform. China



also actively participated in the world peace movement and the international labor movement. But since the People's Republic was still young, and had the Korean War to think of, China then was concentrating primarily on internal problems, which it tackled in national unity. It may be said that the Chinese Communists were not yet venturing on positive diplomatic moves outside the framework of their revolutionary foreign policy.

Late in 1953, after the truce in Korea, Beijing finally set out on a full-scale internal construction program. The first five-year plan (1953-57), based on Soviet aid and oriented toward heavy industry, was officially adopted in July 1955. Actually, however, it had been in progress since 1953, and China was already on its way toward industrialization.

Also in late 1953, grass-root elections were held for the first time to return Delegates to the National People's Congress, and the Constitution of the People's Republic was adopted by the First Congress at its First Session in September 1954. Its preamble expressly called for a "transitional general policy-line" aimed at a long-term progressive transformation of China into socialism.

This basic policy based on a slow but steady internal construction program was reflected on Beijing's diplomatic attitude. Indeed, it was during this period that an orientation toward peaceful coexistence was most conspicuous in China's foreign policy, giving rise to a variety of showy developments in Chinese diplomacy. In June 1954, Beijing recognized the

famous "Five-Point Peace Principle" in a Sino-Indian joint communique. In October, on the occasion of celebrations for the fifth anniversary of the People's Republic, Beijing succeeded in persuading a visiting group of new Soviet top leaders including Bulganin and Khrushchev into correcting old Stalinist inequalities in Sino-Soviet relations. In this diplomatic environment, Zhou Enlai (Premier and Foreign Minister) was primarily responsible for China's foreign affairs. Along with Nehru's India, China then led the group of newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, and cut a prominent figure on the diplomatic scene by attempting to strengthen the solidarity of the nonaligned countries and even calling for a stand of positive neutrality.

The signing of the ceasefire agreement in Indochina in July 1954 and the success of the First Conference of Asian and African Nations in April 1955 (the Bandung Conference) were two noteworthy developments at that time that owed much to China's diplomacy under the Five-Point Peace Principle. In August 1955, an official U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial-level conference began in Geneva.

Under these circumstances, Zhou Enlai delivered a speech titled "On the Current International Situation: Our Foreign Policy and the Problem of Liberating Taiwan" at the Third Session of the First National People's Congress in June 1956, in which he exhibited a remarkably flexible attitude in summing up China's diplomacy under the Five-Point Peace Principle, calling for peaceful liberation of Taiwan among other things.

In the mid-fifties, China's foreign policy thus followed what might be termed "the Bandung Line" of pacifist diplomacy. This allowed Beijing's prestige and influence to go up steadily, and at one time seemed to be giving China the status of a champion for the world's newly independent nations.

In this period of stability and peace at home and abroad, however, it should not be overlooked that China was beginning to show signs of a forthcoming drastic change in internal policy in favor of establishing a "Maoist model".

On July 31, 1955, the day after the first five-year plan was officially adopted at the Second Session of the First National People's Congress, Chairman Mao called a national conference of provincial, municipal, and district CPC committee secretaries, at which he delivered a report titled "On the Issue of Farm Cooperatives", and proposed a farm collectivization program far more precipitous than what had been contemplated in the "transitional general policy-line". The purport of this Mao report was essentially different from the initial slow but steady socialist transformation program designed to cover a period of 15 years. In late 1955, Chinese agriculture began to be collectivized quickly, marking the beginning of a new policy in favor of radical socialist transformation of China.

The initial switch-over from the "transitional general policy-line", which had represented the consensus at the start of China's socialist transformation as well as a guiding



principle of the People's Republic, was forcibly carried out under Chairman Mao's powerful leadership. Among his political and social reasons for this policy change were apparently the Gao Gang affair and other political tensions that shook the CPC in 1954-55, and the alienation and silencing of the intelligentsia caused in the course of the "Dream of the Red Chamber (Hong Lou Meng)" dispute in 1954 and the criticism of Hu Feng in 1955.

Aware of the various political and ideological conflicts and tensions then prevailing in China, Mao ventured on the radical farm collectivization program hoping it would bring about a revolutionary advance in China's socialist transformation and turn the situation around.

In the Soviet Union, meanwhile, the late Stalin was criticized at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. The resulting sudden fall of the myth of Stalin had a tremendous impact on the Beijing leadership too, and the CPC under Mao's leadership was quick to come out with a policy for overcoming "the contradictions within the people". In response to the criticism of Stalin in Moscow and the revolt in Hungary, Beijing published a thesis titled "On the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship" and another titled "Again on the Historical Experience of Proletarian Dictatorship", respectively, in which the CPC expressed unique views of its own as to how the evils of Stalinism should be overcome.



It is on account of these circumstances that the great victories and advances achieved by the CPC were loudly publicized at home and abroad by the Eighth Communist Party Congress in September 1956, which was called after the lapse of eleven years since the Seventh Congress in 1945, and indeed was the first since the foundation of the People's Republic.

At that time, the disturbances in Eastern Europe (the Poznan uprisings in Poland and the Hungarian revolt) that had broken out in the course of the de-Stalinization process were shaking the CPSU and considerably reducing its prestige in the world while that of the CPC was on the rise, allowing China to take over the leadership of international relationship in the Communist bloc. Zhou Enlai made his first visit to Eastern Europe to serve as a peacemaker, hoping to bring the countries there under control and have them reunite with the Soviet Union. His role as a coordinator was very important.

Then came another drastic change in China's domestic policy. To overcome "the contradictions within the people", an extensive popular movement called the "Let All Flowers Bloom, Let All Schools Contend" campaign was launched in May-June 1957, but unexpectedly resulted in hard criticism against the CPC and the Mao regime. On June 8, 1957, the Party suddenly switched this campaign to an anti-right-wing struggle aimed at removing "the poisonous weeds against socialism".

This sharp policy change was the most decisive turn in the political process of the People's Republic up to that time.

As the struggle against the right-wing elements grew rapidly in and after late 1957, Beijing veered away, both internally and externally, from its old policy of slow but steady progress, and this was eventually replaced by the strategy of squarely meeting imperialism in a short, decisive war, featured by the 1958 "Great Leap Forward" program at home and an aggressive foreign policy stance abroad.

Meanwhile, Chairman Mao made his second visit to the Soviet Union to attend a summit conference of socialist nations held in November 1957 in Moscow. On this occasion, he expressed his famous view of the world situation: "The east wind will prevail over the west wind," in recognition of the successful Soviet ICBM tests in August and the launching of the first Sputnik in October, and also on the wishful expectation that China would soon own nuclear weapons under the new Sino-Soviet military agreement signed ahead of his Moscow visit (an agreement on new defense know-how dated October 15, 1957).

The rejection of his view of the world by the Soviet Union and other "brothers" hardened Mao's feelings about the Soviets, and caused him to insist on his own brand of socialism based on a class struggle within socialist society, which he had developed from his experience in domestic politics in China.

While the process of Sino-Soviet conflict was going on under the surface, Beijing held the anti-imperialist Red flag high and pursued an aggressive foreign policy, turning more and more away from the Bandung Line. Symbolic of this change

in Chinese foreign policy were the Taiwan Strait crisis in the summer of 1958 and the Sino-Indian border conflict in the fall of 1959.

## A turn to Pro-Sovietism:: Mao Zedong vs. Stalin

Considering the long, delicate relation between Mao Zedong and Stalin, or between the CCP and the CPSU, it is noteworthy that as early as December, 1945, Mao instructed his comrades to build up a stronghold in the Dongbei (Northeast) to consolidate his regime.<sup>1</sup> After suffering his first real blow from Stalin, <sup>through the Yalta Secret Agreement</sup> Mao must have thought that China should provide against the Soviet Union only gradually while he was being pressed for a choice between dealing or not dealing with the U.S. It is interesting to note in this connection that on March 5, 1949, when he was expecting to imminently win the civil war with the Nationalists, Mao implied a moderate, conciliatory policy toward the U.S. in a report to the 7th CCP Central Committee at its 2nd Plenum (officially called "the Report at the 2nd plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party").<sup>2</sup>

The Soviets, probably under the stimulation of this fact, began in late April that year to speak highly of the victory of the Chinese Communists. On June 15 that year, Mao made his conciliatory attitude toward the U.S. more explicit in an "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference" on June 15 that year, saying.<sup>3</sup>



What this change in Mao's tone meant was extremely important. According to a report<sup>4</sup> made public by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (chaired by Senator Fulbright) on January 21, 1973, after the lapse of nearly a quarter of a century, the CCP in May and June 1949, got in touch with U.S. Ambassador in China John Leighton Stuart through one of the pupils he had taught when he was a professor at Yanjing University, Huang Hua (then Director of the foreign affairs Office, CCP Military Control Committee; <sup>former</sup> Foreign Minister), who went to see him at Mao's request. Stuart was widely respected among the Chinese for his vast knowledge of China and his amiable personality, and his private teacher-to-pupil relationship with Huang was utilized by the CCP to explore the possibility of future negotiations with the U.S. including the possibility of getting diplomatic recognition from Washington.<sup>5</sup>

However, on July 1 that year, the very day on which Ambassador Stuart in Beijing received a telegram from Secretary of State Acheson instructing him to refuse to negotiate with Chinese Communist leaders, The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) carried Mao Zedong's famous thesis, "On Popular Democratic Dictatorship", written in commemoration of the 28th anniversary of the CCP. In this paper Mao declared a "leading to the Soviet Union", thus

making a radical policy change and completely denying himself Titoism. He stressed: "'You are leaning to one side.' Exactly. The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and those twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism."<sup>6</sup> (underscoring by this author) His tone was now very different from that in his speeches in March and June. Apparently, Mao had made a decision reflecting much more complex considerations than the simple fact that "blood is thicker than water" in international relations.

If, as we have seen, Mao Zedong was thoroughly and bitterly aware of Stalin's policy on China in relations not only between China and the Soviet Union but also between their Communist Parties, why did he make that decision? Some imagine that a failure in the negotiations with the U.S. through the Huang Hua-Stuart channel might have caused Mao to change his mind. But there is a timing problem involved in this theory. One should rather look into Mao's mind for internal reasons for the change.

Naturally, with the tremendous task of national construction before him, China must have found it necessary to look up to the Soviet Union as its "big brother" in socialism. Now that the foundation of the People's Republic of China was imminently expected, Mao must have felt that the new republic would badly need Soviet assistance and guidance after all in the course of its growth in the future. In addition to these general consideration, however, one should take note of the following specific factors:

First, in the context of general international circumstances and the Sino-Soviet balance of power then prevailing, there was a risk involved in China's proceeding further toward conciliation with the U.S. and taking practical steps for the purpose. That is, Beijing must have been uneasy about what Stalin would do if China ventured in that direction, considering his past attitude toward China. This anxiety probably played an important role when China made up its mind.

Secondly, there were certain intra-Party circumstances to think of. According to a paper written by Qi Benyu during the Cultural Revolution, titled, "Patriotic or Traitorous? -- Criticizing the Reactionary Film 'Qingong Mishi' (An Unwritten History of the Qin Palace)"<sup>7</sup>, Liu Shaoqi at that time was already getting ready to rebel



against Mao Zedong, and even more conciliatory to Washington than Mao. Indeed, analyzing Liu's speeches in those days from the contemporary viewpoint, one may note that he seldom referred to "American imperialism". If that was the case, Mao, who still had some worries about his leadership in the Party, may have found it necessary to dramatically put up the irresistible slogan "Unity with the Soviet Union!" by way of consolidating his leading position in the Party.

The third, and most important, factor that must be mentioned in this connection is Mao's strategy for realizing his intense nationalism against the Soviet Union. Now in a position to think of China's future in place of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao must have been anxious about the Dongbei, Xinjiang, and other areas susceptible to Soviet intervention that had been taken away from China under the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, and were still in a state of instability. This anxiety may have caused Mao to declare a "leaning toward the Soviet Union" as a tactical move although in his heart he hated to do so. In this connection, it should be noted, in July that year (1949), Stalin, without consulting the Beijing leadership, invited President Gao Gang of the People's Government of the Dongbei to Moscow, and signed a



Dongbei-Soviet trade agreement with him. Mao's uneasiness about the growing intimacy between Stalin and Gao Gang may have influenced Mao's decision a great deal.

Although these various factors may have motivated him in making his tactical change to pro-Sovietism, he apparently had to carry it through once it had been made, and he must have counted on this devotion to the Soviet Union to win generous consideration from Stalin. It may not be appropriate to assume that Mao at that early stage had already freed himself from the conventional idea that the Soviet Union and its Party were the core and the leader of the world Communist movement based on proletarian internationalism. In any case, as was indicated symbolically by Mao's strong criticism<sup>8</sup> of The China White Paper published by Washington on August 5, 1949, the Chinese Communists late that year again turned highly articulate in attacking the U.S. while inclining more and more to praise the Soviet Union and Stalin as they proceeded with their historic task of founding the People's Republic.

A review of issues of The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) in 1949 indicates that the Soviet Union was little covered in the first half of that year whereas, after Mao's pro-Soviet~~X~~ declaration, coverage of the Soviet Union grew remarkably. It is clear that a very important policy change was made around the time of the declaration.

All this praising of Stalin in The Renmin Ribao reached its climax when it put on a big campaign in mid-December (after the foundation of the People's Republic) on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday. But this unusual praising of Stalin cannot be taken as a matter of course.

## Moscow Meeting and the Treats of Sino-Soviet Alliance

It was against this background that Mao Zedong, having declared a pro-Soviet stand, personally led a Chinese delegation to Moscow on December 16, 1949, immediately after the foundation of the People's Republic of China. His heart was probably half filled with the expectation that he would be warmly received by Stalin now that he had accomplished the historic task of the Chinese Revolution, and half<sup>y</sup> with vague anxiety. At the same time, he must have had the ambitious hope that he and Stalin, both triumphant revolutionaries, would be able to launch a new Sino-Soviet relationship based on international Communist solidarity, one wholly improved from the conventional relationship between the two countries. This may be seen from the fact that, alighting at Moscow Station, Mao made a speech in which he called attention to the fact that "after the October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet Government, in compliance with the policy of Lenin and Stalin, first abolished Tsarist Russia's unequal treaty with China." and said he expected much of Generalissimo Stalin's just foreign policy".<sup>9</sup> Officially aimed at congratulating Stalin on his 70th birthday, this unannounced visit by Mao was the first he had ever made abroad. Stalin

welcomed him outwardly, giving him an interview on the very day he arrived in Moscow. But what Mao found in the Soviet leader was an attitude even more frigid than he had shown to Song Ziwen four years and a half before.<sup>10</sup>

This was the <sup>cool</sup>air in which Mao and Stalin had their historic meeting. Now in retrospect, one sign of the rough sailing of the negotiations was present when Mao, asked by a "TASS reporter on January 2, 1950, how long he would stay in the Soviet Union, replied: "I intend to stay in the Soviet Union for several weeks. The length of my stay here will depend partly on how much time will be required to settle various matters concerning the interest of the People's Republic of China."<sup>11</sup>

In this interview with the TASS reporter, Mao Zedong referred for the first time to the on-going Sino-Soviet negotiations, saying that the pending issues were "first of all, the current Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Soviet loans to the People's Republic of China, trade and trade agreements between your country and ours, and other issues".<sup>12</sup> This Mao statement should have been noted with much more interest as it allowed a glimpse of what was going on at the Moscow conference. In this hard atmosphere, the conferees finally reached agreement. But until Mao signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance



on February 14 and returned to Beijing on March 4, the top leader of the new-born People's Republic was away from home on a foreign trip for more than two months and a half. "What to make of treaties and agreements that required two months to negotiate? Obviously there must have been tough talk, disagreement, threats, argument, claims, and counterclaims."<sup>13</sup> No wonder such speculations went about. Initially, Mao was accompanied by Professor Chen Boda<sup>14</sup> as an aide. Chen had been a brain truster of Mao's since his Yanan days, was proficient in Russian, and served as his political secretary. But later, on the following January 20,<sup>1950</sup><sup>15</sup> Mao also called a number of other staffers to Moscow, including Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, Vice President Li Fuchun of the Dongbei People's Government, External Trade Minister Ye Jizhuang, Director Wu Xiuquan of the U.S.S.R. and East Europe Division of the Foreign Office, Deputy Director Lü Dong of the Industry Department of the Dongbei People's Government, and Deputy Director Zhang Huadong of the External Trade Department of the Deongbei People's Government. On January 30, Mao also had President Sai Fuding of the Xinjiang People's Government participate in the negotiations.

Arriving in Moscow on January 20, Zhou Enlai spoke to microphones at the station: "I have been instructed

by Chairman Mao to come to Moscow and Participate in the Negotiations for consolidating diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and China. I consider this mission a great honor. The various expressions of friendship made by the Government of the Soviet Union to the people of China in the past have been based on a consistent policy followed by Comrades Lenin and Stalin to encourage and support the liberation struggles of all oppressed peoples of the world ..... Guided by Martial Stalin's just foreign policy and Chairman Mao Zedong's resolute policy of collaboration with the Soviet Union, our two great nations marching hand in hand will not be thwarted by any influence." <sup>15</sup> This speech is suggestive of the attitude with which Zhou was going to participate in the Moscow conference; and along with the make-up of the Chinese staff that accompanied him, thus clearly meant that the negotiations were proving difficult.

After these developments, the Chinese and Soviet negotiators on February 14 finally had their plenipotentiaries -- Zhou Enlai for China and Foreign Minister Vishinsky for the Soviet Union -- sign the "Sino-Soviet Agreement Concerning Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur and Dalian" and the "Sino-Soviet Agreement Concerning the Granting of Loans from the Soviet Union to the People's

Republic of China" as well as the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, with official notes also exchanged at the same time. The pending issues were thus settled for the moment.<sup>16</sup>

Mao Zedong later recalled his Moscow negotiations at the 10th plenum of the 8th CCP Central Committee and made some then shocking confessions. According to his own words, even after a round of fighting over the treaty, "Stalin would not sign, and it took two months of bargaining to make him finally sign."<sup>17</sup>

As is clear from the two agreements thus signed and the official notes exchanged, Stalin at these Sino-Soviet talks again demanded a variety of interests in India, including ice-free ports and railways. Thus the Dongbei and Xinjiang again became important issues between the two countries, as is evident from the list of the Chinese members that later took part in the negotiations. It is also easy to imagine that the Dongbei-Soviet trade agreement signed by Gao Gang also presented problems there.

After completing the Moscow conference, Mao, Zhou, and other Chinese negotiators left Yaroslavl Station in Moscow on February 17, traveled through Omsk, Irkutsk and Chita in Siberia, and returned to Beijing by rail on March 4. In China, Sino-Soviet friendship



had been loudly called for day after day since the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) the day after Mao's home-coming was filled with stories welcoming him home, saying "Chairman Mao is back!" It is noteworthy, however, that the paper also said: "Let's thank Chairman Mao for his hard efforts!"<sup>18</sup>

Thus, one cannot help realizing how groundless and ridiculous it was to believe, as observers generally did at that time, that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance symbolized a brotherly friendship between the two socialist states, China and the Soviet Union.

As is well known, this treaty was a military alliance pact concluded to show off the monolithic unity of China and the Soviet Union and also to keep Japanese militarism from emerging again. Article 1 of the treaty says: "The parties hereto undertake to endeavor collectively to take all necessary measures to prevent Japan or any other country directly or indirectly colluding with Japan in acts of aggression from making new aggression and destroying peace. In the event either party has been attacked by or come into a state of war with Japan or any other country allied with Japan, the other party shall immediately aid the first party militarily



and otherwise through all available means."<sup>19</sup> This was taken as evidence China and the Soviet Union regarded Japan and its ally, the U.S., as hypothetical enemies, and provided a theoretical ground for the postwar San Francisco peace system and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty system on the side of the Free World.

As a result of the Moscow negotiations, it may be said that succeeded in obtaining concessions from the Soviet Union on some of the pending issues between them, and were now better off at least in comparison with <sup>what</sup> they had been under the <sup>between the National Government of China and the</sup> Sino-Soviet Treaty <sup>of</sup> 1945. The Soviet Union Soviets agreed to transfer the Chinese Changchun Railway gratis to China by the end of 1952, withdraw the Soviet forces from Port Arthur and transfer their facilities there to China following the conclusion of peace with Japan and no later than the end of 1952 (provided they should be used jointly by the two countries in the event of war), confer on the Dalian harbor issue after a peace with Japan, and transfer gratis the property acquired by Soviet economic agencies from the Japanese in the Dongbei and some former military area buildings in Beijing. One cannot help noting in these results a reflection of Mao Zedong's aggressive attitude in dealing with the Soviets and the impression the success of the Chinese Revolution had apparently made on Stalin. On the other

hand, Mao had to yield to the Soviet Union by recognizing the assured independent status of Outer Mongolia, and agree to set up Sino-Soviet joint companies for the mining of oil, colored and rare metals in Xinjiang, more specifically, after Mao and Zhou left Moscow following the completion of their summit with the Kremlin leaders, Li Fuchun, Ye Jizhuang, Sai Fuding and others stayed on for further negotiations with the Soviets, and these resulted in the signing on March 27, 1950, in Moscow of the following four "economic cooperation" agreements apparently symbolic of China's then subservient relationship to the Soviet Union: "Agreement on the Establishment of the Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company in Xinjiang", "Agreement on the Establishment of the Sino-Soviet Colored and Rare Metals Company in Xinjiang", "Agreement on the Establishment of the Sino-Soviet Airline Company", and "Agreement on the Operating Conditions of Soviet Experts in China". Subsequently, on April 19 that year, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Trade and Barter Agreement was signed in Moscow. This was based on the same pattern used by the Soviets for "economic cooperation" with Eastern Europe -- the notorious joint-company formula calling for the equal sharing of both capital and profits. In this connection, Salisbury writes: "In these joint companies the basic resources were provided by China, technical<sup>✓</sup> know-how by the Russians,<sup>^</sup>

and the Russians got 51 per cent of the stock and full control -- not much different from the kind of deals Standard Oil or Shell Petroleum made with weak colonial countries."<sup>20</sup> This Stalin formula was also severely criticized by Khrushchev, who endorsed <sup>Harrison</sup> Salisbury's opinion by saying: "At one point Stalin concluded a treaty with China for the joint exploitation of mineral resources in Sinkiang. The treaty was a mistake on Stalin's part. I would even say it was an insult to the Chinese people. For centuries the French, English and Americans had been exploiting China, and now the Soviet Union was moving in. This exploitation was a bad thing, but not unprecedented: Stalin had set up similar 'joint' companies in Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. Later we liquidated all these companies."<sup>21</sup>

Thus, the 1950 Sino-Soviet summit left Mao Zedong half satisfied and half dissatisfied. But it is easy to imagine how he felt in his heart when he was personally exposed to Stalin's coldness, since as we saw previously, he had staked his future on "pro-Sovietism" and been bent on praising Stalin. It is known today that as early as 1957 or 1958 Mao was already exposing what had happened at the Sino-Soviet summit. In January 1957, he said in a "Summary of the Conference of Provincial and



Municipal Party Committee Secretaries": "We were different in opinion from Stalin. We wanted to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty but he wouldn't. We demanded the Chinese Changchun Railway but he wouldn't return it. But you can pull the meat out of the tiger's mouth after all."<sup>22</sup> In March the following year, (1958), he stated in an "Address at the Chengdu Conference"<sup>23</sup>: "In 1950, I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. On the Mutual Assistance and Alliance Treaty, the Chinese Changchun Railway, the joint companies, and the border issues, our attitude was in favor of disputing those of their proposals to which I was not agreeable, and accepting what they really insisted on. We did so out of consideration for the interest of socialism as a whole. "Then there were the two 'colonies' -- that is, the Dongbei /Northeast/ and Xinjiang, where people of any third country were not allowed to reside. Now this has been rescinded."<sup>24</sup>

As is evident from these statements, Mao came out of the Moscow summit dissatisfied, and was especially sore about the establishment of the joint companies in Xinjiang, which he took as a new provocation against China. Indeed, this was tantamount to Soviet "colonialism", and as such later provided a ground for the criticism of Stalin, as may be seen from the fact that Mikoyan referred to it when he addressed the 20th CPSU



congress in February 1956.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, although Mao apparently worked very hard in Moscow to obtain Soviet aid, the total amount of economic aid the Soviets promised the Chinese was nothing more than an interest-bearing credit of U.S.\$300 million over five years. This hardly compared with what Mao is said to have requested at first, \$2.8 billion, and was less than even the \$450-million credit Poland had obtained from the Soviet Union a year before. Worse still, the devaluation of the rouble announced on February 28, 1950, further reduced the value of the credit by about a quarter.<sup>26</sup>

After the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Secretary of State Acheson in Washington spoke on the significance of the event on March 15. Heartily regretting this final move taken by Beijing in favor of pro-Sovietism, he also referred to the rouble devaluation as follows: "Thus, the Chinese people may find Soviet Russia's credit to be no more than 45 million dollars per year. They can compare this with a grant -- not a loan -- of 400 million dollars voted by the American Congress to China in the single year 1948."<sup>27</sup> As Acheson predicted, the Chinese did find out.

Vice Chairman Long Yun of the National Defense Commission,

who previously was President of Yunnan under the National Government, and who participated in the foundation of the People's Republic of China, was known for his daring speech, for which he was later compelled to criticize himself. During the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" campaign, he frankly stated: "The credit granted us by the Soviet Union has to be repaid within ten years. It is short-term, and interest-bearing. To ease its burden on our economy, I propose that its repayment term be extended to 20 or 30 years. This is what we have got for fighting for socialism"<sup>28</sup> Recognizing that the Chinese were much dissatisfied with the amount of the credit despite their outward gratefulness, the Soviets now say: "In signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the CCP leaders showed us mistrust and suspicion. Without bothering to remember that the Soviet Union itself had the difficult task of getting over the ravages of war, they complained that the credit they had got from the Soviet Union was 'only' \$300 million."<sup>29</sup>

In any case, the fact remains that a credit of \$300 million over five years was just \$60 million a year nominally, which was rather insubstantial considering the loudness with which Sino-Soviet friendship was intoned.

On top of this reality, the remarks of Foreign

Minister Vishinsky at the signing of the treaty and agreements reflected "the attitude of an arrogant bestower of charity".<sup>30</sup> It is easy to imagine that Mao felt the oppressiveness of a big power in the behavior of Stalin and Vishinsky, and was furious in his heart.

Thus, Communist Chinese - Soviet relations involved a serious rift at their very beginning following the foundation of the People's Republic of China, and what we have seen in the above is the truth of what happened at the first meeting of Stalin and Mao Zedong, which used to be advertised externally as<sup>v</sup> and generally believed to be, a typical brotherly friendship and monolithic unity between the Soviet Union and China.

The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, like the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, was good for 30 years, remaining in force until 1980. Its Article 5 said that the term of the treaty "shall be extended for five years unless either party has indicated its intention of repealing the Treaty no later than a year before the expiration of its term, and subsequent extensions shall be made in the same manner."

The treaty was ratified in both countries on April 11, 1950, but it did not come into effect with its ratifications exchanged until September 30 that year -- that is, after the outbreak of the Korean War.



## The Korean War and China's Position

The Korean War was a civil war with an international background reflecting the historical lot and tragedies of the Korean people. On the one hand, it resulted in a tragically divided Korea; on the other, it dictated the international environment in postwar Asia. For this reason, one scholar calls it an event marking an epoch-making turn in contemporary history.<sup>31</sup>

Stalin and Mao Zedong were increasingly distrustful of each other in Moscow when Washington came out with a series of important measures for Asia on the basis of its "China White Paper", as is now well known. The Truman statement of January 5, 1950, made clear that the U.S. did not intend to interfere in the Taiwan affair. Secretary of State Acheson's speech at the National Press Club on January 12 indicated that the U.S. defense line in Asia ran from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines, thus excluding the Republic of Korea and Taiwan from the area of vital strategic importance to the U.S. This official stand revealed by Washington naturally brought considerable dissatisfaction and irritation to the Syngman Rhee regime in Seoul.

It is now known that, while these guidelines of U.S. policy in Asia were being revealed, people in the policy-making machinery in Washington, confronted with the major circumstantial changes in the form of "the three losses"



-- loss of the nuclear monopoly in August 1949, loss of China in October 1949, and loss of Chinese Titoism after the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950 -- were beginning to work out a new Asian policy. Changes in U.S. policy in Asia as reflected in the National Security Council (NSC) documents of April 1950 have already been analyzed in detailed studies. In Washington, policy-makers were preparing for the shift from NSC-48/1 to NSC-48/2 and further for the change-over to anti-Communist globalism manifest in NSC-68. But these "policy changes" still remained mere concepts and were far from ready for implementation. With respect to the Korean Peninsula on the eve of the conflagration, especially, these NSC documents saw no need for military intervention by the U.S. itself. So far as Korea was concerned, therefore, it may be said that these documents<sup>32</sup> were in agreement with the officially announced policy of the U.S.

What, then, was the philosophical basis underlying Washington's policy on Korea, or on Asia as a whole, before the Korean War?

The United States had held a policy of encouraging Chinese Titoism since the China White Paper was issued in the summer of 1949, and was even thinking of recognizing the newly-established People's Republic of China. There is no denying that, as a consequence of its

view of the Beijing regime, Washington was always careful not to provoke the Chinese in the course of implementing its policy in Asia generally.

On the other hand

^ in what position did China find itself at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War? In the following pages, we will consider this question on the basis of all available information.

First of all, we should take note of the fact that Beijing is now beginning to openly criticize the Soviet position in the Korean War in relation to that of China. These attacks clearly indicate how repugnant the Soviet attitude in the war was in the eyes of the Chinese.

Chinese criticism can be found as early as July 1957, when a National People's Congress was convened following a sudden policy turn in Beijing from the hundred flowers campaign to the anti-rightist campaign. At this session, many leaders of democratic parties had to make "self-criticism" about their "free speech" during the hundred flowers campaign. The myth of the monolithic unity of Moscow and Beijing was still prevalent at that time, but Vice Chairman Long Yun of the National Defence Council had been daring enough to speak freely and criticize Beijing's then pro-Soviet policy by pointing out among other things that it was unreasonable for China alone to bear the cost of fighting America and aiding Korea. Although

he had to apologize for this sharp criticism by criticizing himself on July 13, 1957, the fact itself demonstrated that some leaders in China were keenly critical of the Soviet role in the Korean War.<sup>33</sup> After a temporary downfall due to his criticism of the Soviet Union, Long Yun made a quick comeback as a member of the Defence Council in December 1958, after a decisive internal deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. This suggests that Beijing had come to approve of Long Yun's position against Moscow.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1963, the Chinese position toward the Soviets during the Korean War was made public in an official article: "We have always made the necessary sacrifices and stood at the front-line in the defence of socialism so that the Soviet Union can remain at the second line."<sup>34</sup> The "Letter of the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the CPSU", dated February 29, 1964, states that, "We made tremendous sacrifices and spent enormous sums of money for military purposes ... we have paid all principal and interest on the Soviet loans we obtained at that time, and they account for a major proportion of our exports to the Soviet Union. In other words, the military supplies provided China during the 'Resist America, Aid Korea' war were not free aid."<sup>35</sup> What Long Yun had said before was



now officially told by Peking to Moscow.

Among similar subsequent statements, the one made by an official of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Association to a Sôhyô (General Council of Trade Unions of Japan)-Churitsu Roren (Federation of Independent Unions) delegation from Japan in January 1972, is still fresh in our memory: "The Soviet Union is a merchant of death. While China was sending volunteers and shedding blood in the Korean War, the Soviets stayed behind and merely sold weapons. They got payments for them with interest."<sup>36</sup>

Another instance is found in the statements of Chinese leaders to a U.S. congressional delegation to Beijing consisting of members of the House Armed Services Committee and the Committee on International Relations in April 1976, by way of assuring them that even if hostilities should break out again in Korea, China would provide military assistance to Pyongyang but would not send any troops there. According to Representative Lester L. Wolfe, Democrat of New York, the Chinese admitted that their dispatch of troops to Korea in 1950 was a "mistake".<sup>37</sup> These Chinese statements show that, with their volunteers fighting in Korea, the Chinese were profoundly dissatisfied with the Soviet role in the war. Surveying the contemporary official reports in China, one notes that the Chinese leadership said nothing but good about the Soviet Union on



Army Day (August 1) in 1950 but no longer praised the Soviets on that anniversary of the People's Liberation Army in 1951 -- that is, after the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. From this fact, it is easy to imagine what China was thinking of the Soviet Union while fighting the war.

Thus it appears that China harboured a great deal of dissatisfaction and mistrust in its dealings with the Soviet Union from the very beginning of the "Resist America, Aid Korea" war.

On the vital issue of what caused the Chinese to intervene, available information has been so limited that one can only hazard a guess as to their real motive. Admittedly, as Beijing's own statements already cited suggest, the Chinese naturally must have been strongly obsessed by their sense of responsibility for the defence of the global socialist system since they were then still full of revolutionary enthusiasm and faithful to the internationalist spirit of socialism following the foundation of the new republic. However, a more essential reason may have been that the Chinese had real fears that, without their participation in the war, the Soviets might again storm into the Dongbei (Manchuria), then under the rule of the pro-Stalin leader Gao Gang<sup>38</sup> -- a situation different from that prevailing immediately

after World War II, when the Chinese Communists narrowly managed to have the Soviet forces withdraw from the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria). In the international environment of East Asia following the northward march of the U.N. forces across the 38th Parallel, "defens<sup>e</sup>" of the Dongbei had become even more urgent and important than liberation of Taiwan in Beijing's eyes -- "defens<sup>e</sup>" probably from a Soviet attempt at reoccupation rather than from MacArthur's strategy. It should be noted in addition that, under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance already concluded, there was a good possibility that, if the Chinese hesitated, the Soviets might take the lead and, using the treaty as an excuse, propose to send their troops to the Dongbei.<sup>39</sup> According to Khrushchev's memoirs, when the Chinese were expecting to send the People's Volunteers to Korea, Mao Zedong instructed Zhou Enlai to visit Sochi in the Soviet Union to meet with Stalin.<sup>40</sup> In the light of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, such consultation with the Soviets may have been necessary as a matter of formality.

Whatever the reason, as Edgar Snow observes, the participation of the Chinese volunteers in the war in Korea caused China to be branded as an aggressor by the U.N. and to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union in the

41  
military area. Moreover, the Soviet Union was in a position to operate as a "merchant of death" without having any direct hand in the fighting. All this apparently redoubled Beijing's antipathy toward Moscow. One should also point out here the important fact that Beijing had to postpone its objective of liberating Taiwan indefinitely because of the Truman statement of June 27, 1950, which declared that the participation of U.S. forces in the hostilities in Korea incorporated a strategy for "neutralizing" the Taiwan Strait.

Thus, the Korean War meant a great deal of sacrifice for China. It is true, of course, that the increased preparedness in China due to the "Resist America, Aid Korea" war expedited the unification of the country and strengthened the sense of national unity following the foundation of the People's Republic of China. This effect, however, should be viewed as an incidental "by-product".

The above analysis suggest that Beijing, far from being involved substantially in any attempt to start a war in Korea, was caught rather unawares when the hostilities broke out on the early morning of June 25, 1950. Circumstantial evidence also supports this view.

First, it should be noted that a Land Reform Law, conceived as one of the main pillars of the Chinese



Revolution, was promulgated in China on June 30, 1950 -- only five days after the Korean War began. Considering the long, assiduous efforts the Chinese Communists had been making for land reform and its tremendous importance for internal construction in China, it is almost inconceivable that Beijing should have wanted a war at that particular moment.

From the above analysis, we cannot but consider reasonable that Mao could not possibly have had his nation involved in the war before June 25,<sup>42</sup> and that "there is no evidence that it was instigated by the Chinese".<sup>43</sup> Both support the conclusion Allen S. Whiting attempted to establish in his excellent book, China Crosses the Yalu, that "there is no clear evidence of Chinese participation in the planning and preparation of the Korean War".<sup>44</sup>

It may be said that the outbreak of hostilities on June 25 itself was quite a surprise to Beijing. In North Korea, on the other hand, Kim Il-sung immediately showed a most militant attitude the day after the outbreak of the war, saying that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, after studying the current circumstances, had ordered the People's Army to launch a decisive counter-offensive and sweep out the armed forces of the enemy,<sup>45</sup> and on June 26, Pravda lost no time



in accepting as justified the North Korean radio declaration stressing that the South Koreans had made the first attack and that the North Koreans had been instructed to repulse the assault.<sup>46</sup> In contrast, China's radio stations and newspapers were unable to present any prepared report the day after the opening of the hostilities, and the propaganda machinery in Beijing was apparently confused. This fact is highly suggestive.

Having completed the above analysis, we will now return to our own hypothesis that the Korean War broke out as an inevitable "war of national liberation", touched off by the north-south conflict that had been growing dangerously in Korea. At the same time, the Korean War was part of Stalin's overall international strategy, especially as it related to Stalin's postwar Asian policy and his international strategy vis-a-vis China following the establishment of the People's Republic there.

Having just succeeded in their revolution, the Chinese Communists were full of innocent enthusiasm and had a keen sense of responsibility for the solidarity and unity of the socialist camp, but they were wary of Stalin's strategy. Under this double burden, they ventured to intervene in the Korean War because they thought it was urgently necessary to do so for the defense of their own

country. That this choice was a big gamble for Beijing may be seen from the following passage in a national declaration of unity for "resisting America, aiding Korea, and defending our fatherland" issued immediately after the Chinese intervention in Korea (a joint declaration by eleven democratic parties including the Chinese Communist Party):

Historical facts teach us that a crisis in Korea has much to do with the security of China. With the lips gone, the teeth would be exposed to the cold; with the door broken, the house itself would be in danger. For the people of China to aid the people of Korea in their struggle against the U.S. is not merely a moral responsibility but also a matter closely related to the vital interests of our own people, a decision necessitated by a need for self-defense. Saving our neighbors at once means saving ourselves. To protect our own country, we must help the people of Korea.<sup>47</sup>

As Seiji Imabori points out,<sup>48</sup> "history tells us that many Chinese dynasties including Wei, Sui, Ming, and Qing fell due to excessive involvement in Korea". Indeed, for the People's Republic of China immediately after its establishment "to venture into the hostilities in Korea against the U.S. was an adventure with much danger of

self-destruction as well as an action needed for self-defense".

Pressed for a critical choice, China finally decided to intervene in Korea. But the Soviet Union strictly remained a "merchant of death" and was unenthusiastic about aiding China. The Chinese succeeded in achieving the objective of securing the Dongbei, to be sure; but the Dongbei was theirs in the first place, and it cost them tremendously to keep it. Naturally, the suspicion grew in them that they had been tricked by Stalin's strategy, and they were increasingly disgusted with all this.

By way of justifying these assumptions, it will be necessary for us to have a clear picture of Stalin's strategy. For this purpose, we should first recall the Sino-Soviet summit talks in early 1950. As noted previously, Stalin had a hard time dealing with Mao's strong nationalism and could not make him accept all his demands.

Stalin's fears and suspicions about the possibility of Mao's regime approaching the U.S. after the friction-ridden Sino-Soviet summit may have been reinforced by the fact that the U.S. had not yet completely abandoned its old policy of making China Titoist. According to unpublished literature, Mao himself said of Stalin that "he suspected that after we won the revolution, China would be like Yugoslavia, and I would be another Tito".<sup>49</sup> If



Otto Braun is right in his recollection that Mao once attempted to drag the Soviet Union into the war against the Japanese by placing Northeast Asia in a fluid, confused situation<sup>50</sup>, Stalin now may have hoped to weaken Mao's China by creating a similar situation and taking advantage of it to secure the Dongbei again: a military conflict that would probably be limited to Korea, or to the Chinese mainland. From the beginning Stalin perhaps anticipated China's intervention in Korea, and expected that the war would make Mao's regime more dependent on the Soviet Union. Today, one of the authentic books on Sino-Soviet relations in the Soviet Union says: "The Korean War ....., cutting off for a long time the way to a collusion between the nationalistic CCP leaders and the U.S. ruling circles and compelling Chinese leaders to wider co-operation with the Soviet Union".<sup>51</sup> This view proves paradoxically that such was Stalin's design.

This author that the events leading up to the Korean War, where China was unavoidably drawn into Soviet strategy and paid a great price in both lives and money, are important factors in understanding the abrasive criticism that China makes of the Soviet Union today.



## China's Foreign Relations during and after the Korean War

China led the "Fight America, Aid Korea" campaign and successfully took advantage of it in achieving national unity and solidarity at home, naturally helped strengthen China's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The first thing that needs consideration in this connection is the fact that in August-September, 1952, a Government delegation from the People's Republic of China, led by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai visited Moscow for negotiations with the Kremlin leaders, with apparently significant results.

These talks represented the second round of negotiations between the new-born People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the 1950 Moscow summit between Stalin and a Mao-Zhou delegation from Beijing. At the 1952 meetings, both the membership of the Chinese delegation and the contents of the agenda proposed by them seemed no less important than those back in 1950. The Chinese negotiators included Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun (Vice Premier), Li Fuchu (Vice Minister of Financial and Economic Affairs) Wang Heshou (Director for Heavy Industries), Chen Yu (Director for Fuel Industries), and Song Shaowen (Chief Secretary, Financial and Economic Affairs Commission) from the Administration, and Li Yu (Deputy Chief of Staff, People's Revolutionary Military Committee), Liu Yalou (Commander of the Air Force,

People's Liberation Army), Luo Shunchu (Deputy Commander of the Navy), and Qiuchuangcheng (Deputy Commander, Artillery) from the military, and Xu Yixin (Director for Soviet and East European Affairs, Foreign Office), Chen Jiahang (Director for Asian Affairs), and Zhang Wentian (Ambassador to the Soviet Union) from the foreign service. This highly technocratic delegation spent more than a month in the Soviet Union, from their arrival in Moscow on August 17, 1952, to their departure for home on September 22, conducting negotiations with the Soviets.

What, then, were the results of the conference? After nearly month-long negotiations with Stalin, Foreign Minister Vishinsky and other Soviet leaders, a "Sino-Soviet communique Concerning the Negotiations Between the Government Delegation of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Soviet Union" was issued along with an "Announcement Concerning the Transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway to the Government of the People's Republic of China," and at the same time an "Exchanged Note Concerning an Extension of the Term of the Common Use of the Port Arthur Naval Base in China" was signed. That is with respect to the Chinese Changchun Railway, it was reconfirmed in the announcement that, as had been assured in the 1950 Agreement, all rights in the joint management of said railroad and all property

accessory thereto should be transferred gratis to the Government of China" by the end of 1952. In fact, December 31 that year was marked by the signing in Harbin of the final protocol on the transfer of the Chinese Changchun Railway, which was then returned from the Soviets to the Chinese with ceremonies. The following day, on January 1, 1953, Mao Zedong wired his thanks to Stalin. This means that the matter was settled by the end of 1952. On the other hand, with respect to the joint use of the naval base in Port Arthur -- that is, the stationing of the Soviet forces there -- it had been agreed, as was noted in Chapter III, that withdrawal of the Soviet forces and transfer of the facilities should take place following a peace with Japan, or by the end of 1952 at the latest. At that time, the San Francisco peace treaty had already been in effect since April 1952. At the Moscow conference, however, the Chinese and Soviet negotiators viewed it as a separate peace hostile to them, and actually put off action on the Port Arthur issue by agreeing that until they signed a peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet forces should stay in Port Arthur at Beijing's "request" (or "proposal", according to the original text of the exchanged note).

At the same time, as was discovered later, a tripartite agreement on a railroad construction project



was signed by China, the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

These were the results of the 1952 Sino-Soviet negotiations, and nothing more. On the settlement of the long-pending railroad issue, The People's Daily carried an editorial titled, "Congratulations of the Transfer of the Chinese Zhangchun Railroad to Our Country!" , in which it expressed satisfaction with this proof of the Soviet Union's "brotherly, unselfish assistance". Indeed, it was a matter for congratulation to the Chinese, and they greatly stressed their gratitude to and friendship with the Soviets. But then the return of the railroad had been decided upon in the 1950 agreement, which means that the Zhou delegation, despite their long stay in Moscow, was unable to get any new concessions from the Soviets, whether in the way of economic aid and cooperation, or Soviet assurances in favor of a Korean truce.

The fact that, after Zhou's party returned home, Li Fuchun, Chen Yu Song Shaowen, Liu Yalou and other economic and military experts remained in Moscow to continue the talks with the Soviets seems to indicate how hard these negotiations were. Outwardly, both China and the Soviet Union made ostentatious expressions of their "friendship", including a "Sino-Soviet Friendship Month" observed for a 30-day period

from November 7 (Revolution Day in Russia), 1952. But below the surface their relationship was pregnant with tension.

With respect to the Korean War, which was then raging, the Chinese had been making favorable gestures for a truce from time to time on the international scene. But Stalin was then just beginning his last purge of political enemies at home with the 19th CPSU Congress drawing near. It may be surmised that under these circumstances Stalin found it advantageous to keep China and the U.S. bogged down in Korea a little longer, hence his lack of enthusiasm for a Korean truce. <sup>52</sup>

Thus, it appears that Beijing and Moscow then were already at variance over the Korean truce issue. Possibly for this reason, there was no reference to the current conflagration in Korea in the various speeches made by the negotiators during Zhou Enlai's visit in Moscow or in the Sino-Soviet joint communique then issued. This tallies with the facts that the 19th CPSU Congress that began on October 5, 1952, consistently ignored the Korean War, and that it was not mentioned at all in the congratulatory message delivered there by Liu Shaoqi on behalf of the CCP.

These are the general outlines of the 1952 Sino-Soviet negotiations. In those days, China, while faced

with the Korean War on the external scene, had more or less successfully met its various requirements for economic rehabilitation at home, and was ~~was~~ shifting to a socialist reform phase characterized by the "Three Nos and Five Nos" movement. At the same time, on the strength of their increased prestige in Asia due to their successful revolution in China and their participation in the Korean War, the Chinese sponsored an Asia-Pacific pacifist conference in Beijing in early and mid-October, 1952, and were apparently in high spirits in the early glamorous days of their new republic.

Coming after these developments, the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, was bound to cause a new turn in Sino-Soviet relations.

Contrary to their official stand on Stalin's death, the Chinese must have welcomed it, hoping it would mark a major turning point in their relations with the Soviet Union.

The circumstantial change brought about by Stalin's death soon began to affect the vital issue of how to deal ~~with~~ the Korean War. Progress toward a Korean truce, which had been very difficult, was suddenly expedited by diplomatic initiative exercised by Beijing after Stalin's death. In late March, agreement was reached to resume negotiations on the POW exchange issue on the basis of a



Zhou Enlai proposal in favor of free repatriation of POW's. On April 11, an agreement on an exchange of sick and wounded POW's was signed; on April 26, the Korean Truce Conference was resumed in regular session; On June 8, an agreement for the repatriation of POW's was signed; and finally on July 27, a Korean Truce Agreement was concluded, which marked the end of the hostilities in Korea. In any case, the Korean War was brought to a cease-fire largely through China's diplomatic efforts after Stalin's death.

On the other hand, Stalin's death brought about a major turn in Sino-Soviet relations. But in this favorable climate for greater friendship with the Soviets, the Chinese finally achieved a measure of "equality" through improved relations with the latter only in the "third round" of Sino-Soviet negotiations conducted a year later during Khrushchev's visit in Beijing in the fall of 1954.

Having achieved the Korean truce, China found its international prestige greatly increased through such developments as the Zhou-Nehru conference of June 1954, with its advocacy of a "five-point peace principle" and the Geneva conference on Indochina held in April-July that year in which China played an active part. It should be specially noted that the first U.S.-China meeting at the ambassadorial level took place on June

5, 1954 between U.S. ambassador Alexis Johnson and Chinese representative Wang Ping-nan during the Geneva Conference.

Thus China's diplomatic position which contributed to the cease-fire of the Korean War was much more strengthened and it led to the Bangdung line. The international environment after the Korean War was developing favorably for China. In this situation, At home, the first National People's Congress called in September 1954 adopted a new Constitution (the Constitution of the People's Republic of China). Thus enjoying high political stability, the new republic celebrated its fifth anniversary in the fall of 1954, and on September 29-October 12 Beijing received the first top-level Soviet Government delegation including Khrushchev (First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), Bulganin (First Vice Premier), Mikoyan (Vice Premier) and other post-Stalin leaders. This brought about a general change for the better in Sino-Soviet relations. Meeting with the top Beijing leaders, the Soviet delegation signed ten documents including declarations, communiques, agreements and protocols. They agreed that the Soviet forces in Port Arthur should pull out without waiting for a peace treaty to be concluded by China and the Soviet Union with Japan , a precondition the Soviets

had insisted on back in 1952. The conferees also put an end to the Sino-Soviet joint company in Xinjiang , which Mikoyan pointed out as an example of Stalin's wrong foreign-policy decisions at the 20th CPSU Congress, and which Khrushchev also later recalled as a case of Soviet "exploitation" in China.

The 1954 Sino-Soviet talks were thus very fruitful for the Chinese, who must have really felt the "brotherly friendship" of the Soviet for the first time. Unlike Stalin, who had never visited the friendly neighbor, China, in his lifetime, Khrushchev initiated the diplomatic practice of visiting Beijing for talks. Previously, most treaties and agreements between the two countries had been signed or announced in Moscow. Now many began to be signed or announced in Beijing too.<sup>53</sup> These facts imparted the impression that the Chinese had achieved "equality" in their relations with the Soviets.

How come the 1954 Sino-Soviet summit brought all this victory to the Chinese? Two major reasons are conceivable. First, with Beijing's international prestige rising, the Soviets Union naturally had to pay China more respect as a "brother". Especially, the fact that China had been through the Korean War was now an important factor in its favor.



Secondly, internal circumstances then prevailing in the Soviet Union must have played a role. The top-level Soviet Government delegation included Nikolai M. Shvernik (Chairman All-USSR Central Council of Trade Unions), and Dimitri T. Shepilov (Editor-in-Chief, Pravda) as well as Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan. But the list conspicuously lacked the name of Foreign Minister Molotov. As this fact seems to suggest, the significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations apparently reflected a serious internal conflict in the CPSU.

In any case, in his lengthy speech at the fifth anniversary celebration held in Beijing on the eve of Republic Day, Khrushchev said almost nothing but praises for China, greatly extolling the new republic and its leaders including Mao, speaking highly of what China had been doing on the international scene ranging from its participation in the Korean War through the pronouncement of the Five-Point Peace Principle to China's role in the Geneva conference, and stressing that China was now an important power. Khrushchev himself, perhaps impatient with the fact that he had to make these friendly gestures to China for political reasons, later recalled: "I remember that when I came back from China in 1954 I told my comrades, 'Conflict with China is inevitable.' I

came to this conclusion on the basis of various remarks Mao had made. During my visit to Peking, the atmosphere was typically Oriental. Everyone was unbelievably courteous and ingratiating, but I saw through their hypocrisy." 54

These subtle differences remained between the two countries, and later turned important factors responsible for the deterioration of their relationship. But back in 1954 there was a marked lull in Sino-Soviet relations, with the Chinese finally achieving "equality" with Soviets and taking an initial step toward independence from the latter. Indeed, China then enjoyed much stability both at home and in foreign relations.

### The Bandung Line and How It Changed

The adoption of the "slow but steady" domestic construction program in 1954-55 was naturally reflected on China's foreign policy. At that time the country's orientation toward peaceful coexistence was most manifest in its diplomatic stance.

As is well known, the trade and traffic agreement signed in April 1954 between China and India (the Agreement Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India Concerning Trade and Traffic Between the Tibet Region of China and India) contained five rules in international relations in its preamble. These were reconfirmed as "the five-point peace principle" at a Zhou-Nehru conference in June, and subsequently had much bearing on China's external relations and foreign policy.

When the Indochina truce agreement was signed in July 1954, Beijing participated in the international conference held in Geneva for the purpose, and undoubtedly made an important contribution toward its success. Returning home after attending the meeting as head of a Chinese delegation, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, encouraged by what China had achieved through its first participation in a major international parley where delegates from 26 interested nations assembled to bring peace to Indochina, declared confidently: "The outcome of the Geneva conference demonstrates that international conflicts can be settled through peaceful negotiations."<sup>55</sup>

The Afro-Asian meeting held in Bandung in April 1955 owed its success to China's active pursuit of this pacifist diplomacy.



Attended by Government representatives from 29 nations, which accounted for practically the entire community of independent nations in Asia and Africa at that time, the conference took place on April 18-24 in the resort town of Bandung, Indonesia. Looking forward to the opening of a new era on the strength of the success of the Chinese revolution, Zhou observed: "Never before in history have so many nations of Asia and Africa got together in conference." On that occasion he made a point of emphasizing China's policy of peace diplomacy, or the Bandung Line, by saying: "What our nations in Asia and Africa need is peace and independence. We have no intention at all of pitting the nations of Asia and Africa against those of other regions. On the contrary, we need to establish peaceful, cooperative relations with the countries of other regions as well."<sup>56</sup>

As for China's relations with other socialist nations, as we previously noted, a Soviet delegation including Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Beijing in October 1954 to attend celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the People's Republic, and on that occasion they signed agreements that brought new substance into their relationship under the existing Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (signed in February 1950). Other noteworthy developments in this area included the opening of diplomatic relations between China and Yugoslavia in January 1955, and the first U.S.-Chinese ambassadorial-level contact made during the Geneva conference.

China in 1955, unlike what it was in 1954 when the political situation was stable what with the enactment of the Constitution of the People's Republic and the adoption of the transitional general policy-line, underwent a drastic shift to an internal state of political and ideological tension. This, however, primarily concerned developments within the CPC and in its domestic environment. For, in external relations, Beijing continued to follow in earnest the five-point peace principle inaugurated in the previous year, as may be seen from China's opening of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in early 1955, active participation in the Afro-Asian conference in April, advocacy of an all-Asian-Pacific collective security treaty through the mouth of Zhou Enlai in July, and inauguration of ambassadorial-level talks with the U.S. in Geneva in August on the basis of a Chinese proposal made during the Afro-Asian conference. All this apparently involved no factors contributive to domestic political tension inside China.

On the other hand, on the 1954 Beijing summit  
^ having achieved "equality" ^ with the Soviets, the  
Chinese then began to deviate from the Soviet model in  
building up socialism generally reflected in their first  
five-year plan, and increasingly inclined toward a Maoist  
line which soon led them to the 1958 "Great Leap Forward"  
campaign and the Cultural Revolution in the late sixties.  
Mao's report of July 31, 1955, titled, "On the Growth of  
Farm Cooperatives", marked the beginning of a Maoist  
process of building up socialism on the basis of radical  
farm collectivization, as this author noted in a detailed  
analysis elsewhere.<sup>57</sup> When the Maoist policy line was thus  
beginning to grow in China, Khrushchev's Soviet Union, as  
is well known, soon ventured to criticize Stalin at the  
20th CPSU Congress on February 24-25, 1956, and boldly  
announced a set of 20th-Congress policies including the  
one for peaceful coexistence with the West. Ideological  
disputes began to emerge between the two countries  
communist Parties over the criticism of Stalin, peaceful  
coexistence, a peaceful shift to a revolution,  
diverse revolutions, and such other new basic issues  
pringing from the 20th Congress and confronting the  
international Communist movement, as many observers have  
noted already.

Among the issues raised by the 20th CPSU Congress,  
the one of greatest concern to Mao Zedong and other



Chinese leaders concerned the criticism of Stalin, or personal cult. This may be seen from the fact that, after the 20th CPSU Congress in late February, the CCP kept mum on this issue until the famous thesis, "On Historical Experiences in Proletarian Dictatorship",<sup>58</sup> was published on April 5, and that this thesis reduced the matter of criticizing Stalin to that of personal cult. On the one hand, Mao presumably found the criticism of Stalin welcome in the light of what he had always thought of the late Soviet leader. On the other, however, Mao could not tolerate the criticism of Stalin in that it involved the question of personal cult or the power of an autocratic leader. For the first time, Mao was bewildered by Khrushchev's behavior. As is well known, the CCP later in the course of its dispute with the Soviets branded the criticism of Stalin as "a mean political trick"<sup>59</sup> of Khrushchev's.

Now, Stalinism had hung heavy not only over the Soviet Union but also internationally -- established as a social reality especially in Eastern Europe -- and this is why the subsequent de-Stalinization program led to the well-known upheavals in Poland and Hungary. Faced with these revolts, the Soviets themselves, after venturing on de-Stalinization, again resorted to force to oppress them. By doing so, however, they considerably

damaged their external prestige, and created a serious gap within the international Communist movement. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, though having "skipped" theoretical or ideological examination of the new issues raised by the criticism of Stalin<sup>60</sup> saw their external prestige rising rather than declining. Meanwhile, they held the 8th CCP Congress on September 15-28, 1956. This was the first Party Congress since the foundation of the People's Republic, and came after the lapse of 11 years since the 7th CCP Congress in 1945. Boasting the unity of the top Party leadership including Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi, the Congress proudly declared: "Socialism as a social system has been basically established in our country."<sup>61</sup> The new Party Constitution adopted by the 8th Congress were free of the term "Maoism", stressed collective leadership and democratic centralization in Party activities, and deprecated personal cult. Later, during the Cultural Revolution, This new approach was loudly denounced as representing "a plot against Chairman Mao" by Deng Xiaoping (CCP General Secretary), who, after attending the 20th CPSU Congress and getting a brainwash in favor of de-Stalinization, made a report on amendments to the Party Constitution at the 8th CCP Congress. Generally, however, the 8th Congress was the most assured and tension-free of all

the Congresses in the history of the CCP. When Poland fell in turmoil following an uprising in Poznan in June, the Chinese Communists appeared to be backing Gomulka's resistance to the Soviet Union. But when the Soviets resorted to military intervention and oppression in Hungary twice -- in October and November that year -- The People's Daily on December 29 published a thesis titled, "Again on Historical Experiences in Proletarian Dictatorship",<sup>62</sup> which indicated that they positively supported the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary. In early January the following year (1957), Zhou Enlai led a Chinese Government delegation to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary, offering himself as a sort of mediator in these troubled situations, and the result was a joint communique of the Chinese and Soviet Governments issued on January 18, 1957. Zhou's visit to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe impressed the world with the idea that China was finally beginning to cut an important figure in European (East European) affairs too after establishing its essential role in Asian relations through its (or Zhou's) diplomacy on such occasions as the Geneva conference and the Bandung Conference of April 1955 (the First Asian-African Conference). The communique indicated strong Chinese support for the Soviet stand in suppressing the Hungarian



revolt by staging. China's attitude reflected in this communique was necessitated by its prevailing domestic situation, in which quick progress in building up socialism and collectivizing farms was creating internal social tensions that soon compelled the Government to launch the "Let All Flowers Bloom, Let All Schools Contend!"<sup>63</sup> campaign. But the fact remains that China's support on the Hungarian issue helped the Soviets a great deal.

Seeing the disturbances in Eastern Europe following the de-Stalinization program and the resulting decline in the external prestige of the CPSU, the Chinese Communists thus had to uphold the Soviet stand if only for the purpose of consolidating their own regime at home. As a result, the improved friendly relationship between the two countries dating from the fall of 1954 was basically maintained when Mao Zedong made his second visit to Moscow in the fall of 1957. On this second, and last, trip outside China he had ever made in his life, Mao led a delegation comprising Song Jianlin, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, Guo Moruo, Lixiannian, Wu Lanfu, Lu Dingyi, Chen Boda, Shen Yanbing, Wang Xiexiang, Yang Shangkun, Hu Diaomu, Liu Xiao, and Sai Fuding to attend a Moscow conference of the

brother Parties of 12 socialist nations to be held in celebration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution and with a view to reuniting the socialist camp following the disturbances in Eastern Europe. Illustrative of the friendly relationship between the two countries at that time were two developments that preceded Mao's visit in Moscow on November 2-20. First, a "Sino-Soviet Military Agreement on New Defense Technology", or the new military agreement between the two countries that was to become the central issue in their subsequent military, defense dispute, was signed in secret on October 15, 1957, under which the Soviets promised to make an A-bomb sample and know-how available to China. Secondly, a Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society, the Soviet counterpart of the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society previously established in China in October 1949 immediately after the foundation of the People's Republic, was set up in Moscow on October 29, 1957. These things, coming right after the successive downfalls of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and other old Stalinist members of the top Party leadership as well as Marshal Zhukov (Defense Minister), may be viewed by some as resulting from a situation in which Khrushchev's group again needed strong support from the Chinese. However, they were reflections of an

important aspect of the friendly relations then prevailing between the two countries, and must have brought Mao lots of satisfaction prior to his Moscow visit. Especially the former event, or the conclusion of the new Sino-Soviet military agreement, came at a time when Mao's leadership in Beijing was thinking very highly of the Soviet launching of the ICMB (intercontinental ballistic missile) in August 1957, and that of Sputnik I in October -- viewing them as marking the advent of a new phase of the nuclear age. If only as a corollary of Mao's strategic view that China would acquire nuclear weapons in the near future, the Chinese must have felt that the new military agreement with the Soviet Union had put them in an extremely favorable position for that purpose. On November 3, before celebrating the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Soviets put themselves in still higher spirits by launching Sputnik II. It was in this climate that Mao made his famous remark in Moscow with reference to current international situation: "The east wind is prevailing over the west wind."<sup>64</sup> It was also on the basis of this view that he told the Moscow meeting his unique theory of thermonuclear war, arguing that man would not perish if a nuclear war broke out.<sup>65</sup> However, as is well known, the slogan, "The east wind is prevailing over the west wind," was soon strongly



resented by Khrushchev's group in Moscow and by many leaders in East European capitals, who saw geographical, racial, or climatic prejudice in this metaphor; and Mao's theory of thermonuclear war also met with sharp criticism. As these facts illustrate, the series of statements made by Mao in Moscow sounded extremely unpleasant to the Soviets. At that time, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were in a state of confusion and unrest, while Mao's China looked very confident. This contrast caused his remark to be taken as a claim that the east is superior to the west in the international Communist movement.

As this author showed in a detailed analysis elsewhere, it does appear, indeed, that "the 1957 Moscow conference provided the Chinese Communists a golden opportunity to speak with confidence and seek approval of their policy line after building up influence in the international Communist movement since the disturbances in Eastern Europe in the previous year and strengthening their leadership by fighting the right-wing groups at home. Therefore, when they found that Mao's speech at the Moscow conference did not meet with the approval of the Parties of the Soviet Union and other nations, which instead brought up the feasibility of a peaceful shift to a revolution, an idea basically inimical to their

stand, they headed for further intensification of the conflict that had emerged between the Chinese and Soviet Parties over the question of how the conclusions of the 20th CPSU Congress should be evaluated." <sup>66</sup>

Beijing's stand reflected in these developments naturally led to a setback in its diplomacy based on the five-point peace principle, or the Bandung Line. This change subsequently found expression in China's response to the Middle East crisis and the increased tension in the Taiwan Strait in the summer of 1958, and became quite plain during the Sino-Indian border conflict in and after August 1959. Following this strenuous phase between late 1957 and early 1958, when the Chinese Communists were still carrying on an intense struggle against the right-wing elements at home, they finally ventured into the fanatic phase characterized by the Great Leap Forward movement. Their Bandung Line diplomacy thus changed completely.

Finally, let us consider Beijing's process of pursuing and then deviating from the Bandung Line in conjunction with Sino-Japanese relations. China's initial policy shift toward the Bandung Line was first noted when Beijing switched its policy vis-a-vis Tokyo from earnestly encouraging "the anti-U.S. struggle of the Japanese people" to emphasizing peace with Japan in the light of such developments in the early fifties as the post-Stalin change in the international Communist movement, the relaxation of international tension due to the Korean truce, the success of the five-point peace principle on the international scene, and a shift in Japan's attitude toward China under the Hatoyama and Ishibashi Administrations.

After the Korean truce agreement in 1953, Beijing began to act in concert with Moscow to deal with Japan in a markedly different manner, stressing the importance of normalizing intergovernmental relations with Japan, and earnestly calling for contacts between China and Japan by arguing that time was ripe for a rapprochement. In a Sino-Soviet joint declaration signed in October 1954, Beijing and Moscow reaffirmed this approach, which subsequently became the basis of their policy toward Japan at that time.

In the fall of 1954, Japanese notables in various walks of life were invited to People's Republic Day celebrations in Beijing while Madame Li Dequan of the Chinese Red Cross visited Japan. Contacts between the two countries thus made considerable headway.

This flexibility in Beijing's attitude toward Japan was symbolized by the fact that Premier Zhou Enlai, asked by Japanese newsmen if they were right in assuming that abrogation of the Chinese (Taiwan)-Japanese Peace Treaty was not necessarily a precondition for expediting a normalization of relations between China (Beijing) and Japan but should be viewed as a goal or a result of such a process, replied: "That won't make much difference."<sup>67</sup>

Of course, this Chinese attitude toward Japan reflected not only the Sino-Soviet intention at that time of undermining Japan's reliance on the U.S. but also the fact that China's



internal and external circumstances then tended to be stable and relaxed. In other words, it was a reflection of the Bandung Line followed by the Chinese Communists.

Beijing's calls for a rapprochement based on these motives, however, were not met with wholehearted response from Tokyo. The Hatoyama Administration, inclined to refrain from any speech or action that might provoke Beijing, held the attitude of a bystander watching private Sino-Japanese contacts, and took no steps to meet Beijing's expectations. The Ishibashi Administration that came into being in December 1956 was warmly welcomed by the Chinese Communists, but did not last long. The Kishi Administration that followed was looked upon with growing suspicion by the Chinese.

Beijing further hardened its attitude toward Japan as Premier Kishi visited six Southeast Asian countries and the U.S. in May-June 1957. In Taiwan, especially, he expressed support for the Chiang Kaishek regime and stressed Japanese-Taiwan cooperation.


Moreover, all this happened at a time when a critical turn took place in Beijing's domestic policy -- the shift from the "Let All Flowers Bloom, Let All Schools Contend" campaign to a national crusade against the right-wing forces. This had decisive influence to bear on Beijing's subsequent attitude toward Japan, which invariably reflected China's foreign policy swerve away from the Bandung Line.

# NOTES

See

1. Mao Zedong, "Build Stable Base Areas in the Northwest" (December 28, 1945) in op.cit., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, (Beijing, Renmin Publishing House, 1960)  
Also see a signed article by Yan Zhongchuan in Wenhuibao (Hong Kong), May 11, 1969.
2. Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", op. cit., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, p. 1436,
3. Mao Zedong, "Address at the Preliminary Meeting of the New Political Consultative Council", op. cit., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, p. 1470,
4. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and Communist China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973),
5. For an elaborate study of this historic Stuart-Huang Hua negotiations, see Shigeru Usami, "Suchuato Taishi no Pekin Homon Keikaku: Ushinawareta Rekishi no Tenkanten (Ambassador Stuart's Plan to Visit Beijing: A Lost Turning Point in History)", Kokusai Mondai, No. 198 (September 1976).
6. Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship:

In Commemoration of the 28th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party", op. cit., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV, pp. 1477-1478,

7. An ideologue in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution and an important member of the Cultural Revolution Group, Qi Benyu later went down as a "left-wing extremist". He said: "A handful of antirevolutionary revisionists, and the greatest group of technocrats in the Party backing them up and following the road to capitalism /referring to Liu Shaoqi -- by this author/, yielded to the pressure of imperialism, dreamed of compromising with imperialism, and counted on getting 'sympathy' and 'assistance' from imperialism..... They spoke eagerly for the reactionary, thoroughly traitorous film, 'A Hidden History of the Qin Palace', actually  in open defiance of Chairman Mao's criticism of Acheson's 'White Paper', thus making a frantic attack on Maoism." (Qi Banyu, "Patriotic or Traitorous?: Criticizing the Reactionary Film, 'A Hidden History of the Qin Palace'", The Hongqi (Red Flag), 5th issue, 1967, Japanese translation in Pekin Shuho, No. 15, 1967. Qi Banyu apparently suggests that there was a dispute between Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi in the Party over a policy of conciliation with the U.S. in 1949. But he ignores the fact that, as we have already seen, Mao himself



was gradually shifting in the direction of conciliation with the U.S. in March-June that year, and that Mao ventured on making a series of statements against the U.S. only after his "pro-Soviet leaning" declaration and the failure of the Huang Hua-Stuart negotiations.

8. Mao Zedong wrote "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle" on August 14, "Farewell, Leighton Stuart!" on August 18, "Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper" on August 28, "'Friendship' or Aggression" on August 30, and "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History" on September 16. These five anti-U.S. articles were all initially published as New China Agency editorials (all contained in op. cit., Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. IV)
9. The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), December 18, 1950.
10. On this point, See Mineo Nakajima, Chuso Tairitsu to Gendai: Sengo Ajia no Saikosatsu (The Sino-Soviet Confrontation and the Present Age: Reappraisal of the Postwar Asia) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1978, pp.93-95.
11. Chairman Mao Answers TASS Correspondent's Questions", The Renmin Ribao, January 3, 1950.
12. Op. cit., "Chairman Mao Answers TASS Correspondent's Questions".



13. Harrison E. Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969). pp. 105-106,
14. The Renmin Ribao (December 18, 1949), reporting Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union, mentioned "Professor Chen Boda" next to Chairman Mao. Known as the author of "The Four Great Families in China" and other books, Chen was then Vice President of the Party's Central Marxist-Leninist Academy (Alternate Member of the Central Committee, Deputy Director of the Central Propaganda Department of the Party). Incidentally, it is very noteworthy from the current point of view that Wang Dongxing (now Vice Chairman of the Party and Permanent Member of the Central Politburo) was mentioned at the bottom of the staff list as Mao's bodyguard.
15. The Renmin Ribao, January 22, 1950.
16. "Public Notice of China and the Soviet Union Concerning the Conclusion of a Treaty and Agreements Between China and the Soviet Union" (February 14, 1950), The Renmin Ribao, February 15, 1950. For the texts of the treaty and agreements, see Collected Foreign Relations Documents of the People's Republic of China, Vol. I (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Press, 1957),
17. Mao Zedong, "Address at the 10th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee" (September 24, 1962), Long Live

Maoism! ( August 1969).

18. The Renmin Ribao, March 5, 1950.
19. "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance", op. cit., Collected Foreign Relations Documents of the Republic of China", Vol. I, p. 75, Japanese translation, op. cit., Shin Chugoku Shiryo Shusei, Vol. III, p. 54.
20. Harrison E. Salisbury, op. cit., p. 106,
21. Strobe Talbott ( transl. 8ed.), Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston:Little,Brown & Co., 1974).
22. Mao Zedong, "Summary of the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Committee Secretaries" (January 1957), op. cit., Long Live Maoism!,
23. Mao Zedong, "Address at the Chengdu Conference" (March 1958), ibid.,
24. In China, the long-awaited Volume V of Selected Works of Mao Zedong was published in April 1977 (Renmin Publishing House). Compiled by the CCP Central "Chairman Mao Zedong's Works Editing and Publishing Committee", the fifth volume contains papers, speeches and other works written by Mao between September 21, 1949, and November 18, 1957. But "Chairman Mao Answers TASS Correspondent's Questions" and other statements quoted in this book concerning Sino-Soviet relations and dealings with Stalin are all

excluded. "Summary of the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Committee Secretaries" (January 1957) contained in Long Live Maoism! are found in the fifth volume under the title, "Speech at the Conference of Provincial and Municipal Autonomous District Party Committee Secretaries" (January 1957). Containing references to "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools Contend!" and Information News as well as to Sino-Soviet relations, the new text has much in common with the old in Long Live Maoism!, but is considerably different in content from the latter, not containing Mao's reference to his argument with Stalin over the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

25. This Mikoyan speech was carried in full in The Renmin Ribao on February 22, 1956.
26. This subject has been covered in the following study:  
Kang Chao and Feng-hwa Mah, "A Study of the Rouble-Yuan Exchange Rate", The China Quarterly, No. 17 (January-March 1964).
27. "Implications of the Treaty of Alliance and Related Agreements between the Soviet Union and Communist China: Address by the Secretary of State, March 15, 1950 /excerpt/", U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955, Vol. II (New York: Arno Press,



- 1971), p. 2466.
28. "Remarks by Delegate Long Yun", Minutes of the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (Beijing, Renmin Publishing House, 1957), p. 143, Japanese translation, Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo - Chugoku Bukai (ed.), Shin Chugoku Shiryo Shusei, Vol. V (Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 1971), p. 452.
29. O. B. Borisov, and B. T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973: A Brief History, Engl. transl. from the Russian by Yuri Shirokov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 113.
30. San Yuan, Mao Zedong's Thoughts and Sino-Soviet Relations (Hong Kong, Xinda Publishing House, 1972), p. 22. The speeches of the Chinese and Soviet representatives (Zhou Enlai and Vishinsky) at the treaty signing ceremony were compared to find signs of disharmony between the two countries in the following study: John Gittings, "The Origins of China's Foreign Policy" in David Horowitz (ed.), Containment and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), p. 209.
31. For a more extended analysis on the international background of the Korean War, see Mineo Nakajima, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Its roots in the International Background



- of the Korean War" The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, January 1979, Issue Number I
32. NSC-48/1, December 23, 1949, NSC Papers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Archives); NSC-48-2, December 30, 1949, ibid.; NSC-68, April 14, 1950, ibid.
33. "Long Yun daibiao de fayan" (Remarks of Delegate Long Yun), Zhenghua Renmin Congheguo diyijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui disici huiyi huikan (Minutes of the Fourth Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Renmin Publishing House, 1957 ), p.1402-1403.
34. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hongqi (Red Flag) editors, "Zai zhanzheng yu heping wenti de liangtiao luxian: Wu ping Su Gong zhongyang de gongkai xin" (Two different Lines on the Question of War and Peace: Comment on the Open Letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU /5/), The Renmin Ribao, November 19, 1963.
35. "Chong Gong zhongyang yijiuliusi nian er yue ershijiu ri gei Su Gong zhongyang de xin" (Letter of the Central Committee of the CCP to the Central Committee of the CPSU), February 29, 1964.
36. The Mainichi Shinbun, January 26, 1972, report from

Correspondent Ando.

37. Toitsu Nippo (Tokyo), April 29, 1976.

38. Immediately before that, Chairman Gao Gang of the Dongbei People's Government had visited Moscow in July 1949 on Stalin's invitation, independently of the CCP Central Committee, and signed a "Trade Agreement Between the Dongbei and the Soviet Union".

For a detailed discussion about Gao Gang Affair and Sino-Soviet Relations, see Mineo Nakajima, "The Kao Kang Affair and Sino-Soviet Relations," Review March 1977 (No. 44), Japan Institute of International Affairs.

39. Tami Torii, Mo Takuto Itsutsu no Senso: Chugoku Gendaishi Ron (Mao Zedong's Five Wars: A Study of Contemporary Chinese History) (Soshi Sha, 1970), p. 38. Torii's conjecture about Beijing's motives in intervening in Korea is one of the few predecessors of this author's opinion.

40. Of course, this fact was not made public. See Strobe Talbott (transl. & ed.), op. cit., pp. 371-372,

41. Edgar Snow, The Other Side of the River: Red China Today (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 654-655,

42. Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p.263.
43. John Gittings, "The Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", The China Quarterly, No. 39 (July-September 1969).
44. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korea War (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), p.45.
45. "Kim Il-sung's Radio Speech on the Outbreak of the Korean War" (June 26, 1950),
46. Max Beloff, "Soviet Policy in the Far East 1944-1957" (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p.183.
47. "Ge minzhu dangpai lianhe xuyanyan" (Joint Declaration of the Democratic Parties) (November 1950), The Renmin Ribao, November 5, 1950,
48. Seiji Imabori, Chugoku Gendaishi Kenkyu Josetsu (An Introduction to the Study of Contemporary Chinese History) (Keiso Shobo, 1976, p.162-163.)
49. Mao Zedong, "Zai bajie shizhong quanhu shang de jianghua" (Talk at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP) (September 24, 1962), Mao Zedong sixiang wansui (Long Live Maoism!) (August 1969).

50. Otto Braun, Kitayskie zapiski (1932-1939) (Moskva: Politizdat, 1974), str. 214-216; and "Otto Buraun wa Kataru: Mo Takuto wa Ikani Kenryoku o Nigitta ka" (Otto Braun Speaks: How Mao Zedong Seized Power), Kyokuto no Shomondai, Vol. III, No. 2 (June 1974).
51. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations 1945-1973: A Brief History, Engl. transl. from the Russian by Yuri Shirokov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 117.
52. Views of this sort have been expressed in the following works: Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975), pp. 216ff,
53. A review of Sino-Soviet treaties, agreements, protocols, joint declarations, joint communiques and such other documents signed and made public somehow between the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in February 1950 and the Protocol of the 6th Session of the Scientific & Technological Cooperation Committee in July 1957 indicates that those preceding the Sino-Soviet negotiations in October 1954 number 29 including 24 signed or released in Moscow and only 3 in Beijing, with 2 in Harbin, whereas those dating



thereafter, including those involved in the negotiations, number 37, of which 12 were signed or released in Moscow and 22 in Beijing, with one in Port Arthur, one in Ulan Bator, and one released simultaneously in Moscow and Beijing. For a list of these agreements and other documents, see op. cit., Chuso Kankai no Hatten, <sup>1949-1958</sup> (Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1949-1958), pp. 7-11.

54. Strobe Talbott (transl. & ed.). Khrushchev Remembers (op. cit.,)
55. "PRC Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Report on the foreign policy at the 33th Meeting of the Committee of the Central People's Government." (April 19, 1955) Collected Foreign Relations Documents of the People's Republic of China, Vol.III. (Beijing : Shijie Zhishi Shubanshe, 1958)
56. "PRC Premier Chou En-lai's Speech at the Afro-Asian Conference." (August 11, 1954) *ibid.*, p. 243, p. 249.
- See
57. Mineo Nakajima, Gendai Chugoku Ron: Ideorogi to Seiji no Naiteki Kosatsu (On Contemporary China: An Internal Study of Ideology and Politics) (Aoki Shoten, 1964 /Expanded in 1971/), Chapter V, "Tenkanki Chugoku no Seiji Katei (The Political Process in China in a Transitional Period)".

58. "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", The Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), April 5, 1956.
59. People's Daily and Red Flag editors, "Again on the Stalin Issue: Again Criticizing the Public Statement of the CPUS Leadership", The Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1963, The Hongqi, 1963, No. 18.
60. For details on the CCP's reaction to de-Stalinization, see Mineo Nakajima, op. cit., after III, "'Sutarin Hihan' to Chugoku ('De-Stalinization' and China)".
61. Liu Shaoqi, "Political Report of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to the 8th National Congress" (September 15, 1956), The Renmin Ribao, September 17, 1956.
62. "Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", The Renmin Ribao, December 29, 1956.
63. For a more extended analysis of this movement, see Roderick MacFarquhar(ed.), The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Preager, 1960).
64. The slogan, "The east wind is overwhelming the west wind!" which was to be severely attacked by Moscow later in the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, was first presented by Mao Zedong when he analyzed the current international situation by referring to the old Chinese proverb, "Unless

the east wind overwhelms the west wind, the west wind will overwhelm the east wind." On that occasion, Mao said: ".....The Socialist camp should always have a head, which should be the Soviet Union. The Communist parties and labor parties of the various countries also should have a head, which should be the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The unity of the international Communist movement and the Soviet launching of two man-made satellites mark a new turning point in the power relationship between the two camps. Forty years has elapsed since the October Revolution created a new world, and its power has already exceeded that of the old. Today there are 2.7 billion people in the world. The population of the Socialist countries is now close to one billion, that of the newly-independent former colonies is over 700 million and that of the countries now on their way to independence or achieving complete independence is 600 million, whereas the population of the imperialist camp is only about 400 million. Moreover, they are split inside. At present, the west wind is not overwhelming the east wind, but the east wind is overwhelming the west wind." (Chairman Mao Zedong's Speech to Chinese Students and Trainees in Moscow: The Power of the New World Has Already Exceeded That of the Old", <sup>The</sup>Renmin Ribao, November 19, 1957) In thus



presenting the slogan, "The east wind is overwhelming the Soviet west wind". Mao made a point of stressing the leadership of the socialist camp. Moreover, the slogan was not mentioned in Mao's speech at the ceremonies in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1957, or in his speech at the Moscow Conference, but made its debut in his speech to a meeting of Chinese students and trainees in Moscow held on November 17 -- a rather private affair. These facts should be noted as they suggest that Mao thought it necessary to take considerable care in bringing up this slogan.

65. "Chinese Government Spokesman's Statement: Criticizing the Soviet Government Statement of August 21" (September 1, 1963), The Renmin Ribao, September 1, 1963.

66. Mineo Nakajima, op. cit.,

67. On the Sino-Japan relations for this period, see Mineo Nakajima, Chugoku: Rekishi, Shakai, Kokuzaikankei (China: History, Society and International Relations) (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Sha, 1982), pp. 203-215.